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This thesis explores frames communicated through Bahraini public diplomacy 
to foreign media and publics during three key moments of the 2011 crisis in 
Bahrain, and factors connected to the building of these frames. It employed 
qualitative frame analysis of public diplomacy texts published on Bahrain 
News Agency’s website during the first week of protests, the arrival of the 
Peninsula Shield Forces to Bahrain, and the publication of Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry report. It also used interviews with 
communicators from the Bahraini Information Affairs Authority to explore 
background processes of frame-building. This study contributes to research 
on the role of public diplomacy in co-constructing specific versions of reality in 
government messages during crises. It offers an example of Arab government 
practice of public diplomacy and framing in the Arab Spring. The research also 
employs Benoit’s (1995) image repair theory and Shoemaker and Reese’s 
(1996) model to explore crisis response strategies represented by the frames, 
and frame-building processes.  
The research finds that most of the analysed frames denied a crisis, while 
other frames addressed it yet externalised its causes. Denying an internal 
crisis started in absence of decision making, and lack of crisis experience and 
preparedness. It then became connected to promotion of positive news to 
contest foreign media’s coverage, and maintain the authorities’ power status.   
This research suggests the Bahraini government’s responses are similar to 
how nations usually respond to crises, especially not admitting responsibility 
for wrongdoing. Rather, public diplomacy is used as a tool by the government 
to maintain its power position. The thesis suggests this crisis is a turning point 
in Bahrain’s practice of public diplomacy, especially in paying more attention 
to how it can further assure the promotion of messages that maintain the 
authorities’ power position among foreign publics.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
  
  
In February 2011, a series of controversial protests started in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, with demands ranging from economic reforms to a regime overthrow 
(Goldstone, 2011, p. 16). Besides the critical situation on ground which 
triggered riots and sectarian social tensions (Karolak, 2012; 2014), the 
Bahraini authorities were challenged by negative publicity in foreign media 
with accusations of human rights’ breaches and violence against the 
protestors (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011; Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). 
Besides these accusations, several international news media outlets 
presented the Bahraini protests with strong connections to security issues, civil 
unrest, and sectarian conflict (Govers, 2012). This clashed with the Bahraini 
authorities’ efforts to reflect a reformed and business-friendly image of the 
nation among foreign publics (Govers, 2012, p. 52; Karolak, 2012, p. 4; 
Karolak, 2014, p. 97; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 1; Wright, 2008, p, 12). A further 
challenge to the Bahraini authorities at that time is the fact that the Bahraini 
protests coincided with upheavals in other Arab countries, widely referred to 
across foreign media as the ‘Arab Spring’ – a reference which presents the 
Arab protests as revolutions by oppressed people against dictatorships 
(Maguire & Vickers, 2013).  
The account of the presentation of the Bahraini crisis varies widely 
among different relevant actors (Karolak, 2012, p. 186). Previous studies 
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discuss how this crisis was presented by several relevant actors, such as 
international media outlets (Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Bowe & Hoewe, 2011), 
YouTube users (Al-Rawi, 2015), and senior UK politicians (Maguire & Vickers, 
2013). What remains to be explored, however, is how the Bahraini government 
responded to this negative publicity in its public diplomacy messages to foreign 
media and publics.   
This thesis explores the frames communicated through Bahraini public 
diplomacy messages to foreign media and publics during three key moments 
of the 2011 crisis in Bahrain, and examines the factors connected to frame-
building processes during the crisis. This framework aims to deliver insights 
on the role of public diplomacy in framing messages targeted at foreign media 
and publics to communicate specific versions of reality during a crisis and its 
aftermath. 
Public diplomacy is understood here as “efforts by the government of 
one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose 
of turning the policy of the target nation to advantage” (Manheim, 1994, p. 4 in 
Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 448). I focus my research on public diplomacy 
activities during the Bahraini crisis because, in crises, public diplomacy is a 
significant communication activity used by governments to mitigate a crisis 
situation especially in relation to foreign publics (Olsson, 2013). Crises are also 
critical events for the practice of public diplomacy because they create the 
need for prompt and unplanned communication with public groups the 
government never dealt with before (ibid). Furthermore, crises create contests 
 12  
  
between different actors (e.g. governments; protestors; the media) to define 
the situation at hand from their own perspective, and to promote such 
definitions to relevant members of the public (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). My 
research focuses on the role of Bahraini public diplomacy in communicating 
(or representing) specific versions of reality of the examined crisis by 
specifically looking at messages produced by people communicating on behalf 
of the government of Bahrain. 
While my research offers insights on versions of reality promoted by the 
Bahraini government during the examined crisis, it also contributes to limited 
academic debates on public diplomacy in Arab countries and in Bahrain in 
particular. In addition, my research offers an example of Arab government 
engagement in public diplomacy in the context of the Arab Spring. The 
significance of this refers to the limited research on Arab governments’ framing 
during the Arab Spring comparing to the focus on the framing by foreign news 
media (e.g. Du, 2016; Guzman, 2016), and the major focus on Western state 
and non-state actors’ engagement in public diplomacy during the Arab Spring 
(Cofelice , 2016; Golan , 2013; Samei, 2015; YliKaitala, 2014).   
My research also contributes to public diplomacy literature by shifting 
attention in public diplomacy frame-building research to the factors connected 
to the articulation of public diplomacy frames in public diplomacy texts. 
Although limited, public diplomacy literature shows interest by a number of 
scholars to examine how different actors frame different issues through public 
diplomacy activities in a crisis context (e.g. Entman, 2008; Jungblut, 2017; 
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Melki & Jabado, 2016; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Sheafer et al., 2014; Yarchi et 
al., 2013; Zhang, 2006). Their work delivers insights on how state and non-
state actors who engage in public diplomacy promote specific frames to 
foreign media, and what factors contribute to the success or failure of public 
diplomats’ efforts to promote their preferred frames to foreign media. 
Nevertheless, this does not offer insights on the factors connected to the 
articulation of frames produced by public diplomacy communicators and not 
journalists. Whether or how the Bahraini government’s frames appear in 
foreign media content is beyond the focus of this thesis. Rather, my research 
focuses on factors of influence related to the articulation of public diplomacy 
frames about the crisis in content produced by professional communicators 
and not journalists.   
Another contribution of my research to this area is extending 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model of influence on media 
content to study frame-building in public diplomacy. It is a media research 
model that offers a framework to organise our understanding of frame-building 
factors at five different levels: individual, professional, organisational, external, 
and ideological. Using this model in the current study also responds to 
academic calls to use multidisciplinary approaches to study public diplomacy, 
which should help us understand how public diplomacy works (Fitzpatrick, 
2007, p. 211; Gilboa, 2008, p. 75).  
Besides Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model, another significant 
framework employed in my research is Benoit’s (1995) image repair theory 
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(IRT). Drawing on Western contexts, this theory offers a list of different crisis 
response strategies. The role of the IRT in the current study is to understand 
what crisis response strategies are reflected in the analysed Bahraini public 
diplomacy messages to foreign media and publics during the 2011 crisis, and 
how these are related to frames identified in these messages. Note that the 
use of the term ‘strategy’ does not necessarily involve a strategic intent by the 
Bahraini government or its communicators to represent a specific response 
strategy in the analysed texts. This highlights the significance of employing 
both the IRT and Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model in this research, as it 
has potential in delivering insights on the factors connected to the articulation 
of public diplomacy frames that depict specific crisis response strategies, and 
exploring whether the presence of certain frames in the analysed texts 
involved strategic intents or not. 
As stated earlier, I focus my exploration of Bahraini public diplomacy 
frames on three key moments of the 2011 crisis, and these are: the first week 
of protests (14-19 February 2011), the arrival of the Peninsula Shield forces 
(PSF) to Bahrain (14-16 March 2011), and the publication of the Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report (23-25 November 2011).   
The first key moment covers the first week of protests across different 
areas of Bahrain, which started on 14 February marking the 10th Anniversary 
of the National Action Charter (NAC). The NAC is a political document which 
constitutes the roadmap for comprehensive national reforms in the country (Al-
Hasan, 2015), which was endorsed by 98.4% of Bahraini voters in a national 
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referendum that took place on 14 February 2001. The protests started by 
demanding social, political, and economic reforms, suggesting that reforms 
promised in 2001 were not delivered. This increased to demands for regime 
overthrow when the death of protestors after clashes with security forces at an 
early stage of the crisis radicalised the protests, escalated the level of violence, 
and increased negative publicity against the Bahraini authorities across foreign 
media (Govers, 2012).  
The second examined moment focuses on the arrival of the PSF, a joint 
military force among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, to Bahrain 
on 14 March 2011. The period between 20 February and 13 March 2011 
marked a relatively calm phase of the Bahraini 2011 crisis (BICI, 2011, p. 126). 
However, 13 March was a turning point as levels of security, law and order 
dropped considerably across Bahrain (ibid). Vandalism of private and public 
properties, assault against individuals, and sectarian clashes were recorded. 
Further, negotiations between the government and the opposition to start the 
national dialogue reached an end. At this point, the King of Bahrain, Hamad 
bin Isa Al-Khalifa decided that Bahrain needed military help from GCC 
members to protect Bahrain from what they believed was possible Iranian 
interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs. The arrival of the troops was 
controversial. As the authorities considered it a strategic measure against 
potential foreign threat, the opposition viewed the arrival of the PSF as illegal 
use of GCC troops to confront popular demands (BICI, 2011, p. 387). Iranian 
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media, as well, presented it as a “massacre” against Bahraini civilians (Belfer, 
2014).   
   The third examined key moment focuses on the publication of BICI 
report. The BICI was established after the crisis had subsided to investigate 
any human rights’ breaches during February and March 2011. The 
establishment of BICI in July 2011 was considered by Western officials as 
progress in the situation in Bahrain (Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). “Such inquiry 
has not been attempted previously in Bahrain or elsewhere.” (Weatherby & 
Longworth, 2011, p. 91) The Bahraini authorities aspired to achieve image 
recovery through this initiative, but it resulted in a more challenging situation 
in November 2011, when BICI report confirmed violations of human rights by 
some members of the security forces.  
As indicated earlier, it is significant to note that the Bahraini crisis 
coincided with public demonstrations in other Arab countries, which were 
widely presented in foreign media as the ‘Arab Spring’ (Avraham, 2015). The 
King of Bahrain rejected the reference to the protests in his country as another 
‘Arab Spring’ (Pinto, 2014), especially as this reference presents the Arab 
demonstrations as revolutions by oppressed people against dictatorships 
(Maguire & Vickers, 2013), and an outbreak of democratic change in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Joffe, 2011, p. 507). It also provokes sympathy 
and support for the protesters (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1365). Therefore, 
the perception of Arab demonstrations as ‘Arab Spring’ legitimises regime 
overthrows and urgent international military intervention as valid solutions to 
help protestors bring down what was perceived as oppressive regimes 
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(Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 129). The causes of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ are portrayed as accumulated political and economic tensions and 
challenges that have not been resolved by Arab leaders but, instead, artificially 
repressed in the search for stability for their power position and authority 
(Joffe, 2011, p. 508). Note that the success of upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia, 
which were widely framed as ‘Arab Spring’, managed to draw international 
attention to the Bahraini protests (Karolak, 2012, p. 180). As the Bahraini 
authorities worked on rebranding the country as a reformed nation since 2000 
(Govers, 2012, p. 52; Karolak, 2012, p. 4; Karolak, 2014, p. 97; Ulrichsen, 
2013, p. 1; Wright, 2008, p, 12); associations with the Arab Spring can threaten 
not only Bahrain’s efforts to appear in the international arena as a reformed 
nation but also the legitimacy of its political system.  
Bahrain’s political system is based on the principle of tribal hereditary 
monarchy since Al-Khalifa family ruled the country in the eighteenth century. 
Yet, efforts established by King Hamad to change the country form a state to 
a kingdom when he accessed the throne in 2000 introduced several reforms 
that guaranteed further political rights for the citizens (Al-Hasan, 2015). For 
instance, the reforms included the return of parliamentary elections after about 
25 years of being stopped (ibid; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 2). Noteworthy is the fact 
that these reforms did not only aim to enhance Bahrain’s reputation 
internationally; as they were also targeted at the Bahraini society which is 
usually discussed with sectarian connotations (Karolak, 2012). While the 
examined protests may be new to Bahrain in terms of number of participants 
and impact on security levels; there had been sporadic political protests on 
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and off since the country’s independence from Britain in 1971, especially by 
Shiite citizens. Al-Khalifa features a Sunni royal family in a country with highly 
sectarian demographic structure. Segments of the Shiite community always 
accused the government of favouring the Sunni population both socially and 
in access to jobs (ibid, p. 181). This suggests that foreign media accusations 
of human rights’ breaches can be more threatening to Bahrain’s image when 
they are associated with a history of political protests demanding reforms. 
Thus; in the discussion of the Bahraini crisis it is significant to consider the 
sectarian aspect of the Bahraini society and the problematic situation in other 
Arab countries framed across foreign media as the ‘Arab Spring’. With this 
rejection of the ‘Arab Spring’ frame by Bahraini authorities (Pinto, 2014), my 
research examines how the Bahraini government presented the crisis to 
foreign media and publics during the aforementioned three key moments.   
In my exploration of frames, I study public diplomacy texts published in 
news format on the English website of Bahrain News Agency (BNA). The BNA 
is not an independent news agency – it is a state-owned governmental news 
agency that was responsible for publishing government messages during the 
examined crisis. The BNA worked under the management of the Bahraini 
Information Affairs Authority (IAA) which was the main governmental entity 
responsible for official communications in Bahrain during the crisis. The IAA 
represented the ministry of information in Bahrain, but it functioned as 
‘Authority’ from 2010 until 2014 when a royal decree changed its title to the 
Ministry of Information Affairs. During that time, the CEO of the IAA still had a 
rank of a minister in the Bahraini government and was directly appointed by 
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the king. Hence, the IAA represented the main communication authority in the 
Bahraini government, and currently functions as a Ministry of Information 
Affairs. When discussing the roles of IAA and BNA as government entities in 
Bahrain, it is worth noting that the king assigns and dismisses the prime 
minister, meaning that the Bahraini government is not elected. Note too that 
the prime minister in Bahrain is in charge since Bahrain’s independence from 
Britain in 1971. This, in addition to the fact he is the King’s uncle generated 
criticism against the political system in Bahrain, especially when it comes to 
the application of democratic approaches of assembling a government 
(Wright, 2008), and Bahrain’s efforts to present an image of a reformed nation 
in the international arena. Further, the king exercises his powers directly and 
through his ministers, and ministers are jointly answerable to the king for 
general government policy (Constitution of Bahrain, 2002, p. 16). Hence, 
although the IAA and BNA are government communication platforms, its 
connections with the leadership should be considered when discussing its 
different functions and responses during the examined timeframes.   
It is worth mentioning the IAA did not have a devoted department 
responsible for public diplomacy or used the ‘public diplomacy’ label. In 
December 2016 a royal decree was issued to establish and organise the 
‘National Communication Centre’ under the management of the IAA. One of 
the centre’s expected tasks is to handle public diplomacy, including in times of 
crises. The centre is not fully functioning yet. And to date, none of the centre’s 
tasks of communicating with foreign publics is titled using the ‘public 
diplomacy’ label (alwatannews, 2017; alwasatnews, 2016). Instead of a 
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department specifically devoted to public diplomacy, government (IAA) 
communications targeted at foreign media and publics were carried out 
through the BNA, and the External Relations Directorate. BNA’s 
communications with foreign publics were practiced within a media relations 
aspect of public diplomacy, while External Relations’ work focused on issuing 
permissions for foreign journalists to enter Bahrain. Thus, despite engaging 
with foreign publics, External Relations were not involved in frame-building of 
government messages (Interviewee 2). Another form of communicating with 
foreign public was through the Directorate of Public Relations, but this had a 
marketing role to promote the IAA programmes and channels, and therefore 
was not engaged in frame-building of the crisis responses either (I2). As the 
IAA was the main official entity for government communications, the role of the 
BNA as part of this Authority was to work as the initial source for Bahraini 
affairs news.  
I focus my study on two main research questions. The first question 
explores frames present in public diplomacy texts published in news format on 
BNA’s English website during the three examined key moments. Within the 
first research question, I explore how these frames are reflected across the 
analysed texts and the examined key moments; whether the frames were 
unique or consistent through the examined key moments; and how the 
analysed frames represent specific crisis response strategies. The second 
research question focuses on the background processes and factors 
connected to frame-building during the 2011 crisis and its aftermath. By 
answering this question I seek to explore how public diplomacy activities at the 
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IAA/BNA frame and communicate their interpretations of the examined 
context, which potentially contribute to the co-construction of specific versions 
of reality during the crisis and its aftermath. 
To systematically answer the research questions I employ two qualitative 
research methods. The main method is qualitative frame analysis of news 
items published on BNA’s English website during the three key timeframes 
discussed earlier. The supplemental method is in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with selected IAA communicators engaged in message 
development and/or news writing during the crisis. The thesis does not aim to 
find generalizations on public diplomacy in the Arab world or even Bahrain. 
The purpose is to provide in-depth understanding of how Bahraini public 
diplomacy communications targeted at foreign media and publics work at a 
time of a national crisis, and how these activities offer specific versions of 
reality in government messages.  
To further discuss the concepts and frameworks employed in this project, 
the next chapter (chapter 2: Literature Review) starts with reviewing public 
diplomacy literature. It discusses how, under intense Western and North 
American focus, it has been conceptualised from realist and liberalist world 
views until the 9/11 attacks that yielded the concept of ‘new public diplomacy’. 
New public diplomacy emphasises twoway symmetrical communication and 
relationship building which encouraged further public diplomacy research 
using the functionalist paradigm in public relations. Thus, the chapter 
discusses functionalism in public relations, the main critiques of this approach, 
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and why the social constructivist paradigm is employed instead. The chapter 
also reviews framing literature to justify the significance of employing frame 
analysis, especially because framing provides a significant framework to 
examine how public diplomacy texts promote certain interpretations of an 
issue over others. This can be used as framework to understand how certain 
interpretations of the examined crisis are promoted through Bahraini public 
diplomacy messages during specific timeframes of the crisis. The chapter also 
further discusses Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model and how it is 
extended to a public diplomacy context in this study, and reviews research on 
frame-building in public diplomacy. The chapter also discusses crisis 
communication from a social constructivist view and the role of Benoit’s (1995) 
‘image repair theory’ (IRT) in this thesis.   
 After that, chapter 3: Methodology, discusses the philosophical approach 
to research employed in this project and the research design and methods. It 
highlights the role of the social constructivist paradigm in the study, including 
the idealist ontological and interpretivist epistemological stands. It details the 
methods used in the project, explaining each method’s purpose, sample, and 
analysis procedure. The chapter also justifies the selected timeframes 
examined in this study.   
Chapter 4 presents the findings and discussion of the frame analysis. It 
highlights the presence of six issue-specific frames in the analysed news: 
‘reform’; ‘events’; ‘supported leadership’; ‘existential threat’; ‘sovereignty’; and 
‘unprecedented achievement’. The chapter also investigates connections 
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between the frames and the most common crisis response strategies offered 
by the IRT to deliver insights on Bahraini public diplomacy responses to the 
crisis.  The analysis of frames and the image repair strategies they represent 
suggest that Bahraini public diplomacy messages to foreign media and public 
during the examined crisis tend not to address a crisis situation, and even 
when they do, it externalises the causes of the crisis instead of addressing any 
internal (national) problematic issues causing a crisis. Such public diplomacy 
messages are similar to common responses of nations in crises, where crisis 
responses do not normally address responsibility for wrongdoing (Benoit, 
1997; Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 216). Instead, public diplomacy is used as a 
power tool in the hand of the sponsoring government to maintain its power 
position (Zhang & Swartz, 2009).   
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of data generated from interviews with five 
Bahraini communicators who were engaged in writing content for the BNA’s 
website and/or decision making on messaging during the examined crisis. The 
interview analysis uses Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model to 
organise understanding of factors connected to the construction of frames in 
the background at five levels: individual; professional; organisational; external; 
and ideological. It also highlights how these levels interact rather than work in 
isolation, and explores the level of strategic intent in promoting certain frames 
in government messages. The analysis argues that the communication of 
frames that tend not to address a crisis started in a context of absent decision 
making by senior officials at the Bahraini government, and lack of crisis 
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experience and preparedness. In a matter of days, it became more connected 
to a strategic choice of promoting positive news to contest unfavourable 
coverage across foreign media. On the other hand, externalising the causes 
of the crisis when it was addressed is connected to government 
representatives’ tendency to redefine the situation without reference to any of 
the internal causes of the crisis, with a background of ideological tensions 
between Bahraini and Iranian authorities.    
Considering both analyses, the research argues in the final chapter 
(chapter 6: Conclusion) the Bahraini government did not consider the 
significance of crisis public diplomacy before the examined protests. It 
suggests the examined crisis could be a turning point for Bahraini public 
diplomacy, where it devotes more attention to the criticality of communicating 
with foreign publics, and utilising public diplomacy to mitigate crises. This does 
not suggest that the Bahraini government did not engage with foreign media 
and publics before the crisis. Rather, it suggests the crisis was a key factor in 
changing how public diplomacy is practiced in Bahrain, especially in terms of 
devoting more efforts to assure the promotion of public diplomacy messages 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
  
1. CHAPTER OVERVIEW   
  
This project examines the frames communicated through Bahraini public 
diplomacy messages during three key moments of the 2011 crisis in Bahrain, 
and the factors connected to their articulation. It aims to deliver insights on 
frame-building process and construction of messages by public diplomacy 
professionals that promote a specific version of reality, which potentially might 
influence co-construction of specific social realities around the Bahraini crisis 
and its aftermath.  This chapter reviews theoretical frameworks that inform this 
study focusing on the frames reflected in government news items published 
during the crisis and the factors related to the production of such frames.  
The chapter contains five main sections. The following section (2) 
focuses on public diplomacy and is divided into 3 main subcategories. Section 
2.1 reviews public diplomacy definitions and goals to highlight how it is 
understood in this thesis as a political information activity rather than a cultural 
communication activity to build relationships with foreign publics. As political 
information in public diplomacy relies heavily on the use of media platforms to 
inform foreign publics, section 2.2 focuses on the conceptualisations of media 
role in public diplomacy. This is followed by, in section 2.3, a discussion on 
three different conceptualisations of public diplomacy in general. It highlights 
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how the conceptualisation of public diplomacy started mostly within a realist 
school, before the emergence of liberalist viewpoint, and how it is recently 
revitalized under the heading of ‘new public diplomacy’, where two-way 
symmetrical communication and balanced relations are emphasised.   
 While public diplomacy’s literature offers studies from several theoretical 
perspectives; the literature is still dominated by functionalist approaches that 
evaluate the effectiveness of public diplomacy activities. For instance, the 
concept of ‘new public diplomacy’ stemmed additional interest in the study of 
public diplomacy using the concepts of two-way symmetrical communication 
and mutually beneficial relations, which are widely researched in functionalist 
public relations literature. Section 3.1 discusses the functionalist approaches 
transferred from public relations to public diplomacy to understand how these 
dominant approaches work, and the general critique of this approach. This is 
followed, in section 3.2 by a discussion on the social constructivist approach 
in public relations to illustrate how public diplomacy is examined here from a 
social constructivist viewpoint. It also presents the constructivist paradigm as 
the most prominent approach to achieve this research’s goals of delivering 
insights on public diplomacy and its potential contribution to co-construction of 
specific versions of reality during a crisis and its aftermath.  
  After this, section 4 reviews the concept of ‘framing’, which is utilised 
here to examine public diplomacy messages from a social constructivist 
viewpoint. Framing is argued to have potential in public relations’ research to 
systematically examine what versions of perceived reality are communicated 
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in texts written by public relations or public diplomacy practitioners. A social 
constructivist approach to framing aims to highlight the multiplicity of frames 
communicated by several actors about a specific issue, and talks about 
framing as symbolic power and how this works in the ‘frame contests’ arena. 
It also suggests that a text contains sets of “interpretive packages” that consist 
of a set of elements that support and reinforce each other to give meaning to 
an issue (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 398). It is employed in this project to 
specifically examine the frames communicated by the Bahraini government 
(IAA/BNA) during the 2011 crisis, with the aim of understanding what versions 
of reality were promoted through Bahraini public diplomacy at the time.  
After this, section 4.2 reviews research focusing on the construction and 
articulation of frames (frame-building and frame-setting) in a public diplomacy 
context. It highlights how this line of research mainly focuses on examining the 
factors that contribute to the success or failure of public diplomacy frames to 
appear in foreign media’s content. However, my research does not aim to 
investigate whether or how Bahraini public diplomacy frames were adopted by 
foreign media or other actors. Rather, my aim is to deliver insights on the 
factors and background processes connected to the construction and 
articulation of specific frames (frame-building) in online content produced by 
Bahraini public diplomacy communicators themselves and not journalists. 
Therefore, section 4.3 argues the potential of extending Shoemaker & Reese’s 
(1996) hierarchal model of influence on media content to a public diplomacy 
context. This theory is used in my research as a framework to understand the 
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factors related to the articulation of Bahraini public diplomacy frames during 
the 2011 crisis at five levels: individual; professional, organisational; external; 
and ideological.    
To deliver insights on academic discussions on the framing of the 
Bahraini crisis, section 4.4 discusses framing studies focusing on the 
examined crisis. It highlights the existence of handful of studies that look into 
the framing of the Bahraini crisis by different actors. Yet, none of these studies 
specifically focuses on governments or government frames. This section also 
highlights how insights from these studies are employed in the frame analysis 
in my thesis. Then, section 4.5 reviews available studies on the wider 
problematic context that coincided with the examined Bahraini crisis, known 
as the ‘Arab Spring’. It delivers insights on how this phenomenon was 
approached form frame-building and public diplomacy perspectives.   
As my research looks at public diplomacy activities in a crisis situation, 
section 5 focuses on crisis communication. Section 5.1 highlights how crises 
are understood from a social constructivist perspective, and presents the 
significance of public diplomacy during crises. Section 5.2 discusses Benoit’s 
(1997) image repair theory and its role in this thesis. And, finally, section 5.3 
discusses crises response in different national contexts.  
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2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY   
 2.1.  Definitions and Goals  
Public diplomacy can be understood traditionally as “government 
communication aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the ‘hearts 
or minds’ of the people”  
(Szondi, 2008, p. 6). The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined by the retired 
American diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965 (Vela & Xifra, 2015, p. 85). He 
defines it as follows:    
Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the 
formation and implementation of foreign policies. It includes 
dimensions of international relations beyond those of traditional 
diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other 
countries; private interests and groups interacting between 
countries […]. In public diplomacy, the transnational flow of 
information and ideas is key.  
Gullion’s definition highlights the foundations of understanding public 
diplomacy as specifically government communication function targeted at 
audiences in another nation. More recent definitions of public diplomacy draw 
attention to the difference between public and traditional diplomacy. Castells 
(2008 in Vela & Xifra, 2015, p. 85), for example, states:   
Public diplomacy is not propaganda. And it is not government 
diplomacy. We do not need to use a new concept to define the 
traditional practices of diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the 
diplomacy of public opinion, that is, the projection of the values and 
ideas of the general public in the international arena.   
The above definition suggests that, as communications in the 
international arena are no longer mere communication between governments 
at a state level (traditional diplomacy), there is a shift toward public, citizen 
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level diplomacy (public diplomacy) (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006, p. 436). The 
definition also suggests that “public diplomacy is not propaganda” while, 
among practitioners and scholars, one of the longest-running debates about 
public diplomacy is whether it should be related to propaganda (Kelley, 2009, 
p. 75). For example, Millissen (2005, p. 11) states that public diplomacy is 
more than a form of propaganda practiced by diplomats. Conversely, 
according to Cull (2009, p. 19), Gullion’s coinage of the term ‘public diplomacy’ 
in 1965 is a fresh start of an established term: propaganda, which had 
accumulated many negative connotations being understood as “the deliberate 
manipulation of information to achieve a desired result” (Scott-Smith, 2009, p. 
51). Gullion said he “would have liked to call ‘public diplomacy’ ‘propaganda’” 
because “it seemed the nearest thing in the pure interpretation of the word to 
what we were doing.” (Armstrong, 2009, p. 66) The reason that the term public 
diplomacy took off in 1965 was that there was a real need for such a concept 
in Washington, DC, where the United States Information Agency needed an 
alternative to the “malignant term propaganda: a fresh turn of phrase upon 
which it could build new and benign meanings” (Cull, 2009, p. 21). In my 
research, I adopt the argument that even if public diplomacy may not be 
equivalent to propaganda, there are instances where it has shown a 
propagandistic communication style (Kelley, 2009, p. 82; Pratkanis, 2009, p. 
111).            
Public diplomacy literature also offers definitions that differ based on 
the goal of engaging in public diplomacy, whether it is persuasion or mutual 
understanding. Manheim (1994, p. 4 in Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 448), for 
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instance, defines it as a persuasive form of communication stating it is “efforts 
by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second 
nation for the purpose of turning the policy of the target nation to advantage”. 
This definition is adopted in this thesis. Tuch’s (1990, p. 3 in Signitzer & 
Wamser, 2006, p. 438) definition, on the other hand, presents the goal of public 
diplomacy as building mutual understanding by stating “public diplomacy is a 
government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to 
bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and 
culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” These two goals work in-
line with distinctions between the ‘tough-minded’ and ‘tender-minded’ schools 
of public diplomacy- between ‘political information’ (persuasion) and ‘cultural 
communication’ (understanding) (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006, p. 438). The 
tough-minded school aims to influence attitudes of foreign publics by sharing 
hard political information through “fast media” like television, radio, and 
newspapers. According to Signitzer and Coombs (1992 in Snow, 2009, p. 9), 
the tough-minded school holds that the purpose of public diplomacy is to exert 
an influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and 
propaganda. On the other hand, the tender-minded view public diplomacy as 
long-term cultural function that should ideally create mutual understanding 
through “slow media” like academic exchanges (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006, p. 
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Figure 1. System of public diplomacy (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006, p. 439)  
 
The above classification lists media relations as an ‘informative’ form of 
communicating with foreign publics (government-to-people), while exchange 
programs are a form of building mutual understanding between foreign and 
domestic publics (people-to-people) (Signitzer& Wamser, 2006, p. 438). My 
study focuses on the media relations aspect of public diplomacy, and primarily 
examines the ‘information’ aspect instead of ‘building mutual understanding’ 
and relationships with foreign publics. It is worth noting, however, that the 
classification of cultural exchange as a ‘tender-minded’ approach to generate 
‘mutual understanding’ limits the understanding of the “real” goals of cultural 
public diplomacy which could also be ‘persuasive’ (L’Etang, 2006, p. 379). For 
example, a cultural agency funded by a government also has ‘tough-minded’ 
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‘persuasive’ goals behind its engagement in cultural events in another nation 
(ibid).    
As my research specifically focuses on the media relations aspect of 
public diplomacy, the next section further discusses the role of media in public 
diplomacy, with attention to the concept of ‘soft power’.   
 2.2.  Media and Soft Power in Public Diplomacy   
Public diplomacy employs different tools, the most important of which is 
media (Samei, 2015, p. 114). To illustrate the significance of media in public 
diplomacy, it is important to highlight a closely related concept to public 
diplomacy which is “soft power”. This term was coined by Joseph Nye, an 
American political scientist who defines it as “the ability to affect others to 
obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment” (Nye, 2008. p. 94). The concept of ‘soft power’ highlights that public 
diplomacy functions use soft power resources (e.g. nation’s culture, values, 
policies) and not hard power (e.g. military operations, bribes). When a nation’s 
soft power resources are seen as legitimate or authorized by foreign publics, 
a nation’s soft power is increased (Gilboa, 2008, p. 61). This is significant due 
to the growing importance of images and control of information to build national 
statuses in world politics instead of mere military and economic power (Gilboa, 
2001, p. 2; Gilboa, 2008, p. 59). Moreover, the increasing costs of hard power 
directed nations to attract others using soft power instead of forcing them to 
do so (Jungblut, 2017, p. 385). It is also worth noting that nations’ rising interest 
in public diplomacy was most of the time a direct reaction to a downturn in 
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foreign perceptions of their nations and the recognition of the significance of a 
nation’s favourable image abroad to achieve its foreign policy goals (Melissen, 
2005a, p. 9; Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 194).  
A nation’s image is considered one form of soft power (Nye & Owen, 1996 
in Zhang, 2006, p. 26). Image can be understood as perception of a group, 
person, or nation held by others (Benoit & Brinson, 1999, p. 145). Nations seek 
to cultivate favourable national images to achieve a range of objectives in 
foreign relations (Dolea, 2015, p. 276; Hartig, 2017, p. 343; Kirat, 2005, p. 
324). Governments communicate with and explain their positions not only to 
local publics, but also foreign audiences with the aim of creating support for 
their opinion in foreign publics and potentially have an impact on the policy of 
other countries or votes within supranational entities (Jungblut, 2017, p. 384). 
Media is one tool used by public diplomats to do so. This can be either “state-
owned media” targeted at foreign publics (Zhang et al., 2017, p. 238), or 
foreign news media which have a vital role in shaping the public opinion on 
other countries, especially because, unlike domestic issues, foreign news is 
beyond an individual’s direct experience (Lim & Seo, 2009, p. 204). Thus, 
communicating through mass media, traditional or digital, state-owned or 
foreign is a “crucial” component of public diplomacy (Wu & Yang, 2017, p. 
347).   
There are different conceptualisations on the role of media and media 
relations in public diplomacy. For example, it is conceptualised as 
‘international news broadcasting’ (Cull, 2008); ‘media diplomacy’ (Gilboa, 
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2002; 2008); and ‘mediated public diplomacy’ (Entman, 2008). They have 
specific differences, but all focus on the use of media and media relations in 
public diplomacy practices.  
Cull (2008) defines ‘international news broadcasting’ as a specific public 
diplomacy practice that aims to “manage the international environment by 
using the technologies of radio, television, and the internet to engage with 
foreign publics” (p. 34). He emphasises that the key component of this practice 
is its focus on ‘news’. While his work draws on the British practice of public 
diplomacy, he suggests that, historically, the most influential element of 
international broadcasting has been its use of news, especially when it is 
perceived as “objective”. This led to the alignment of the entire practice of 
international broadcasting with the ethical culture of domestic broadcast 
journalism and turned international broadcasting into a mechanism for 
diffusing this culture (ibid). Although this builds on insights from a specific 
cultural context of practicing public diplomacy, it suggests close connections 
between the routines of practicing international news broadcasting and 
journalism. The significance of this similarity between both fields is discussed 
further in section 4.3 when I discuss the potential of using media research 
frameworks in the study of public diplomacy.  
Another conceptualisation on the role of media in the practice of public 
diplomacy is Gilboa’s (2008) ‘media diplomacy’. It is understood as the use of 
“the media to investigate and promote mutual interests, negotiations, and 
conflict resolution” (p. 58). Media diplomacy is practiced through several 
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routines and special media activities, including “press conferences, interviews, 
and leaks, visits by heads of states and mediators in rival countries, and 
spectacular media events” (Gilboa, 2002, p. 741). According to Gilboa (2002), 
media diplomacy is different from public diplomacy in that the last typically 
uses media communications along with interpersonal and other tools 
(brochures, courses, cultural exchanges), but they are both oriented to long-
term cultivation of favourability toward the practicing country among foreign 
publics.   
Entman (2008), on the other hand, developed the concept of ‘mediated US 
public diplomacy’. As suggested by its label, it is based on North American 
context of public diplomacy and defined as “the organised attempts by a 
president and his foreign policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible 
over the framing of the US policy in foreign media” (p. 89). Mediated public 
diplomacy is different from Gilboa’s (2002; 2008) understandings of media or 
public diplomacy in that “it involves shorter term and more targeted efforts 
using mass communication (including the internet) to increase support of a 
country’s specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country’s 
boarders” (Entman, 2008, p. 88). However, mediated public diplomacy can go 
beyond mere promotion of foreign policies in North American context; as it can 
be utilised to garner support for all decisions made in international context 
(Jungblut, 2017, p. 385). “Despite the increasing interest in mediated public 
diplomacy, empirical examination and theoretical understanding of the field are 
still limited.” (Sheafer et al., 2014, p. 150) ‘Mediated public diplomacy’ is 
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discussed further in section 4.2 in relation to the concept of “frame-building” 
(Scheufele, 1999), where I highlight the latter’s use as one approach of 
examining public diplomacy activities which have a potential to contribute to 
the co-construction of specific versions of reality. 
‘Mediated public diplomacy’ can make use of ‘international broadcasting’ 
(Jungblut, 2017, p. 385), and I adopt this conceptualisation in my research for 
a number of reasons. First, mediated public diplomacy reflects the focus on 
the use of media and media relations to promote specific presentations of 
national issues in the international arena to garner support for the sponsoring 
country among foreign publics. This is associated with my focus on examining 
what versions of reality were promoted by the Bahraini government messages 
to foreign media and publics during the 2011 crisis. Second, mediated public 
diplomacy has a short-term focus, which is the timeframe focus of the 
examined Bahraini public diplomacy responses to the 2011 crisis because, in 
crises, public diplomacy is a reactive form of communication, where actors 
need to react to a short notice warning to limit any damage (Andreasen, 2008, 
p. 203). This also brings us to the third reason as the short-term and reactive 
features of crisis response are mostly practiced through media relations, 
especially through one-way forms of communication (e.g. news), because they 
can communicate a nation’s standpoint on a specific issue or correct 
misinformation (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 15). In my research, I analyse 
public diplomacy texts published in news format on the BNA website aimed at 
foreign media and publics. Fourth, international news broadcasting is 
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associated with the study of “state-owned” media targeted at foreign publics, 
such as television, radio, or newswires (Zhang, et al., 2017, p. 239). “State-
owned media not only directly reach out to foreign publics, but also target 
foreign news media in that country. This case is especially true for state-owned 
international news agencies with foreign news organisations as the main 
audience.” (ibid, p. 240) My research focuses on news items produced by 
public diplomacy communicators at the IAA and published on the state-owned 
newswire: Bahrain News Agency (BNA).     
As mentioned earlier, my research focuses on the practice of public 
diplomacy during a time of crisis and specifically looks at the messages 
promoted to foreign media and publics during the crisis and its aftermath. 
Sympathetic media coverage is vital for political influence, especially at times 
of political conflicts (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 447). In such times, a nation 
engages in public diplomacy to defend its policies and attack those of the 
enemy (Gilboa & Clila, 2016). This argument is offered in an international 
conflict context, whereas this thesis looks at a national crisis where same 
principles apply. Antagonists’ images in the international news media can play 
a significant role in determining their level of political success in the 
international arena, which explains why so many political actors invest 
considerable resources in public diplomacy (Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 263). The 
political communication environment is known for competition between 
political actors, issues, and messages for media attention. This attention has 
two dimensions: competing for media attention (agenda building) and 
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competing for media framing (frame-building) (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 
448). In their competition for foreign media attention, actors, such as national 
governments are required to demonstrate “skills, performance, and talent that 
are pertinent to these media values, such as initiating major political events 
that will be considered ‘good stories’ by foreign media” (ibid, p. 449). My 
research looks at the messages (frames) communicated during a time of crisis 
and the factors connected to the articulation of specific messages in news 
items produced by government communicators and published on the website 
of the BNA.    
While this section focused on conceptualisations specifically related to 
the role of media as a public diplomacy tool, the next section discusses 
different conceptualisations of public diplomacy in general. It highlights how 
different conceptualisations have different focus in their study of public 
diplomacy, and explains how and why this research adopts a realist1 public 
diplomacy standpoint.   
 2.3.  Conceptualisations of Public Diplomacy   
In terms of the conceptualisation of public diplomacy, the concept has 
gone through three main stages: the realist, the liberalist, and ‘new public 
diplomacy’. Each of these is related to changes in the international relations’ 
environment that influenced the scholarship and practice of public diplomacy. 
In addition, these conceptualisations highlight the dominance of Western, 
                                            
1 The realist stance here specifically refers to the conceptualisation of public diplomacy and not the 
epistemological stand implicated by the social constructivist paradigm. Epistemology, and other 
philosophical standpoints, is discussed further in the Methodology chapter (3).   
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specifically North American, focus in public diplomacy literature that urges for 
public diplomacy research in other contexts. I discuss the differences between 
these three conceptualisations directly below, leading to how the concept of 
‘new public diplomacy’ encourages the study of public diplomacy using public 
relations’ models, especially those of two-way symmetrical communication 
and relationship building. It is worth noting that these models are studied from 
functionalist normative perspectives focusing on the role of public relations in 
achieving organisational/state goals and objectives and overall success. 
However, this project looks at public diplomacy from a social constructivist 
viewpoint discussed further in section 3.2.  
Realist public diplomacy   
Public diplomacy’s origin and historical development is largely defined 
through and dominated by realism (Melissen, 2005a, p. 5). Within the realist 
school “international relations [are] largely a realm of power and interest” 
(Donnelly, 2002, p. 9), where “the state’s interest provides the spring of action” 
(ibid, p. 7). A realist approach assumes that the world is driven by power and 
greed which will necessarily lead to clash of interests among nation-states, 
and therefore, pressure, intelligence, and inducements must be used to 
increase chances of success (L’Etang, 2006, p. 384; L’Etang, 2009, p. 617). 
Two main assumptions make the base for realist public diplomacy. First is the 
view of the state as the most important actor in the world system, and second 
is the assumption of power politics and national security as the premium 
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concern of a nation-state (Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 494; Zhang & Swartz, 2009, 
p. 383).   
Within the realist world view, public diplomacy is conceptualised as: image 
cultivation, promotion of mutual understanding, or advocacy of national 
interests (Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 382). In ‘image cultivation’, public 
diplomacy is viewed as one-way communication whereby nations aim to 
cultivate favourable images with publics who live in other countries. In the 
‘promotion of mutual understanding’, it is assumed that better mutual 
understanding between the sponsoring nation and targeted nations facilitates 
execution of foreign policy, where reducing misperceptions of a nation state 
and its soft power resources can lessen complications in relations between 
nations. Finally, in the ‘advocacy of national interests’, public diplomacy is 
viewed as a tool that serves the promotion of national interests and the 
creation of favourable international communication environment (Zhang & 
Swartz, 2009).   
These realist conceptualisations are criticised for: their “power-based” 
focus which uses public diplomacy as a power tool in the hands of the state 
and not to build relations with the publics of other nations; the state-centred 
emphasis focusing on how public diplomacy can best serve the interests of 
nation-states only without highlighting other non-state actors in the 
international arena; and public diplomats’ aim to boost the power of a state by 
promoting its values through rhetorically defending its interests (Zhang & 
Swartz, 2009, p. 383). Despite the critique, these three realist 
conceptualisations of public diplomacy reflect the reality of international 
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relations and how public diplomacy is commonly practiced (Fisher, 2010, p. 
277; Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 383). My research draws on the understanding 
of public diplomacy from a realist viewpoint. The implications of this are 
reflected in the understanding of the goal of engaging in public diplomacy.    
Realism’s assumption of the state as the only primary actor limits the 
number of significant actors in the environment of international relations. This 
means, within a realist world view, foreign publics are only perceived as 
channels through which national governments influence foreign governments 
(Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 494). This means that realist public diplomacy has a 
dual goal. It first aims to influence the publics of a targeted state and shape its 
public opinion on foreign policy matters, and then this should lead to the 
second aim which is pressurising the targeted state’s government to change 
foreign or local policies (Szondi, 2009. p. 292). This dual-goal orientation is 
perceived in this research as the aim of engaging in public diplomacy. Meaning 
that the communication of specific messages by the Bahraini government 
during the 2011 crisis does not aim to influence foreign publics or media as an 
end goal. Rather, the ultimate goal is to influence the governments of other 
countries through influencing foreign media and public opinion first. The focus 
on foreign authorities as an end goal is not to undermine the growing vitality 
of foreign public opinion in the international relations environment which is 
highlighted more within liberalist and new public diplomacy. Rather, the 
significance of this perception lies in considering the wider problematic context 
in the Arab region at the time of the examined crisis. As indicated in the 
Introduction chapter, protests in Arab countries which coincided with the 
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examined Bahraini crisis were widely framed across foreign media as the ‘Arab 
Spring’ (Avraham, 2015; Karolak, 2012, p. 173). The perception of Arab 
demonstrations as ‘Arab Spring’ legitimises urgent international military 
intervention as a valid solution to help protestors bring down what was 
perceived as oppressive regimes (Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 
129). In Libya, for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air 
forces, with the United Nations’ (UN) and national (e.g. UK government) 
approval was sent to expel Gaddafi’s regime (Maguire & Vickers, 2013; 
Nuruzzaman, 2015), and this was on 19 March 2011, just around the second 
examined moment in Bahrain (14-16 March 2011) where the situation 
escalated and Bahraini authorities asked its GCC allies for support to contain 
the situation. It is argued that the decision to send NATO to Libya was 
supported by foreign public opinion on the significance of international 
intervention to help civilians from oppressive regimes2 (Nuruzzaman, 2015). 
Thus, the understanding of public diplomacy from a realist viewpoint with its 
dual-goal suggests that the Bahraini government’s engagement in public 
diplomacy through media relations during the examined crisis was not targeted 
at foreign media and publics as an end goal. Rather, influencing foreign media 
and publics to form favourable perceptions of the Bahraini authorities during 
the crisis aimed to avoid a foreign public opinion pressure on foreign 
                                            
2 The act is controversial from a human rights perspective because the NATO air forces’ operations did 
result in the death of civilians, suggesting the move was to aid certain world powers and geopolitics to 
get rid of Gaddafi and not specifically to aid Libyan civilians (Nuruzzaman, 2015).   
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governments and supranational organisations to legitimise international 
military intervention in Bahrain.     
Note that the understanding of public diplomacy from a realist perspective 
is not limited to the focus on its dual-goal. This approach also emphasises 
promotion, persuasion, self-interest, and impression management carried out 
by nation-states (Szondi, 2009. p. 292). Nevertheless, the focus on nation-
states as the primary actors and the dual-goal of public diplomacy was 
challenged by liberalists who direct attention towards other players in the 
international arena.  
Liberalist public diplomacy   
In  the  mid-2000s  liberalist  public  diplomacy  became a 
 challenging conceptualisation to compete with its realist counterpart (Yun & 
Toth, 2009, p. 497). The emergence of new actors in the international arena 
such as non-government organisations (NGOs), corporations, state-less 
nations and activists, and the increasing interdependence among such players 
led to changes in the conceptualisation of public diplomacy (Dolea, 2015, p. 
277; L’Etang, 2009, p. 610; Xifra & McKie, 2012, p. 820; Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 
496). International liberalists, unlike realists, do not view the state as the most 
prominent actor in international relations, but consider the state as one 
important actor among others in world politics (Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 496). 
Within liberalist public diplomacy, foreign publics became an end partner 
communicator in a one-step process of communicating with foreign publics 
instead of the earlier dual-goal process (ibid, p. 498). The role of public 
diplomacy for liberalists is to build a receptive environment for national 
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interests abroad through influencing foreign public opinion by creating 
understanding and appreciation of a nation’s culture, ideas and policies, 
labelled as ‘soft power’ (Szondi, 2008. p. 7; Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 496).   
Liberalists, as well as realists, emphasise the value of ‘soft power’ in 
achieving national interests. As mentioned earlier, this stems from nations’ 
recognition of the importance of image cultivation and reputation management 
in world politics rather than merely focusing on military and economic power 
(Gilboa, 2001, p. 2; Gilboa, 2008, p. 59). Yet, liberalists view the work of soft 
power in a more complex communication environment, where governments 
are only one among multiple players in the international arena (Yun & Toth, 
2009, p. 496). Specifically, liberalist public diplomacy focuses more on the 
“conditions (credibility and legitimacy) for soft power, in which a country’s soft 
power resources can be translated into soft power” (ibid). Meaning that, 
liberalist public diplomacy emphasises the match between the nation’s 
communicated messages on policies and its actions. Although my research 
mainly views realist public diplomacy conceptualisations as more reflective of 
its common practices, it does not deny the complexity in the international 
relations arena raised by the variety of state and non-state actors and 
interdependencies among them. However, my research focus remains on a 
state-government context and does not consider other actors, because I 
examine the Bahraini government’s messages- a voice mostly ignored in 
academic studies on the framing of the Bahraini 2011 crisis.   
In addition to the rise of non-state actors, other significant changes in the 
international relations environment contributed to the emergence of the 
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concept of ‘new public diplomacy’. This conceptualisation has implications on 
the value of public opinion in public diplomacy, and the study of public 
diplomacy using public relations’ concepts of the normative concepts of two-
way symmetrical communication and balanced, mutually beneficial relations.  
New public diplomacy   
‘New public diplomacy’ was introduced by Melissen (2005a), who points 
to the shift in public diplomacy from ‘promoting’ positive aspects of a country 
to foreign audiences towards ‘engaging’ with foreign publics. The literature 
does not offer clear cut definitions of ‘new public diplomacy’. Instead, in an 
attempt to propose possible definitions, it offers discussions on the driving 
factors behind the development of the concept and what differentiates it from 
earlier conceptualisations. One of these factors is the 9/11 attacks on the US, 
which developed different appreciation to public opinion within public 
diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, p. xix; Gilboa, 2008, p. 55; Snow, 2009, p. ix).  
Within ‘new public diplomacy’ the 9/11 attacks are viewed as a result of 
US public diplomacy’s failure to create favourable attitudes toward the US and 
its values, for depending merely on one-way information and self-projection 
techniques to share the American values with taken-for-granted foreign 
publics, assuming that such approach was enough to build favourable foreign 
public opinion toward the US (Snow, 2009, p. 6; Zaharna, 2004). As a result 
of this ‘failure’, a new approach to public diplomacy emerged, where gaining 
foreign public opinion support became the ultimate goal. This considerably 
shifted the focus from elites to mass foreign publics in the Muslim world, due 
to a fear of terrorists’ success in spreading their ideology among Muslim 
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publics (Nisbet et al., 2004, p. 15). Most importantly, within new public 
diplomacy, gaining favourable foreign public opinion should be ideally 
achieved through two-way symmetrical communication and relationship 
building (Fitzpatrick, 2007; Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005; Melissen, 2005; 
Snow, 2009).   
Attention to the significance of foreign public opinion post 9/11 was not 
limited to the US. Arab and Muslim nations were also put under pressure after 
9/11 because they were viewed as responsible for the terrorist attacks on the 
US (Vujnovic & Kruckeberg, 2004, p. 339). This fuelled negative attitudes 
against Arabs and Muslims as terrorists by a majority of a Western society that 
did not know much about these cultures in the first place (ibid). This has 
created huge challenge to Arabs’ public diplomacy as they needed to recover 
from such terrorist image among foreign publics (ibid; Hiebert, 2005, p. 319; 
Zhang & Benoit, 2004).  
As indicated earlier, 9/11 is only one aspect underlying discussions on ‘new 
public diplomacy’. Cull (2010, p. 15) mentions that ‘new public diplomacy’ 
reflects the changes in the environment in which public diplomacy is practiced, 
increasing emphasis on the significance of foreign public opinion. The changes 
include: the end of the Cold War bipolar era; the rise of international actors 
such as NGOs and corporations; and the advancements in communication 
technologies raising global and real-time communications during the last 
decade or so. The end of the Cold War represents the end of the top-down 
communication era characterised by the dual-goal concept of engaging in 
 48  
  
public diplomacy. The rise of international actors suggests public diplomacy is 
no longer mere government practice, as the involvement of private individuals 
and groups in public diplomacy challenges governments’ public diplomacy 
efforts because these actors’ agenda may differ from the governments’ (Dolea, 
2015, p. 278; Van Dyke & Vercic, 2009, p. 916; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 264; 
Zaharna & Uysal, 2016, p. 110). Real-time media in a globalised world has 
also complicated this challenge by enabling corporations, countries, and 
individuals reach into the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever 
before (Vujnovic & Kruckeberg, 2005, p. 340). Note that public have always 
mattered to diplomats, but it is the easier access by publics to advanced 
communication technologies that further increased the significance of public 
opinion (Snow, 2009; Melissen, 2005a, p. 24).  
These changes in the international affairs environment encouraged 
changes in how public diplomacy is perceived, giving more importance to 
networking with foreign publics rather than merely focusing on influencing 
foreign governments. And similar to post 9/11 debates on public diplomacy, 
these changes influenced the conceptualisation of public diplomacy in a 
normative sense, suggesting it should be ideally practiced through two-way 
symmetrical communication processes, and aiming for mutually beneficial 
balanced relations with foreign publics. These concepts are discussed further 
in section 5. Note though that ‘new public diplomacy’ is mainly a shift in the 
theoretical standpoint and not a transformation in practice (Pamment, 2011, p. 
21).  
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I mentioned earlier that the conceptualisation of ‘new public diplomacy’ 
draws our attention to how the study of public diplomacy may be consistent 
with models emerging from the field of public relations. This specifically relates 
to new public diplomacy’s emphasis on the idealistic concepts of mutual 
understanding and two-way symmetrical communication to build relationships 
rather than persuade publics via one-way information (Melissen, 2005; Snow, 
2009). Two-way symmetrical communication and relationship building are 
concepts widely researched within the area of public relations. One of the 
earliest attempts that encourage studying public diplomacy and public 
relations closely is the work of Signitzer and Coombs (1992). They argue that 
public relations and public diplomacy have a similar objective of affecting 
public opinions for their client or organisation’s benefit (government in case of 
public diplomacy) (p. 139), which suggests the transferability of public 
relations’ concepts of symmetry and relationship building to study how public 
diplomacy should be practiced.    
Nevertheless, another perspective on the significance of studying public 
diplomacy and public relations closely is offered by L’Etang (1996; 2006). 
While she also addresses similar boundary spanning roles in both public 
relations and public diplomacy, which encourages researching them closely, 
her work is underpinned by understanding of diplomacy as a speciality within 
the more academically advanced area of international relations. Instead of 
using functionalist approaches that examine how public relations and public 
diplomacy should be ideally practiced through two-way symmetrical 
communication and build/maintain mutually beneficial relations to increase 
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organisational effectiveness, she argues that linking public relations to 
diplomacy will help address the role of power positions in public relations 
functions (L’Etang, 1996, p. 24; L’Etang, 2006, p. 381; L’Etang, 2009, p. 609). 
Adopting this perspective shifts attention in public relations and public 
diplomacy research to examine how various actors, through their practice, try 
to impose their own definitions and interpretations of specific issues, or even 
manipulate meaning in order to impose specific versions of reality in the 
competitive environment of international relations (Dolea, 2015, p. 275; 
L’Etang, 2006, p. 379). My research draws on such understanding of public 
relations as a social phenomenon which, through its different activities, like 
public diplomacy, contributes to the construction of specific versions of social 
reality (Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009). Therefore, my research aims to examine 
public diplomacy and how it promotes a certain understanding of events in 
government messages, potentially contributing to the co-construction of 
specific versions of reality. It does this by specifically looking at the frames 
communicated by the Bahraini government during the 2011 crisis, and the 
background processes and factors connected to the articulation of specific 
frames.   
Until this point, the chapter presented several definitions of public 
diplomacy and its goals, how media is studied as a public diplomacy tool, and 
different conceptualisations of public diplomacy. It illustrates that public 
diplomacy is understood in this thesis as a form of government communication 
aiming to persuade foreign publics through information with strong focus on 
media relations, and perceives public diplomacy from a realist viewpoint. The 
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last section presented two different views on the significance of examining 
public diplomacy and public relations closely. My research does not adopt a 
functionalist worldview, where there is emphasis on the significance of two-
way symmetrical communication and relationship building with the aim to 
achieve organisational or political goals and objectives. Rather, it examines 
public diplomacy through the lens of the social constructivist paradigm. The 
next section discusses the functionalist approaches transferred from public 
relations to public diplomacy to understand how these “dominant” approaches 
work (Dolea, 2015, p. 276). This is followed by a discussion of the social 
constructivist approach to illustrate why it is more fruitful to answer this 
research’s questions.   
     
3. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND RESEARCH 
PARADIGMS   
 3.1.  Public Diplomacy, Public Relations, and Functionalism    
In terms of the theoretical frameworks used to study public diplomacy, the 
literature was criticized for the dominance of writings by practitioners and 
policy advocates especially in American context during the Cold War, leaving 
a gap in the theoretical advancement of public diplomacy as an academic field 
(Gilboa, 2008, p. 56; Gregory, 2008, p. 275). Yet, in more recent years, 
academics are paying more attention to public diplomacy (Gregory, 2008, p. 
275). Public diplomacy is a multidisciplinary field of research (Huijgh & Byrne, 
2012; Gilboa, 2008, p. 56). The study of the concept of public diplomacy is 
hosted among several disciplines of social science, such as public relations, 
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international relations, communication, and branding (Gilboa, 2008, p. 61). My 
research studies public diplomacy as a specific function of public relations 
practiced by governments and aimed at foreign audiences, while public 
relations is understood as:   
the flow of purposive communication produced on behalf of 
individuals, formally constituted and informally constituted groups, 
through their continuous trans-actions with other social entities. It 
has social, cultural, political and economic effects at local, national 
and global levels. (Edwards, 2012, p. 21)  
This section discusses how public diplomacy is studied in the dominant 
functionalist approach in public relations to illustrate why the social 
constructivist paradigm is more suitable framework to answer this research 
questions.   
Literature on public diplomacy was criticized for its Western focus, 
especially on US practices and definitions of public diplomacy (Brown, 2004, 
p. 14; Gilboa, 2008, p. 56; Melissen, 2005, p. xix; Melissen, 2005a, p. 6). Within 
this Western focus, the practice of public diplomacy in the US is divided into 
three main stages. The first phase falls between the end of the Second World 
War (1945) and the end of the Cold War (1991), where public diplomacy was 
about the spread of North American and Western values. The second phase 
is between the fall of Berlin Wall (1989) and the 9/11 attacks (2001), depicted 
by the fall in American public diplomacy worldwide. The third phase is post 
9/11, and focuses on US-Arab relations (Szondi, 2008. p. 2; Szondi, 2009. p. 
292). As indicated above, after 9/11 the concept of ‘new public diplomacy’ 
emerged, signifying the study of public diplomacy using public relations’ 
concepts of two-way symmetrical communication and relationship building 
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(Fitzpatrick, 2007; Melissen, 2005; Snow, 2009). Historically, public relations 
scholars showed little interest in public diplomacy, or how diplomats 
communicate and build relations with foreign publics. Even public diplomacy 
practitioners ignored relevant knowledge in public relations literature (Vanc & 
Fitzpatrick, 2016, pp. 432-433). They even tried to distance themselves from 
public relations due to its problematic connections with propaganda (Cull, 
2009, p. 21), despite public diplomacy’s roots in the persuasion industry of 
public relations (Snow, 2009, p. 9). However, in more recent years, public 
relations scholars’ interest in public diplomacy is significantly increasing, as 
they applied, tested, and recommended concepts form public relations as 
workable theoretical frameworks in the study of public diplomacy (ibid, p. 433).   
 As mentioned earlier, one of the earliest attempts encouraging the study 
of public diplomacy and public relations closely was by Signitzer and Coombs 
(1992). They suggest public relations and public diplomacy have similar goals 
and use similar tools as practitioners in both areas aim to influence public 
opinion for the benefit of their sponsoring organisation (p. 139). Signitzer and 
Wamser (2006) went further to conceptualise public diplomacy as 
“international nation public relations”. ‘International’ reflects the international 
dimension, ‘nation’ reflects the focus on the relation between the nation-state 
and different actors, and ‘public relations’ emphasise the communicative 
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dimension and offers theoretical and instrumental input to public diplomacy3 
(p. 441).  
Particularly after the development of the notion of ‘new public diplomacy’, 
this close focus was taken further with the notions’ emerging interest in the 
concepts of symmetry and relationships which are widely researched among 
functionalist public relations. Functionalist public relations dominates its 
scholarship (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011, p. 2), yet the use of other paradigms 
such as the social constructivist, and critical are emerging and gaining 
recognition in the field. Functionalism is defined as “any view which analyses 
something in terms of how it functions, and especially in terms of its causes 
and effects” (Lacey, 1976, p. 83 in L’Etang, 2008, p. 10). Most importantly, it 
“views societies as integrated, harmonious, cohesive ‘wholes’ or ‘social 
systems’, where all parts ideally function to maintain equilibrium, consensus 
and social order” (O’Sullivan, 1994, p. 124 in L’Etang, 2008, p. 10). This 
highlights how ideas of balance, equilibrium and consensus are at the heart of 
functionalist thinking.   
Functionalism in public relations underlies approaches such as the 
excellence theory and relationship management which were mainly developed 
in the US (Curtin, 2011, p. 37), and has traditional emphasis on making 
recommendations for practitioners (Bardhan & Weaver, 2011, p. 2; Grunig, 
2001, p. 17; Ihlen &Verhoeven, 2012, p. 160). Further, functionalist public 
                                            
3 Note though that this conceptualisation by Signitzer and Wamser (2006) is offered in the discussion of 
the cultural communication aspect of public diplomacy (see Figure 1).   
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relations’ definitions endorse mutuality values and the public interests, and 
assert the strategic, managerial organisational focus of the field (Brown, 
2011a, p. 94). This approach conceptualises public relations as a managerial 
function within an organisation.   
Two-way symmetrical communication emphasised in ‘new public 
diplomacy’ is an essential concept in functionalist public relations scholarship. 
Symmetry in public relations means that it “should go beyond the advocacy of 
self-interest without concern for the impact of an organisation’s behaviour on 
others to a balance between self-interest and concern for the interests of 
others.” (Grunig, 2001, p. 28) This emphasis on balance within symmetry does 
not work in-line with the understanding of public diplomacy from a realist 
viewpoint, especially as realists perceive public diplomacy as a power tool in 
the hand of nation-states to maintain their interests instead of concern for the 
interests of others (Zhang & Swartz, 2009).   
  Two-way symmetry is also a core element of the ‘excellence’ theory in 
public relations (Grunig, 1992, p. 6). In 1992, James Grunig and his colleagues 
published their research on public relations as a first step of developing the 
‘excellence theory’, which is perceived as the “first general theory of public 
relations” (Grunig, 1992, p. 2). Excellence in public relations is symmetrical, 
idealistic and critical, and managerial (Grunig, 1992, p. 10; Grunig & White, 
1992, p. 31). ‘Symmetry’ is explained above. ‘Idealistic’ means how it should 
be practiced as a mechanism by which organisations and competing groups 
in a pluralistic system interact to manage conflict for the benefit of all (Grunig, 
 56  
  
1992, p. 9; Grunig & White, 1992, p. 56). The ‘critical’ dimension means that 
public relations’ practitioners and scholars “can and should criticize public 
relations for poor ethics, negative social consequences, or ineffectiveness” 
(Gruinig, 1992, p. 10). The ‘managerial’ dimension argues that public relations 
“must” be a management function in order to contribute to an organisation’s 
effectiveness (ibid, p. 11), which is meeting organisational goals, ultimately 
organisational autonomy (ibid).  
When examining excellence in public relations, an important question is: 
“how must public relations be practiced and the communication function be 
organised for it to contribute the most to organisational effectiveness.” (Grunig, 
1992, p. 3) Effectiveness means achieving organisational goals. The idealized 
goal is to achieve organisational autonomy (ibid, p. 11). However, 
organisations are interdependent with publics who might limit or enhance their 
autonomy. The role of public relations is to strategically manage their 
interdependence “by building stable, open, and trusting relationships with 
strategic constituencies.” (ibid) The contribution of public relations in managing 
relationships on the long-run contributes to the organisation’s effectiveness. 
Among four models of communication: press agentry; public information; two-
way asymmetrical communication; and two-way symmetrical communication, 
the latest is presented by functionalism as the most contributing model to 
organisational effectiveness (ibid, p. 10). The first two models are viewed as 
one-way form of communication. Press agentry “describes propagandistic 
public relations that seeks media attention in almost any way possible.” Public 
information, on the other hand, is dissemination of “what generally is accurate 
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information about the organisation”. Functionalists view two-way asymmetrical 
communication as manipulation because “public relations programmes use 
research to identify the messages most likely to produce the support of publics 
without having to change the behaviour of the organisation.” Two-way 
symmetrical communication is praised by functionalists as it is viewed to 
benefit both the organisation and its publics. In this model “public relations use 
bargaining, negotiating, and strategies of conflict resolution to bring about 
symbiotic changes in the ideas, attitudes, and behaviours of both the 
organisation and its publics.” (Grunig et al., 1995, p. 169) Thus, the 
functionalist framework focuses on examining how public relations work to 
achieve organisational goals, giving this paradigm its organisation-centric 
approach, and viewing two-way symmetrical communication as the best way 
of practicing public relations. ‘New public diplomacy’, too, conceptualises 
public relations’ model of two-way symmetrical communication as a normative 
ideal a government should strive for in its communications with foreign publics 
to achieve mutually beneficial relationships with them (Fitzpatrick, 2007; 
Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005; Melissen, 2005; Snow, 2009).  
However, public relations’ focus on symmetry triggered wide critique 
among scholars, leading to diversification of the worldviews from which public 
relations is researched. Mainly, symmetry is criticized for failing to provide a 
“plausible, much less compelling, account of the actual world” due to its “static, 
dualistic and linearity” (Brown, 2011a, p. 91). Symmetry is viewed as “ethical” 
public relations while failing to recognize that not all participants in public 
relations activities have equal access to resources that qualify them to be in a 
 58  
  
powerful position (Weaver, 2011, p. 256). Thus, when power is taken into 
account, public relations can be far from symmetrical. Furthermore, symmetry 
is developed based on two problematic unbalanced assumptions which refer 
to the suppositions that public relations began in the US in mid-19th century; 
and that it evolved to be more ethical than past practices (Brown, 2011a, p. 
95). Thus, the main critique of symmetry that links to my examination of public 
diplomacy is the idealistic and normative presuppositions on what it should be 
instead of examining what it is at a societal level. Functionalism does question 
how public relations is practiced and what factors influence the practice 
(Grunig, 1992, p. 24). Yet, it focuses on ‘excellence’ when it odds any other 
type of practice that does not match normative thinking (Pieczka, 2006, p. 354) 
and only looks at power issues at an individual level when it examines the 
practices as choices of the members of the dominant coalition in an 
organisation.  
Another issue stemming from symmetry in public relations is its attempt to 
limit the concept to a single type of practice identified as ethical and excellent 
(Brown, 2011a, p. 97), unlike critiques of symmetry who support multiple, 
interdisciplinary and qualitative approaches “over any single, unitary, 
quantitative, putatively scientific method” (ibid, p. 96). Social theory 
approaches, for example, favour “local, historically contextualized, and 
pragmatic types of social inquiry” (Seidman, 1997, p. 5 in Holtzhausen, 2011, 
p. 142) instead of aiming to discover the causal relationships between 
phenomena (Weaver, 2011, p. 252), and predict the outcomes of future 
actions (Curtin, 2011, p. 37; Weaver, 2011, p. 252). Furthermore, even when 
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‘excellence’ raises questions on power issues within the practice of public 
relations, it does so through the functionalist paradigm without adopting other 
points of view, which raised questions on the reasons behind not employing 
other world views (Pieczka, 2006, p. 352). The openness to other views in 
researching and theorizing public relations is important for the field’s 
expansion and reputation (McKie, 2001, p. 79).  
Functionalist public relations’ approaches focus on organisational 
instead of societal roles of public relations, and the benefits it offers to 
organisations and their publics through building relationships and mutually 
beneficial outcomes (Edwards, 2011, p. 30). In addition, public relations is 
understood within functionalism as the process of establishing and maintaining 
mutually beneficial relations between an organisation and publics on whom it 
depends (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1994), instead of critically viewing it as a 
way to “perpetuate the existing system of power relations by creating and 
sustaining ‘realities’ for its audiences, indirectly communicating principles that 
support the organisations for which public relations works via the media and 
other channels” (Edwards, 2014, p. 132; see also Mckie, 2001, p. 77).   
Nevertheless, functionalism, and specifically the Excellence project 
developed by James Grunig and his colleagues, is valued for bringing 
considerable legitimacy to public relations after decades of problematic 
associations with propaganda (Pieczka, 2006, p. 354; Weaver, 2011, p. 252). 
In addition, it brought external and internal credibility to its scholarship through 
its scientific methodologies (Weaver, 2011, p. 252). The discussion of critique 
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on functionalism is not to say that one paradigm is generally better than the 
other. The purpose is to present the theoretical framework that works in-line 
with the understanding of public relations and public diplomacy in this thesis. 
A functionalist approach in this research would focus on examining how and 
whether the communication of specific frames through Bahraini public 
diplomacy would have helped the Bahraini government (IAA/BNA) achieve its 
strategic goals, with a focus on equilibrium and consensus, and achieving 
organisational effectiveness.  However, this is not what my research focuses 
on, and it does not work in-line with the adopted understanding of public 
relations and public diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, public relations is 
understood here as a social phenomenon which, through its different activities, 
like public diplomacy, contributes to the construction of specific versions of 
social reality (Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009). Drawing on this understanding, my 
study aims to deliver insights on how the practice of public diplomacy during 
the 2011 Bahraini crisis communicated and framed government messages, 
which have a potential to co-construct specific versions of reality. Therefore, 
the following section reviews the social constructivist paradigm in public 
relations, arguing its significance to answer this research’s questions.  
 3.2.  Public Relations and Social Constructivism  
Social constructivism is a research paradigm widely used in different social 
science disciplines. A socially oriented view to public relations focuses on “the 
relationship public relations has with the societies from which it is produced 
and with the social systems it coproduces” (Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009, p. 3). After 
the dominance of positivist approaches in public relations focusing on 
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managerial problems, scholars started working from a social constructivist 
viewpoint to diversify the theoretical approaches to public relations research 
and enrich academic debates with different perspectives. More importantly, 
social constructivism serves as one way of examining public relations (and 
public diplomacy) as a social phenomenon, with a specific focus in this thesis 
on public diplomacy functions in contributing to the co-construction of specific 
versions of social reality through messages and communication activities. The 
Methodology chapter discusses the features of working within a social 
constructivist paradigm, including its ontological and epistemological 
implications. This section of the chapter, however, discusses what it means to 
look at public relations, and by implication public diplomacy, through the lens 
of social constructivism, and its significance to answering this research’s 
questions.  
One way used to understand social constructivism is discussing it in 
comparison to positivism. Presenting them as extreme opposites of a 
continuum of understanding reality, positivism suggests the existence of an 
objective reality out there, while social constructivism argues reality is 
subjective linguistic construction and not an objective fact. According to 
Shotter and Gergen (1994 in Tsetsura, 2010, p.164), construction of social 
reality is “a process of creation, expression, and reinforcement of 
understanding through continuous and iterative social interaction by social 
agents situated in contextual environments and identified politically, 
socioeconomically and culturally.” Discussions on social constructivism in 
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public relations are based on debates by Berger and Luckmann (1966) who 
contributed insightful ideas on social construction of reality and brought 
attention to the analysis of the nature and origins of social construction.     
The social constructivist paradigm offers a framework for understanding 
public relations “as an activity and as a field, and for understanding the identity 
of the working professionals, the institutions they represent, and people 
affected by that construction process” (Tsetsura, 2010, p. 163). In this 
research, I focus on public diplomacy work as an activity that essentially 
encompasses the construction of social reality. Thus, public relations, and 
therefore public diplomacy, are fundamentally understood as a process of 
“producing, sustaining, and regulating” social realities (Edwards & Hodges, 
2011, p. 3).  
It is important to highlight that this paradigm too has its critiques. Criticism 
directed to social constructivism comes from scholars who take a realist view 
and praise objectivism as the overall goal for science. Heide (2009, p. 51), for 
instance, highlights how those scholars criticise constructivism stating:  
The critique is focused on strong social constructionism or to use 
another word, extreme relativism; in other words, social 
constructionism as ontology where a physical reality is denied. 
However, most social constructionist scholars understand social 
constructionism as an epistemology or a mild constructionism, 
where attention is directed to social processes involved in the 
production and reproduction of institutions, epistemologies, and 
knowledge. The goal for mild constructionism is to understand how 
social reality is socially constructed  
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Thus, mild constructivism does not claim that nothing can exist if it is not 
socially constructed (ibid). As mentioned above, the Methodology chapter 
further discusses the constructivist paradigm, and the epistemological and 
ontological implications.    
When public relations workers provide consultancy to organisations, their 
work involves defining reality for these organisations by shaping organisational 
perspectives about the outside world (Hallahan, 1999, p. 206). Also when 
public relations professionals communicate with external publics of an 
organisation, these outbound communications involve attempts to define 
reality (ibid). The core significance of this function is communicating and 
circulating ‘truth’, which then results in the co-production of social reality 
(Edwards & Hodges, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, public relations’ production of 
social realities involves the production of “competing” and/or “convergent” 
versions of social realities (Heath, 2006, p. 94). This suggests that public 
relations is not an isolated actor in the process of producing specific versions 
of social realities. Moreover, even within public relations itself, public relations 
workers representing different organisations may compete with each other to 
promote their own versions of reality among targeted publics. Public relations 
practitioners’ involvement in the process of constructing social reality is 
sometimes dismissed as “manipulation”. Yet, “because defining reality is the 
very essence of communication, constructionists would argue that the process 
is neither inherently good nor bad” (Hallahan, 1999, pp. 206-207).   
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In order to systematically explore what versions of reality are promoted by 
public diplomacy, this study uses framing theory. “Framing is a critical activity 
in the construction of social reality because it helps shape the perspectives 
through which people see the world” (Hallahan, 1999, p. 207). About twenty 
years ago, Hallahan (1999, p. 205) suggested that “framing is a potentially 
useful paradigm for examining the strategic creation of public relations 
messages”. Today, framing is used in public relations and public diplomacy 
academic research not only as a framework to understand how professional 
communicators shape messages they share with the wider public, but also to 
study how publics perceive public relations’ messages (e.g. Cabosky, 2014; 
Entman, 2008; Hanggli, 2012; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009). My research 
specifically focuses on public diplomacy practitioners’ construction of 
messages or “frame-building” (Scheufele, 1999; 2000). The following section 
discusses the concept of framing in more detail, explaining how this thesis 
uses the concept of “frame-building” in a public diplomacy context.    
  
4. FRAMING  
 4.1.  The Framing Theory  
This section reviews the concept of framing. It argues that framing helps 
understand how public diplomacy contributes to the construction of social 
reality by offering a framework to analyse what versions of reality were 
communicated by the Bahraini government through its public diplomacy 
messages to foreign media during the 2011 crisis. It also discusses how 
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models of framing research, originally developed in media studies, can be 
applied to public relations and public diplomacy research.  
Framing is used as a framework of examination in a variety of studies 
in the field of communication (Hallahan, 1999, p. 205), and is increasingly used 
in public relations and media research (Froehlich & Rudiger, 2006, p. 19; 
Johansson, 2009, p. 123). Framing is a process that mainly involves “selection 
and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item selected” (Entman, 
1993, p. 52). The significance of this concept to the scholarship of public 
relations rests in the latter’s fundamental involvement in the processes of co-
construction of social reality (Hallahan, 1999, p. 206; Heide, 2009; Tsetsura, 
2010) through communicating tailored information with publics through, for 
example, newsmakers and journalists (Cabosky, 2014, p. 70; Gerth & Siegert, 
2012, p. 281). Therefore, public relations - and public diplomacy - frame 
perceived reality in their messages directed to the media and other publics.  
In news media context, where framing is widely used, research usually 
pursues one of four empirical goals. According to D’Angelo (2002, p. 873), 
these goals are:   
(a) to identify thematic units called frames, (b) to investigate the 
antecedent conditions that produce frames, (c) to examine how 
news frames activate, and interact with, an individual’s prior 
knowledge to affect interpretations, recall of information, decision 
making, and evaluations, and (d) to examine how news frames 
 66  
  
shape social-level processes such as public opinion and policy 
issue debates.  
My research focuses on the first and second goals. While these goals 
are proposed in news media research, they are applied here to public 
diplomacy context. This can be applied in the examined case mainly because 
the Bahraini government’s (IAA/BNA) processes of producing news items 
shared with foreign media and publics are very similar to journalistic processes 
of news writing, especially when they are perceived from social constructivism 
viewpoint. The close relationships between source and media highlight 
overlaps in many places between professional communication and journalism 
(Edwards, 2012, p. 22). Yet, both fields have different background goals and 
purposes. As this study focuses on public diplomacy’s ‘information’ processes, 
the first goal can be used to identify what frames appear in public diplomacy 
texts (e.g. press content made available to foreign media). The second goal 
looks at the factors that influence the production of the identified frames. The 
third goal can investigate how public diplomacy texts, and the frames they 
carry, work as means of interpreting specific issues among foreign publics. 
And finally, the last goal can examine how public diplomacy texts play a role 
in foreign public debate. My research, however, focuses on the first two goals.    
Public relations activities and communications bring issues to the 
public’s attention (Froehlich & Rudiger, 2006, p. 18). Especially when 
performed with political focus, such as in public diplomacy, the goal of public 
relations is to communicate specific political views, solutions and most 
importantly interpretations of issues with hope to gain public support for 
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policies or certain issues (ibid; Entman, 2003; Gamson, 1992; Jungblut, 2017, 
p. 387; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 265). “It is the political actors who introduce the 
most important frames into the public discourse” (Hanggli, 2012, p. 302) and 
it is through framing that political actors shape the texts that suggest how 
politics or issues should be thought about (Entman, 2007, p. 165; Kinder, 
2007, p. 156). When conducting a content-based analysis of public relations 
in a political context, it is more valuable to examine the complex perspectives, 
interpretations, and contexts of issues in the source material generated 
through a public relations activity, instead of reducing the analysis to themes 
or issues alone. Framing is an “ideal” method for such analysis (ibid). It is 
recommended to study public relations as the source of many frames shared 
with the publics (Hanggli, 2012, p. 301), and it is used in this research to look 
at public diplomacy as source of many frames shared with foreign media and 
publics. Therefore, the first goal of identifying frames, as suggested by 
D’Angelo (2002), can be used to examine what frames are present in news 
items produced by the Bahraini government (IAA/BNA) and shared with 
foreign media and publics. The second goal can be applied to understand the 
factors connected to the production of frames present in the analysed texts. 
As this thesis aims to understand the production processes of framing rather 
than the effects of frames, it adopts the macro or “sociological” approach 
instead of the micro or “psychological” approach (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The 
micro or “psychological” approach examines frames as individual means of 
processing and structuring incoming information (Scheufele, 2000, p. 301). 
The macro or “sociological” approach, on the other hand, is originally applied 
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to examine media frames as outcomes of journalistic norms or organisational 
constraints (Scheufele, 2000, p. 300). In a similar way, the sociological 
approach can be applied to examine public diplomacy frames as outcomes of 
public diplomacy activities which can be connected to several levels of 
influence discussed further in section 9 of this chapter.    
Because of its wide applicability in different communication studies, 
framing is described as a fragmented paradigm. Entman (1993) mentions that 
the absence of “general statement theory” of framing led to a “fractured 
paradigm” of framing research (p. 51). On the other hand, D’Angelo (2002, p. 
871) argues “there is not, nor should be, a single paradigm of framing” (see 
also de Vreese, 2012, p. 365; Matthes, 2012, p. 251). He proposes 
researching framing within the constructivist, critical, and cognitive paradigms. 
Employing one of these paradigms contributes to the analysis and data 
gathered. Within the critical paradigm, framing processes are perceived to 
work for the advantage of political and economic elites by promoting their 
perspectives. It is also argued that framing processes involve intentional 
inclusion and exclusion of an issue’s attributes in support for a single viewpoint 
(D’Angelo, 2002, p. 876). Cognitivist framing views frames as triggers of nods 
that interact with an individual’s prior knowledge, which can result in the 
individual’s perception of an issue in a specific way (ibid, p. 875). This 
paradigm is usually fruitful for the study of framing at a micro-level, where the 
aim is to identify individual frames among audiences (Scheufele, 1999, p. 111). 
From a social constructivist viewpoint, which is adopted in this research, a text 
contains sets of “interpretive packages” that consist of a set of elements that 
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support and reinforce each other to give meaning to an issue (Gamson & 
Lasch, 1983, p. 398). In each package is a “central organising idea” or a frame 
that invites the recipient to understand the issue at hand in a specific way 
(Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 398; see also Gamson, 1981; Gamson, 1992; 
Gamson, 2001; Gamson & Lasch, 1981; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).   
In social constructivism, news media is perceived to have an important 
role in the public construction of social reality. By selecting certain topics the 
media can set the publics’ agenda of the most important issues while framing 
these issues can help the public to think about them in a certain manner 
(Bedingfield & Anshari, 2014, p. 80). Political actors, such as public relations 
practitioners and public diplomacy communicators (“frame sponsors”; Gamson 
& Lasch, 1983, p. 6), put much effort to diverge media coverage to their side, 
as media is considered a way to influence public perceptions (Bedingfield & 
Anshari, 2014, p. 81; Van Gorp, 2007, p. 68). Thus, public relations and public 
diplomacy are perceived to contribute to the construction of social realities 
through promoting specific frames to the media which then may share with the 
wider public, in addition to the publics in general. These are called “advocate 
frames” (Tewksbury et al., 2000, p. 806 in Van Gorp, 2007, p. 68) to distinguish 
between frames communicated by the media (media frames) and frames 
communicated through the media (advocate frames) (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 68). 
Public diplomacy texts, such as press content shared with foreign media 
through state-owned media is perceived as one tool used by public diplomacy 
professionals to promote a government’s interpretation of an issue to foreign 
media and publics.  As mentioned earlier and detailed in the Methodology 
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chapter, this is the type of texts that were analysed in this research, because 
the focus is on the frames the Bahraini government (IAA/BNA) attempted to 
promote to foreign media and publics. The study of whether and how these 
‘advocate frames’ appeared in foreign media is beyond the scope of this study.    
Most of framing research in media context used to focus more on the 
effects of framing (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 220; Hanggli, 2012, p. 301; 
Kiousis & Wu, 2008, p. 61). Yet, in more recent years, more scholars are 
looking at the frame production processes in journalism (e.g. Bartholome et 
al., 2015; Boesman et al., 2015; Castello & Montagut, 2011; Dekavalla, 2016). 
Even in public diplomacy, more studies (Entman, 2008; Jungblut, 2017; Melki 
& Jabado, 2016; Sheafer et al., 2014; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Yarchi et al., 
2013; Zhang, 2006) are paying attention to the frame production process. 
These are discussed in section 8. The study of frame production processes is 
labelled by D’Angelo (2002, p. 880) as “the frame construction flow”. 
Scheufele’s (1999) ‘process model of framing’ offers a breakdown of this 
construction flow, and the term “frame-building” is widely used in different 
areas of communication research to study the production of frames.   
Scheufele’s (1999) ‘process model of framing’ originally provides a 
scheme for framing research in media contexts. Yet, as discussed earlier, this 
can be applied to public relations and public diplomacy contexts of frame 
construction, because professional communicators communicate tailored 
information with publics through news-makers and journalists (Cabosky, 2014, 
p. 70; Gerth & Siegert, 2012, p. 281). And, when they do so, they employ 
journalistic values in their writing to produce material that would appeal to 
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journalists (Gamson, 1988, p. 168; Jungblut, 2017, p. 387; Sheafer & Gabay, 
2009, p. 449). Further, in the examined case, communicators at the Bahraini 
government (IAA/BNA) worked in a news writing environment similar to that of 
journalistic context. Employing framing models in academic research is 
important, as they “offer a range of guidance regarding how methods and 
measures should be used to … observe frames both in texts and in the 
contexts of their production” (D’Angelo, 2012, p. 56). Scheufele (1999, pp. 
114-118) examines four stages of the framing process labelled as 1) frame-
building, 2) frame-setting, 3) individual-level effects of framing, and 4) a link 
between individual frames and media frames. My research focuses on the first 
process.   
Frame-building studies examine the various factors that influence the 
production of new frames or changes in current frames in journalistic coverage  
(Scheufele, 1999, p. 115; Scheufele, 2000, p. 307). Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996) developed the ‘hierarchal model of influence’ on media content, which 
examines influences on journalistic contexts of frame-building at five levels: 
individual; professional; organisational; external; and ideological. This model 
was originally developed in journalism studies but is used here to study public 
diplomacy frame-building. I discuss the model further in section 4.3.   
The following section reviews studies focusing on frame-building in 
public diplomacy, highlighting how they contribute to the study of public 
diplomacy from a social constructivist standpoint. It also highlights the main 
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focus of such studies, and how my research contributes to public diplomacy 
research in this area by employing Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model.    
 4.2.  Frame-Building and Public Diplomacy  
The concept of ‘frame-building’ is used by public diplomacy scholars as 
one way of examining the content of public diplomacy communications. This 
section highlights how public diplomacy frame-building studies extend their 
examination of the communication content by majorly looking at the factors 
that help public diplomats successfully promote their frames to foreign media. 
And, therefore, it highlights how my study contributes to academic research in 
this area by looking at the factors connected to the articulation of specific 
frames that appear in public diplomacy texts, such as press content shared 
with the media, and not public diplomacy frames that appear in foreign media 
content. It is beyond this research’s scope to examine whether and how 
Bahraini public diplomacy frames are adopted by foreign media and publics. 
This section also paves the way to discuss the potential of extending 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model to public diplomacy frame-building 
research.     
To deliver insights on the role of public diplomacy activities in the 
construction of social realities, Zhang (2006) conceptualises public diplomacy 
as symbolic interactionism, where nations actively engage in constructing and 
negotiating meanings of symbols and performing actions based on these 
meanings. His study examines this conceptualisation in the context of the 
international relief efforts for the Asian tsunami disaster. He uses frame 
analysis to examine news media’s coverage and interpretation of the 
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international relief efforts for the tsunami. It offers insights on the process and 
dynamics of public diplomacy by analysing how image has become a concern 
to nations, and how symbols are communicated and meanings are 
constructed. It highlights that different nations had different image concerns in 
tsunami relief, which could be linked to these nations’ motivations to engage 
in the relief efforts through specific actions. For instance, it is suggested that 
the US had explicit image building and maintenance motivations, where 
humanitarian aid could give the world, especially Muslims who opposed the 
invasion of Iraq at the time, a chance to see American values of generosity in 
action (p. 28). China, on the other hand, wanted to improve its image as a 
friendly regional power (p. 29). Although the study examines public diplomacy 
actions, it examines news media texts instead of texts written by the involved 
nations’ professional communicators.    
Entman (2008) offers one of the earliest attempts to create a model to 
study frame-building in public diplomacy when he introduced the concept of 
‘mediated public diplomacy’. As highlighted earlier, based on his US research 
context, mediated US public diplomacy is defined as “the organised attempts 
by a president and his foreign policy apparatus to exert as much control as 
possible over the framing of the US policy in foreign media” (p. 89). Before the 
introduction of this concept, he developed the ‘cascading network activation 
model’ (Entman, 2003) to explain the spread and dominance of different 
framings of US foreign policy in the American media. Entman (2008) extends 
the model to the international communication process to help understand the 
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success and failure of efforts by the US government to promote favourable 
frames on its policies in foreign news media.   
The cascading network activation model investigates the dissemination 
of frames from the US president and administration through the networks of 
elites outside the administration who also serve as media sources; to the 
networks of news organisations and within and across them; to the networks 
of journalists; on to the textual networks of connected and repeated keywords, 
themes and visual images and symbols published in media texts; and finally 
to the networks of associations activated in citizens’ minds. The president and 
members of his administration have the greatest power to initiate these 
associations, but each succeeding level also has some potential impact, and 
important feedback loops exist (Entman, 2008, pp. 90-91).  
 The extension of this model to international media includes the addition 
of external forces that interact with the political communication system in the 
foreign nation:  
These external influences include those arising from private 
communications (diplomatic feelers, informal and formal 
negotiating stands, threats, and the like) between US leaders and 
the foreign country’s elites; coverage of the US policy by the global 
media (including the US media) which influences foreign elites and 
journalists…; and US longer term public diplomacy as well as 
narrower mediated diplomatic efforts to shape the foreign political 
communication system’s output” (Entman, 2008, p. 97).   
The goal of extending the model to international media is to understand 
the conditions under which foreign support for American foreign policies can 
be stimulated by US public diplomacy initiatives that employ mediated 
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communication (p. 88). He argues that the success of mediated public 
diplomacy depends mainly on political cultural compatibility between the US 
and the targeted nation, and the motivations, power, and strategy of foreign 
elites to promote positive news of the US in their own media (p. 92). Therefore, 
he offers a framework to examine the factors that may help a government 
successfully promote its frames to foreign media.   
Entman’s (2008) work is utilised by other scholars such as Sheafer and 
Gabay (2009). They focus on the competition over international agenda 
building and frame-building as one central strategic activity in public diplomacy 
by examining the cases of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and the general 
elections in the Palestinian authority. Their research examines the success 
and failure of public diplomacy efforts to promote each actor’s agenda and 
frames in the US news media. It is stated that “the attempt by national actors 
to influence the media in foreign countries is the initial step in a public 
diplomacy process and involves dominating agenda building and frame-
building” (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 448). This suggests the centrality of both 
media relations and frame-building in public diplomacy. They highlight that an 
actor’s success in promoting their frames to the media could be related to 
factors of political power; cultural and political resonance with the journalists 
and the general publics of the target nation; and communication and political 
skills (p. 449). Their particular context of examination suggests that one actor’s 
success in promoting their agenda and framing to foreign media is related to 
cultural and political congruency between itself and the target nation (p. 463). 
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They also highlight that the success of one actor in promoting their frame to 
the media does not necessarily mean the acceptance of all the frame 
dimensions (problem definition; causal interpretation; treatment 
recommendation; and moral evaluation; Entman, 1993). This suggests that 
promoting a complete frame to the media is complicated (Sheafer & Gabay, 
2009, p. 463).  They also state that “more empirical studies in the field of public 
diplomacy, specifically on agenda and frame-building, are required in order to 
shed light on the mechanisms that affect the success of promoting countries’ 
issues and images” (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 464). My research addresses 
this by looking at the factors related to the articulation of specific public 
diplomacy frames before they reach media content.   
Jungblut (2017) is another scholar who builds on Entman’s (2008) 
concept of mediated public diplomacy. He examines how the German and 
Hungarian governments communicated their positions on the recent migrant 
crisis in Europe to foreign publics. He analyses the content of English 
language press releases and their reflection in the news coverage of CNN and 
Al-Jazeera. Thus, his work examines both governments’ attempts to influence 
the media’s agenda and framing, and indicators of their success in doing so. 
He hints at the five levels of analysis offered by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) 
in his examination of frame-building in mediated public diplomacy. 
Nevertheless, these five levels are discussed in their original media context as 
important forces that public diplomats need to appreciate in order to 
understand how media news comes into being, and thus increase chances of 
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successful framing through the media (Jungblut, 2017, p. 387). It is also 
highlighted that professional communicators, like public diplomats and public 
relations practitioners, know about media routine practices and thus adjust 
their messages to journalistic standards and demands (ibid). He argues that 
professional communicators’ familiarity with journalistic routines can help them 
put together information subsidies (e.g. news; press releases) that will 
successfully access the media agenda of the most important topics. 
Nevertheless, it is emphasised that journalists will not passively transmit the 
press releases as they are. Rather, they are edited and integrated into a news 
story alongside additional context. “At least in international opinion-leading 
media outlets, journalists still critically evaluate the incoming source material 
despite the increasing shortage of time and resources that media 
organisations have to face” (Jungblut, 2017, p. 395). Therefore, his work is 
another example of public diplomacy frame-building research which focuses 
on the factors that help public diplomats successfully promote their frames to 
foreign media, which also delivers insights on public diplomacy activities that 
contribute to the construction of specific versions of reality.     
Sheafer, Shenhav, Takens and van Atteveldt (2014) also offer empirical 
examination of a country’s success in its mediated public diplomacy efforts. 
They focus on the roles of value proximity and political proximity in successful 
frame-building by a nation in foreign media. Value proximity involves political 
values’ proximity and affinity, while political proximity represents shared 
political and policy interests (p. 150). They examine the role of these factors in 
the case of the Israeli mediated public diplomacy efforts during the war in Gaza 
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in the winter of 2008-2009. They first analyse daily internal messages from the 
Israeli Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to trace the 
production of Israeli strategic messages during the war on a daily basis4. They 
then content analyse international media coverage during the war. They argue 
that the closer the relative proximity between Israel and a foreign country, the 
greater the acceptance of Israel’s frames.     
Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer and Shenhav (2013) extend discussions on 
mediated public diplomacy by examining the level of success that countries 
and non-state actors have in promoting their preferred frames about terror to 
the international news media. They use quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis of official publications and websites to understand what the preferred 
frames by state and non-state actors on a specific terrorist attack were. This 
is combined with quantitative analysis of large sample of news stories about 
terrorist attacks published in several national newspapers. They suggest that 
the nature of the trigger events that generate news coverage of terrorism have 
the most significant effect on the way foreign media covers conflicts. Other 
factors examined in the study are policy and political values proximity between 
the country attacked and the targeted country whose news media are also 
targeted for influence, in addition to the experience of the target country in 
dealing with terror. They argue that understanding how political actors 
                                            
4 It is worth noting that their examination of internal messages is significant to public diplomacy 
research, specifically because it is an unusual opportunity to access sensitive restricted data which 
can deliver insights on a country’s frame-building during a war.  
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successfully promote their preferred frames to foreign media can help states 
manage their public diplomacy in their struggle against terrorism.      
Therefore, the above discussion highlights the attention to frame-building 
in public diplomacy research. Although this line of research is relatively limited, 
it offers insights on the factors that may help public diplomats successfully 
promote their frames to foreign media. This is significant for theory and 
practice as is it helps understand the conditions under which foreign support 
for a nation’s foreign policy or decisions made in international context can be 
stimulated by this nation’s mediated public diplomacy (Entman, 2008, p. 88). 
Nevertheless, available research on frame-building in public diplomacy does 
not examine the background processes and factors connected to the 
articulation of specific versions of reality in public diplomacy texts. It is 
mentioned that professional communicators, such as public diplomats, 
familiarise themselves with journalistic norms of producing news content to 
produce information subsidies (e.g. news items; press releases) that meet 
journalistic standards to gain media access and successful framing (Gamson, 
1988, p. 168; Jungblut, 2017, p. 387; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 449). This 
may contribute to the understanding of some factors related to the articulation 
of public diplomacy frames at the professional routines level. However, it does 
not highlight how other levels of influence may also contribute to the frame 
construction. Therefore, my research examines the factors and background 
processes connected to the articulation of frames in public diplomacy texts 
using Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model. As mentioned earlier, they 
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developed the ‘hierarchal model of influence’ which examines the construction 
of journalistic messages at five levels: individual, professional routine, 
organisational, external, and ideological. The next section further discusses 
this model, and how it is applied to frame-building in public diplomacy in this 
study.   
 4.3.  Shoemaker & Reese (1996) Hierarchal Model of Influence   
This section focuses on Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) ‘hierarchal 
model of influence’ which was developed to study factors of influence on 
journalists’ construction of frames. The model is used in this thesis in a public 
diplomacy context, and I discuss below the structure of this model and how it 
is transferred to this context and can be used to study frame-building factors 
in public diplomacy.    
Public diplomacy and journalism are different fields of work and 
research (Edwards & Pieczka, 2013, p. 7). The former, as indicated earlier, 
aims to influence foreign public opinion for the benefit of the sponsoring 
government (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; L’Eatng, 2006, p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 
1992, p. 139), while the latter’s general goal is to inform publics. Nevertheless, 
despite their different interests, both journalists and public diplomacy 
communicators have overlapping roles of constructing social realities (Ihlen 
&van Ruler, 2007, p. 246; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009, p. 10; White & Hobsbawm, 
2007, p. 291), and both use available information selectively in the process of 
communicating with targeted publics (Seib, 2009, p. 774; White & Hobsbawm, 
2007, p. 287) influenced by factors in their personal, professional and 
organisational environment. Therefore, framing is at the core of both 
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professional practices (Gilboa, 2008, p. 64; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 447), 
and this suggests the potential of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model to 
deliver insights on different levels of influence in public diplomacy frame-
building, if it is applied to this field. The specific factors influencing public 
diplomacy professionals may be different from those influencing journalists. 
However, the broad categories in which these influences fall (individual, 
professional, organisational, external, ideological) may be usefully transferred 
from one domain to the other to help us better understand public diplomacy 
frame-building. Further, the model offers a framework to explore the level of 
strategic intent in the articulation of messages (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 
252). Hence, it offers a framework to explore the level of strategic intent in the 
articulation of public diplomacy frames and the crisis response strategies they 
represent.  
With this approach, my research aims to contribute to academic 
discussions on frame-building in public diplomacy in an effort to deliver insights 
on background public diplomacy activities and message construction in times 
of a crisis and its aftermath. This is done by specifically looking at the factors 
that contribute to the construction of frames in public diplomacy texts (news 
items produced by IAA/BNA), and not factors that contribute to the adoption of 
public diplomacy frames in media texts. As Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) 
model is a media/journalism theoretical framework, utilising it in my research 
responds to academic calls to use multidisciplinary approaches to study public 
diplomacy, which should help us understand how public diplomacy works 
(Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 211; Gilboa, 2008, p. 75).  
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I discuss here how the hierarchal model is critically used in this project 
to understand the factors connected to the production of specific versions of 
reality by public diplomacy communicators. It is important to note that the 
model provides a beneficial framework to disentangle the complex 
relationships between different factors of influence at five different levels. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that these levels interact with each 
other and do not work in isolation. The model is displayed in Figure 2, where 
the ‘onion structure’ emphasises the interaction and interrelatedness among 
different layers of influence.   






 83  
  
The individual level   
The first level of influence is the individual level, which looks at the 
personal characteristics of journalists and how they may contribute to frame-
building. For example, it examines the effect of journalists’ personal values, 
attitudes, and professional and educational backgrounds on the content that 
they produce (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 63). Moreover, the individual 
level investigates how journalists’ conception of their professional role is 
connected to frame-building. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) suggest two role 
conceptions: neutral transmitters of events or active participants in developing 
a story. Within the first perception, journalists are more likely to adopt source 
frames as they are, and within the second they would promote their own 
frames instead. Note though that media organisations impose bureaucratic 
controls over the production of media content, and these controls limit the 
influence of individual journalists’ professional orientations (p. 93). Similarly, 
professional communicators, especially at public organisations like 
governmental institutions, are “bounded by confidentiality and loyalty to 
political decisions, and bureaucratic culture and norms” (Ihlen & 
Thorbjornsrud, 2014, p. 46), suggesting restricted ability to develop their own 
frames without consulting the government or gaining government’s approval. 
In this project, therefore, the individual level of analysis looks at the personal 
characteristics of public diplomacy communicators, and how these may be 
connected to the frame-building process at the IAA/BNA. This includes the 
investigation whether and how their experience and professional background 
is related to the frame-building at the IAA/BNA during the examined crisis.   
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The professional routines level   
The second level of the hierarchal model of influence is the media routines 
level. This level examines patterns of response to common situations 
“including the routine and craft norms that are so much a part of a systematic 
information gathering … they form cohesive set of rules and become 
integrated parts of what it means to be a media professional” (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996, p. 106). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) discuss routines that 
work to satisfy the news’ sources, the organisation, or the audience. For 
instance, they discuss routines in relation to private newsmakers which seek 
financial benefits from news making that exceed the production cost. Another 
media routine is the tradition of aspiring to write impartially (ibid, p. 88), which 
requires the inclusion of oppositional voices in coverage, and is considered 
good journalism (Bartholome et al, 2015, p. 442). There is also the routine of 
journalistic storytelling, which often leads to the addition of an element of 
conflict by using dramatic depictions to a story to transform events into a news 
product and make an issue a vivid story (ibid). However, this study looks at 
the routines related to the profession of public diplomacy and public relations 
in governmental contexts. More specifically, it examines the role that public 
diplomacy professional routines play in message construction and production. 
These activities and messages are important as they have a powerful potential 
to contribute to the co-construction of specific versions of reality. For example, 
as this project studies public diplomacy in a governmental context, one 
professional routine that needs to be considered is the profession’s aim to 
influence the recipients’ perceptions for the benefit of the sponsoring 
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government (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; L’Eatng, 2006, p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 
1992, p. 139). Further, work routines in governmental contexts imply the 
bureaucratic and top-down routines of decision-making processes (Lee, 2009; 
Sanders, 2011).   
Specifically in terms of professional rituals of message construction, 
some professional communicators, like public diplomats and public relations 
practitioners, familiarise themselves with media routine practices and thus 
adjust their messages to journalistic standards and demands (Gamson, 1988, 
p. 168; Hallahan, 1999, p. 228; Jungblut, 2017, p. 387). They subsidise 
journalists with information in the form of news which can help journalists 
reduce the time and cost of news-gathering. Fulfilling journalistic needs aims 
to increase professional communicators’ chances of successfully promoting 
advocate frames to the media to shape its agenda and frame-building 
(Jungblut, 2017, p. 387; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 449). It is noteworthy; 
however, that journalism is not mere transmission of press releases or 
advocate frames (Jungblut, 2017, p. 395). The suggested similarity between 
public diplomats and journalists’ routines of producing news texts further 
supports the potential of extending Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) media 
model to public diplomacy.   
Moreover, it is observed that some news stories published through 
state-owned media are perceived as objective, while others are pushing a 
government’s agenda on certain critical issues (Zhang et al., 2017, pp. 239-
240). This suggests that state-owned media “have a dual role as an official 
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news service that produces information judged by traditional, western criteria 
to be newsworthy, and as a platform for the distribution of information 
subsidies from the government” (ibid). Note that I discussed earlier that the 
BNA is a state-owned communication platform, highlighting it is a channel that 
the government uses to distribute information subsidies to foreign journalists 
and publics in the form of journalistic work.     
Despite emphasis on professional communicators’ familiarity with 
journalistic standards and demands (Gamson, 1988, p. 168; Hallahan, 1999, 
p. 228; Jungblut, 2017, p. 387), Ihlen and Thorbjornsrud (2014, p. 46) highlight 
how public institutions, like governmental institutions “use bureaucratic 
language with complex arguments or references to laws and directives, and 
how this is a poor fit with the formats of the media”. Moreover, in a crisis 
situation, which is examined here, Avraham (2015, p. 228), argues that Arab 
communicators tend to minimise a crisis when it is presented in the media. 
Note though that this is discussed in destination marketing context, which is 
beyond the focus of this study. Nevertheless, it delivers insights on Arab 
communicators’ rituals of presenting crises through the media. Avraham 
(2015) also notes that this communication ritual is observed in this region 
significantly before the ‘Arab Spring’, suggesting the commonality of this 
routine in handling crises in the Arab region.   
The organisational level   
The third level in Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model is the 
organisational level, which focuses on organisational structures, policies, and 
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processes that lead to variation in content between media organisations, and 
explains “variations in content that cannot be attributed to differences in 
routines and individuals” (p. 139). In this research, the organisational level also 
looks at the organisational structures, policies, and processes yet in a public 
diplomacy organisation (IAA/BNA). In a journalistic context, the organisational 
level of influence usually overrules the influence of the first two levels. The 
organisational structure may limit the journalist’s decisions on the content of 
the communication, whether these decisions stem from individual-level 
characteristics or occupational rituals (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 140). 
Similar to journalism, organisational culture has a significant role in the 
practice of public relations (Edwards, 2014a, p. 321), and by implication on 
public diplomacy.  Therefore, it is significant to understand how organisational 
level factors may influence the articulation of frames communicated by public 
diplomacy in a crisis situation.  
Among the extremely limited discussions on Bahraini public relations 
and public diplomacy, AlSaqer (2008) offers insights on the position of public 
relations’ departments in several types of organisations in Bahrain, including 
government institutions. She highlights the marginalisation of public relations’ 
functions because different types of organisations (consultancies, non-profits, 
governmental, banks) only had the title of public relations for specific 
departments, while they were doing a mixture of technical tasks such as 
secretary, sales and marketing (p. 78). In governmental entities in specific, 
public relations suffered unclear social perspective and failure to perform as a 
management function (ibid). More recently, Jones (2017, p. 326) mentions that 
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the Bahraini government employed several Western public relations 
companies to rebuild an image of stability, which has been the core of 
Bahrain’s public diplomacy efforts since the examined crisis unfold. These 
companies include “Bell Pottinger, Qorvis, and M&C Saatchi”, and they 
focused on promoting more positive image of Bahrain by promoting investment 
in the Kingdom to blur the negative image resulting from accusations of human 
rights abuses (ibid). My research examines whether and how these factors 
have connections with IAA/BNA articulation of public diplomacy frames during 
the Bahraini 2011 crisis.   
The external level  
The fourth level of influence is labelled in Shoemaker and Reese’s 
(1996) work as extra-media and examines the factors that influence media 
content from outside the media organisation. In this thesis, however, this level 
is labelled ‘external factors’ as it looks at factors from outside the organisation 
practicing public diplomacy (IAA/BNA), and to avoid the confusion with media 
organisations. In the original media context, public relations and public 
diplomacy is part of the external layer of the hierarchal model. In my research, 
media is considered one among other external factors that may be connected 
to frame-building in IAA/BNA. Other external factors can be on-ground 
developments such as the escalation of the protests and drop in levels of 




 89  
  
The ideological level   
The fifth and final level of the hierarchal model is the ideological level. 
This level examines factors that contribute to the articulation of frames 
interpreted from the perspective of power centres in a society (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996, pp. 223-224). The analysis of ideological level factors in this 
project aims to understand connections between the communication of 
specific frames through Bahraini public diplomacy and the effort to maintain 
the status quo of powerful actors (government, leadership). This is expected 
to have connections with the frame-building at IAA/BNA, especially because 
public diplomacy is understood in this research from a realist viewpoint- it is a 
power tool in the hands of the state, which, through promoting specific versions 
of reality serves the interests of nation-states, and public diplomats’ aim is to 
boost the power of a state by promoting its values through rhetorically 
defending its interests (Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 383). I discussed earlier that 
realist conceptualisations of public diplomacy are most reflective of how it is 
practiced in real-world (Fisher, 2010, p. 277; Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 383). 
In Arab countries in particular “most important is the socio-economic, political, 
social, legal and organisational context in which public relations [and here 
public diplomacy] operate in the Arab world. Public relations is highly tied to 
governmental institutions and is looked at as a tool of publicity, manipulation 
and protocol” (Kirat, 2005, p. 325). This suggests possible connections 
between frame-building and attempts to maintain power positions of the 
nation-state.  
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The five levels of the hierarchal model are employed in this thesis to 
organise our understanding of the factors and background processes 
connected to Bahraini public diplomacy frame-building during the examined 
crisis. As mentioned earlier, previous research on frame-building in public 
diplomacy evaluate the success or failure of public diplomacy frames in being 
adopted by the press, by exploring which factors contribute to journalists’ 
adoption of frames promoted by public diplomacy communicators. In my study, 
however, my focus is on the factors that may contribute to the articulation of 
frames by public diplomacy practitioners themselves, and not the factors that 
may contribute to their adoption by journalists or other recipients. Whether and 
how these frames were adopted by foreign media falls outside the scope of 
my thesis, because the focus is on the framing process of public diplomacy 
messages and not on their coverage in the media.  
The past three subsections (framing theory; frame-building & public 
diplomacy; the hierarchal model of influence) discussed the concept of framing 
and frame-building and how these may be usefully extended to discuss the 
formation of public diplomacy messages. Framing has potential in public 
relations and public diplomacy research. The purpose of this review is to 
present the significance of frame analysis as a framework to study versions of 
reality promoted in Bahraini public diplomacy messages. The frame analysis 
through the lens of the social constructivist paradigm should offer insights on 
the multiplicity of versions of reality communicated by different actors on a 
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specific issue (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 104). This project specifically focuses on 
the frames communicated by one actor: the Bahraini government  
(IAA/BNA).    
The following section reviews the available studies on framing Bahrain 
in relation to the examined crisis.  
 4.4.  The Bahraini 2011 Crisis in Framing Research  
There are only a few studies that use the concept of framing in relation to 
the examined 2011 Bahraini crisis (Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2015; Bowe & 
Hoewe, 2011; Pinto, 2014), and none of them focuses on the frames 
communicated by the Bahraini government. Therefore, my research extends 
academic discussions on the framing of the Bahraini crisis by systematically 
examining the frames communicated by the Bahraini government, specifically 
frames present in BNA’s online content. This aims to contribute to research on 
the co-construction of the reality of the Bahraini crisis by offering insights on 
public diplomacy frames which is one among other factors that would 
contribute to the co-creation of social reality about the examined crisis. This 
section discusses these studies, highlighting which stakeholders they focus on 
and what they found, how the framing concept is used, and whether they offer 
frames which may be used in the analysis in this thesis.  
Al-Rawi (2015) and Pinto (2014) suggest that one of the frames related to 
the examined crisis is the ‘existential threat’ frame. My research employs 
insights from these two studies to operationalize the use of this frame in the 
frame analysis.  AlRawi (2015) did a content analysis of comments of Bahraini 
online activists on YouTube videos about the Bahraini crisis. He suggests the 
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examined crisis was framed as a foreign conspiracy by Iran against Bahrain 
and other GCC5  countries to infiltrate into the region and spread Shiism. 
Sectarianism was widely referred to in the context of the Bahraini crisis. The 
historical conflict between the Sunni monarchies of the GCC countries and the 
Shiite leadership in Iran was used to discredit the cause of the mostly Shiite 
protestors, as, according to this frame, they were seen as betrayers for 
supporting an Iranian agenda in the Arab and GCC region (Al-Rawi, 2015, pp. 
25- 26). To understand how this frame was manifested in the activists’ 
comments between February-October 2011, Al-Rawi measures the dominant 
words and phrases in the comments, in addition to the most recurrent 
associations between them. I use his insights to operationalize the analysis of 
this frame in my project. Yet, instead of only using the individual words he 
counted, which would not deliver an in-depth understanding of the co-text in 
which they were used, I employ his explanations of what the most used 
associations imply to form the elements of this frame. The Methodology 
chapter details how insights from Al-Rawi’s (2015) work are used in this project 
to operationalize the frame analysis.   
Pinto (2014) explores how the Bahraini leadership “successfully” promoted 
a securitised frame in messages6 targeted at other GCC countries between 
early 2011 until August 2013. She considers GCC’s response of sending the 
Peninsula Shield Forces (PSF) to Bahrain as evidence of the success of this 
                                            
5 The Gulf Cooperation Council, founded in 1981. It comprises: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman.   
6 The author does not specify the source of the messages, i.e. whether collected from media sources or any 
other source.  
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frame (p. 169). She mentions that a securitised frame is built in messages 
targeted at other GCC countries through the “construction of an existential 
threat as regards a referent object must contain certain elements that convince 
the audience to move the subject from the realm of normal politics into one of 
extraordinary measures” (Pinto, 2014, p. 166). According to her, the elements 
of a successful securitised frame by the Bahraini authorities were: 
representing Iran as a threat that wanted to invade GCC and spread Shiism 
through Bahrain; targeting other GCC countries and their Sunni monarchies 
who also have historical conflict with Iran; spreading the message through the 
king of Bahrain- a trusted source of a securitised message; and asking for 
foreign military intervention (p. 168). The Methodology chapter details how I 
used insights from this study in the frame analysis.  
On the other hand, Bowe and Hoewe’s (2011) frame analysis only 
measures whether positive or negative framings were employed by three US 
newspapers (New York Times; Los Angeles Times; Washington Post) in their 
coverage of the Bahraini crisis between January-March 2011. They count 
which sides (protestors or government supporters) were represented in 
articles sampled from these newspapers and the number of words quoted or 
paraphrased from these sources. Based on these measurements they identify 
different levels of negative and positive framings of the studied topic. This 
analysis does not provide an approach to help to understand the situation in 
Bahrain during the studied timeframe and does not adopt the same 
understanding of framing used in the present thesis (frames as schemata 
proposing problem definitions, evaluations and treatment recommendations, 
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as explained earlier in this chapter). Frame analysis is understood in my 
research as more than a classification of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ narratives on 
a certain topic (Tankard, 2001). Nevertheless, despite the different 
understanding of frame analysis in Bowe and Hoewe (2011), it delivers 
insights on whose voices dominated in foreign media in relation to the 
examined crisis. They suggest that the content of the analysed US 
newspapers was overwhelmingly against the Bahraini government- in the 
findings I will discuss how negative international coverage impacted on the 
messaging of the Bahraini authorities.   
Another relevant study is the work of Maguire and Vickers (2013). They do 
not use frame analysis, but their work delivers very relevant and significant 
insights on the portrayal of the Bahraini crisis in the international arena. They 
use discourse analysis to explore British foreign policy officials’ responses to 
the crisis in Bahrain compared to that in Libya. By analysing speeches, 
statements and press releases issued by British key government ministries 
between February-December 2011, the study concludes that the crisis in 
Bahrain was referred to as “events [that] had led to deaths of some protestors”, 
unlike Libya where “civilians were being brutally attacked by a dictatorial 
regime” (Maguire & Vickers, 2013, p. 23 emphasis in original). According to 
them, the effect of British official references to the case of Bahrain as only 
‘events’ was to downplay the seriousness of the situation and the importance 
of the protestors’ actions (p. 14). Discourses employed by British foreign policy 
officials state that “dialogue” between the government and the protestors, and 
further “reform” was enough to solve any issues (p. 23).  Furthermore, officials 
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referred to those involved in the events as “protestors” rather than “civilians” 
or “rebels”. This is to suggest that Bahraini protestors “are similar to those who 
protest in the UK, for example against government cuts, or increased fees, 
rather than for a change of government. Although this does not portray them 
as being legitimate, non-violent and organised, it does not give an impetus for 
mass sympathy and comes without the connotations of innocence or empathy 
framing” (p. 14). I considered the portrayal of the situation in Bahrain as 
‘events’ as a frame that emerged from narratives used by IAA/BNA to promote 
such an interpretation of what was happening in Bahrain to foreign media. The 
textual elements identified through Maguire and Vickers’s (2013) discourse 
analysis suggesting this representation were employed as potential elements 
of this frame. These elements are detailed in the Methodology chapter.   
This section reviewed relevant framing studies on the presentation of the 
Bahraini crisis. It offers insights on potential frames and frame elements that 
can be used in the frame analysis in this project. Yet, as discussed earlier, the 
2011 Bahraini crisis coincided with protests in other Arab countries, which 
were widely referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’ (Avraham, 2015; Karolak, 2012, 
p. 173). While the literature offers limited number of studies on the framing of 
the Bahraini crisis, the literature on framing during the ‘Arab Spring’ is 
dominated by discussions on Egypt. Moreover, there are relatively limited 
studies that look at the ‘Arab Spring’ form a public diplomacy perspective, 
comparing to the focus on the role of social media during the Arab Spring. The 
next section discusses research on the Arab Spring with focus on framing and 
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public diplomacy. It highlights insights offered by this line of research and 
positions the current study among them.  
 4.5.  The ‘Arab Spring’ in Public Diplomacy and Framing Research      
This section discusses how the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon is approached 
in public diplomacy and framing literature. In terms of public diplomacy, it is 
observed that the major focus is on Western actors’ public diplomacy activities 
in relation to the ‘Arab Spring’, while Arab countries engagement in public 
diplomacy remains a largely untapped area. Regarding framing, the focus is 
on the framing of the situation among several foreign media platforms, and not 
the framing of public diplomacy messages or the content of state-owned 
media. Yet, it delivers insights on the presentation of the ‘Arab Spring’ in media 
platforms from different geographical and ideological contexts.   
First of all, I use insights from previous studies to define the ‘Arab Spring’ 
using Entman’s (1993) four dimensions of a frame (problem definition, causal 
interpretation, treatment recommendations, and moral evaluation). The 
problem definition within the ‘Arab Spring’ frame presents the Arab 
demonstrations as revolutions by oppressed people against dictatorships 
(Maguire & Vickers, 2013), and an outbreak of democratic change in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Joffe, 2011, p. 507). The causal interpretation is 
the accumulated political and economic tensions and challenges that have not 
been resolved by Arab leaders but, instead, artificially repressed in the search 
for stability for their power position and authority (Joffe, 2011, p. 508). The 
recommended treatment is regime overthrows and urgent international military 
intervention to help protestors bring down what was perceived as oppressive 
 97  
  
regimes (Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 129). In terms of moral 
judgment, the frame provokes sympathy and support for the protesters, and 
thus legitimises regime overthrows and foreign military interventions to help 
oppressed citizens pursue democratic change (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 
1365). This description of the frame highlights the broader cultural framework 
in which the Bahraini crisis evolved. The Methodology chapter further 
discusses the role of the Arab Spring frame in my research.   
Regarding public diplomacy and the Arab Spring, Yli-Kaitala (2014), for 
example, examines the events in Egypt in the context of US public diplomacy 
efforts to drive public opinion in the Middle East. Golan (2013), on the other 
hand, examines how two elite European newspapers (The International Herald 
Tribune and the European edition of the Wall Street Journal) used op-eds as 
public diplomacy tools during the Arab Spring to interpret and advocate 
divergent policy stances about the Egyptian upheavals for Western readers. 
Other scholars like Cofelice (2016), for instance, examine the role of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean during the Arab Spring as an 
example of parliamentary actor engaging in public diplomacy. Samei (2015), 
studies public diplomacy of the European Union towards the Arab Spring by 
specifically focusing on the case of Egypt. These studies suggest interest in 
examining different types of actors’ (e.g. state and non-state actors) 
engagement in public diplomacy in relation to the Arab Spring. Yet, there is 
limited research on public diplomacy by Arab countries themselves witnessing 
mass protests during 2011.   
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 In terms of framing research and the ‘Arab Spring’, Guzman (2016), for 
example, examines the evolution of US news media frames of participants in 
the 2011 Egyptian upheavals (Mubarak and the government; anti-government 
protestors; Muslim brotherhood). She suggests that frames present in news 
stories texts appearing on CNN.com and Foxnews.com predominantly reflect 
US political ideology that favours people seeking democracy over authoritarian 
rule and remains wary of Islam. Du (2016) investigates how the Arab Spring 
events were framed by news media in mainland China compared with that in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. The study reveals significant differences in coverage 
among the three markets and interprets this in terms of the ideological 
differences and differences in press freedom. Mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan are in close geographic and cultural proximity but are in stark 
ideological contrast. They have a not free, a partially free, and a free media 
system, respectively (p. 100). Although Du (2016) does not examine the 
framing of the Arab spring by Arab countries, her work delivers insights on the 
framing of the Arab Spring in contexts other than the dominantly examined 
Western (especially US) media, and insights on media coverage of events that 
are culturally and politically distant and unfamiliar to their general publics. 
These studies highlight interest in examining the framing of Arab Spring events 
in different countries. Nevertheless, the focus remains on foreign media’s 
framing instead of the involved countries’ framing. Therefore, this section 
highlights that the current literature on public diplomacy during the Arab Spring 
does not focus on Arab countries public diplomacy responses to the crisis. 
Further, it suggests that framing research mainly focuses on the presentations 
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of the Arab Spring by different foreign news media, and not by the Arab 
governments. And, in both cases, the focus remains on the Arab Spring events 
in Egypt. Therefore, my research focus on Bahraini public diplomacy 
responses to the 2011 crisis aims to extend studies on the ‘Arab Spring’ 
context in a number of ways. First, the focus on Bahrain offers insights on 
another Arab country largely overlooked in the literature with a dominant focus 
on Egypt. Second, the focus on the Bahraini practice of public diplomacy 
during 2011 offers an example of an Arab country’s engagement in public 
diplomacy in the Arab Spring context instead of western state and non-state 
actors. And third, the focus on the content of the Bahraini government’s public 
diplomacy delivers insights on a government rather than media framing during 
the Arab Spring.     
As the examined context in this research is a crisis situation, the 
following section discusses crisis communication, which is another relevant 
area in this research. It discusses how crisis communication is understood 
from a social constructivist viewpoint; the role of public diplomacy in crisis 
communication, the significance of framing during crises, and the most 
common crisis response strategies as proposed by Benoit’s (1997) image 
repair theory.   
  
5. CRISIS COMMUNICATION   
 5.1.  Crisis Communication and Social Constructivism   
Form a social constructivist perspective, “crises are social constructions 
produced by the organisational member’s perception and sense-making 
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processes” (Heide, 2009, p. 43). This is different from the dominant 
functionalist approaches to study crises in public relations, where a crisis is 
understood as “a result of some external threats in the surrounding 
environment. Thus, a crisis is normally understood as an objective and a ‘real’ 
thing ‘out there’, which hits and affects an organisation at full strength. As a 
consequence, an organisation is supposed to react to the objective crisis and 
immediately act in order to revert to an imagined state of equilibrium.” (ibid, p. 
44) These different perspectives on the understanding of a crisis affect the 
focus of academic research on crisis communication.   
Crisis communication is the main field of research on how different types 
of organisations communicatively respond to different types of crises, and is a 
significant area of public relations’ practice and research. As a result to the risk 
in today’s society imposed by modernity, and media’s intensive focus on crises 
taking place in this risk society; crisis communication has received a lot of 
attention from public relations’ researchers and has become an emerging field 
in public relations (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, 2002 in Heide, 2009, p. 44). 
Falkheimer & Heide (2006, p. 181), for instance, state that “Crisis 
communication is the core of public relations practice and theory. From a 
historical standpoint ‘damage control’, managing public opinion, mainly 
through mass media, set off the public relations industry” (see also Lyu, 2012, 
p. 782). With this popularity as a field of study in public relations, crisis 
communication research was dominated by case studies, and 
recommendations on best practices and guidelines on how practitioners 
 101  
  
should respond to crises (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006, p. 180; Hearit & 
Courtright, 2003, p. 79; Heide, 2009, pp. 44-45). Yet, crisis communication 
research has moved beyond this with the development of theoretical models 
and examination from different theoretical positions. In the dominant 
positivistic approaches to crisis communication research, crises are “objective 
phenomena that have similar characteristics and, therefore, may be remedied 
with similarly ‘appropriate’ media strategies and decision-making rules” (Hearit 
& Courtright, 2003, p. 80). A social constructivist approach, on the other hand, 
“argues that crises are above all communicative creation, and as such, their 
successful management and resolution is fundamentally communicative” 
(ibid). In the functionalist realm, studies focus on how organisations should 
respond to crises without offering insights on how to frame specific responses 
(Hearit & Courtright, 2003, p. 80). Alternatively, a social constructivist 
approach to crisis communication means that “crisis communication is 
understood and analysed as a sense-making process … where reality is 
negotiated and constructed in cultural contexts and situations, rather than 
distributed from a sender to a recipient” (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006, p. 180; 
see also Heide, 2009, p. 54). Therefore, a social constructivist approach to 
crisis communication suggests that this study does not aim to evaluate how 
the Bahraini government responded to the examined crisis through public 
diplomacy, or suggest how it should respond. Instead, a constructivist 
approach suggests the examination of crises as collective linguistic 
reconstructions by several stakeholders, and my research specifically focuses 
on the constructions offered by Bahraini public diplomacy (IAA/BNA) during 
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the 2011 crisis, taking into account that within this umbrella there are several 
stakeholders with conflicting views. The frame analysis aims to systematically 
deliver insights on versions of reality promoted through online content shared 
with foreign media, and the interviews aim to offer an understanding on the 
background processes of articulating specific versions of reality in government 
messages. This framework aims to deliver insights on public diplomacy 
processes that contribute to the construction of specific versions of reality 
communicated on behalf of the government during a crisis and its aftermath.  
A crisis triggers questions on an organisations’ social legitimacy, 
threatening the organisation’s reputation and related assets (Coombs, 2011, 
p. 215). In terms of public diplomacy and governmental contexts, emotional 
news stories about public organisations (e.g. government) and how their 
functions negatively affect publics can threaten the reputation and legitimacy 
of such organisation (Ihlen & Thorbjornsrud, 2014, p. 45). Crisis response is 
critical as crises create demand for information, and stakeholders, 
spearheaded by media, will seek information to understand the situation. From 
a positivist perspective, a ‘quick’ response by the organisation will help meet 
stakeholders’ demand for information, minimising the room for speculation or 
other competing actors’ un-favourable framing (Coombs, 2006, p. 172). A 
constructivist view of a crisis suggests that crises create “framing contests” 
between different actors (e.g. governments; protestors; the media) to define 
the situation at hand from their own perspective, and to promote such 
definitions to relevant members of the public (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; see also 
Galloway, 2016, p. 469). This is critical as failure or success in crisis 
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communication is often a matter of whose crisis frame dominates the situation 
(Coombs, 2011, p. 223; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 447; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 
263). Hence, a crisis response may critically contribute to an organisation’s 
image and reputation, and in terms of public diplomacy, it is vital in maintaining 
a nation’s image and other soft power resources among foreign media and 
publics.   
Crisis response research is divided into two main streams, the first 
focusing on ‘form’ and the other on ‘content’. ‘Form’ studies what should be 
done, while ‘content’ focuses on what is said in the message (Coombs, 2006, 
p. 171). From a functionalist perspective, three main lessons are emphasised 
through crisis communication literature focusing on the form of response: “be 
quick, be consistent, and be open” (ibid, p. 172). Research on the ‘content’ 
looks at crisis response strategies employed to maintain the organisational 
reputation and rebuild its legitimacy (Coombs, 2011). Two widely used 
theories to study crisis response are Coomb’s (2006) ‘situational crisis 
communication theory’, and Benoit’s (1995) ‘image repair theory’ which is 
employed in this thesis. The situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) is 
a “prescriptive system for matching crisis responses to the crisis situation” 
(Coomb, 2006, p. 149). It offers a set of crisis response strategies and 
suggests what strategies are most effective in certain crisis situations. The 
three core premises of the SCCT are: 1) a list of crisis response strategies, 2) 
a framework for categorising crisis situations, and 3) a method for matching 
the crisis response strategy(ies) to the crisis situation (ibid, 152). Thus, the 
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theory offers a framework for evaluating crisis situations and matching them to 
the most desirable crisis response, which is beyond the focus of my research.  
Instead of evaluating the effectiveness of the Bahraini government’s 
public diplomacy messages during the 2011 crisis, my research aims to 
understand how these messages were framed and what factors contributed to 
their construction in the frame-building process during the crisis and its 
aftermath. A widely used theory in public relations’ studies of crisis response 
is Benoit’s (1995) ‘image repair theory’ (IRT) (Avery et al., 2010, p. 190; 
Maresh & Williams, 2010, p. 285), which offers a framework to analyse 
“persuasive discourse” (Benoit, 2006, p. 137). Drawing on a Western context 
of crisis situations, the theory offers a list of the most common crisis response 
strategies used by different types of actors (e.g. governments; corporations; 
public figures). I use this theory in my research to understand what crisis 
response strategies are reflected in the frames present in the Bahraini 
government’s (IAA/BNA) analysed online content. The purpose of this 
approach and the theory are detailed below.   
 5.2.  The Image Repair Theory  
The image repair theory (IRT) is applicable whenever an organisation, 
government, or a public figure’s reputation is under threat (Coombs, 2011, p. 
215). Benoit’s early discussions of the theory (e.g. Benoit, 1995; 1997) labelled 
it as the image ‘restoration’ theory, but now he prefers to call it image ‘repair’ 
to avoid implying that one’s image has been ‘restored’ to its prior state, while 
sometimes all one can hope for is ‘repairs’ (Benoit, 2000; 2014). The 
significance of applying Benoit’s theory in my study lies in its speaker-centric 
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focus. This means that it focuses on how the communicators respond to a 
crisis situation (Coombs, 2011, p. 217). Moreover, image repair theory “is the 
best-suited crisis communication theory for the case analysis of political crises” 
(ibid, p. 223). It “focuses exclusively on messages designed to improve images 
tarnished by criticism and suspicion” (Benoit, 2015, p. 3). This was the case in 
the examined crisis where Bahraini authorities, surrounded by inflamed region 
widely portrayed across foreign media as Arab Spring, were accused of human 
rights’ violations in their treatment of public protests.  
It is worth noting that crisis communication strategies can stand for the 
verbal and nonverbal actions an organisation or government takes in response 
to a crisis. When I discuss image repair strategy in my research, the term 
‘strategy’ is used here as “an abstract or general concept that represents a 
goal or an effect sought by discourse” (Benoit, 1995, p. 80 in Avraham, 2015, 
p. 225), and not nonverbal actions. Another significant point on the 
understanding of the term ‘strategy’ in this thesis refers to the level of strategic 
intent by the organisation or individuals in the message construction process. 
Benoit (2014, p. 16) suggests that “communication generally is best 
understood as an intentional activity. Communicators attempt to devise 
utterances that they believe will best achieve the goals that are most salient to 
them when they communicate”. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
“image repair strategies may have an element of improvisation precisely when 
public and media attention are most focused on the organisation and its 
communicative practices, and when the organisation’s image is most 
vulnerable” (Harlow et al., 2011, p. 11), which was the case in the examined 
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crisis. Thus, in the analysis of image repair strategies reflected in the frames 
present in BNA’s online content, it is important to note that the observation of 
a specific ‘crisis response strategy’ does not necessarily suggest the Bahraini 
government had a strategic plan to reflect certain meanings and interpretations 
of reality in its public diplomacy messages. Further insights on this are 
discussed in the Interview Analysis chapter (4). 
In this theory, a crisis situation is built on two main premises: (1) the 
accused (e.g. government, corporation, public figure) is considered 
responsible for an action, and (2) that act is considered offensive among a 
salient group of the public (Benoit, 1997, p. 178; Benoit & Brinson, 1999, p. 
148). These two premises underlie the understanding of the examined events 
in this thesis as a crisis: the Bahraini authorities were accused across foreign 
media of human rights’ violations during the 2011 protests (Brown, 2011; 
Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82), and foreign media and publics perceived this as 
offensive act against the protestors (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). Note that the IRT 
emphasises that “the person (or organisation) who seeks to repair a damaged 
image does so because he or she believes (or has a perception) that an 
important audience holds an unfavourable attitude”. (Benoit, 2104, p. 5 
emphases in original) This works in-line with social constructivist 
understanding of crises as “social constructions produced by the 
organisational member’s perception and sense-making processes” (Heide, 
2009, p. 43).  
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The IRT holds the principle that “perceptions are more important than 
reality”. This means if a significant segment of the public perceives an actor to 
be responsible for an act and that the act is offensive, then the actor’s 
reputation is at stake (Benoit, 1997, p. 178). This is significant for Bahraini 
public diplomacy because a nation’s ability to reflect its respect for human 
rights is significant to gain favourable image in the international media 
(Kunczik, 1997, p. 283). In the examined crisis, these were the most attacked 
aspects of the Bahraini authorities’ policies, especially as protestors died at a 
very early stage of the crisis after clashes with security forces, and military 
measures were employed to contain the situation. Hence, this could lead to an 
understanding of the situation as another Arab revolution against a 
dictatorship- a representation rejected by Bahraini authorities (Pinto, 2014). 
Note that the success of upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia, which were widely 
framed as ‘Arab Spring’, managed to draw international attention to the 
Bahraini protests (Karolak, 2012, p. 180).  
 The IRT offers five response strategies to repair an organisation’s image 
in a crisis: (1) denial; (2) evasion of responsibility; (3) reducing offensiveness 
of event; (4) corrective action; and (5) mortification. Some of these broad 
strategies have variations. These are presented in Table 1 as developed by 
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Table 1. Image Repair Strategies (Benoit, 1997, p. 179)  
Image Restoration Strategies  
  
Strategy  Key Characteristic  
Denial   
Simple denial  Did not perform act  
Shift the blame   Act performed by another  
Evasion of responsibility  
Provocation   Respond to act of another   
Defeasibility   Lack of information or ability  
Accident   Act was a misshape  
Good intentions   Act meant well   
Reducing offensiveness of events   
Bolstering   Stress good traits   
Minimization   Act not serious  
Differentiation  Act less offensive  
Transcendence   More important considerations   
Attack accuser  Reduce credibility of accuser   
Compensation   Reimburse victim   
Corrective action   Plan to solve or prevent problem   
Mortification   apologize for act   
  
   
The denial strategy has two variations. The first is simple denial and it can 
be done in three forms: denying the offensive act happened, denying 
committing the act, or denying the act was harmful. The second variation is 
shifting the blame where another actor is accused of the act in question. Denial 
is a defensive strategy that tries to change the audiences’ beliefs about 
whether the accused is to blame (Benoit, 1997, pp. 179-180; Benoit & Brinson, 
1999, p. 149-150, Brinson & Benoit, 1999, pp. 486-489; Benoit, 2014, pp. 22-
29).    
Another defensive approach is to try to evade or reduce responsibility for 
the offensive act. In this case, an actor may not be able to completely deny 
responsibility but tries to reduce perceived responsibility for the wrongdoing by 
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altering audience’s existing beliefs or adding new beliefs in the audience. This 
can be done through the general strategy of ‘evasion of responsibility’, which 
has four variations: (1) provocation strategy where the offensive act is justified 
as response for another actor’s act; (2) defeasibility- claiming lack of control 
over or information about the situation; (3) alleging the offensive action was an 
accident; or (4) asserting good intentions. Successful use of strategies to 
evade responsibility can improve the image of the accused but may not restore 
it completely (ibid).    
Reducing the offensiveness of an act has six variations: (1) bolstering 
through, for example, describing positive characteristics or acts to absorb 
negative feelings; (2) minimise the negative act to minimise negative feelings- 
it works by changing beliefs about the magnitude of the offensive act; (3) 
differentiation through distinguishing from other similar yet more offensive act; 
(4) transcendence by placing the act in a more favourable context; (5) 
attacking the accuser to reduce the damage caused for the actors accused of 
offensive doings; and (6) compensating the victims (ibid).  
Another image repair strategy is corrective action, where the accused can 
promise to correct the problem by restoring the state of affairs existing before 
the offensive action, and/or promising to prevent the recurrence of the 
offensive act. The final general strategy is mortification where the accused 
actor admits wrong-doing and asks for forgiveness (ibid).   
The first two categories (denial and evasion of responsibility) tend to 
minimise accusations of responsibility for the act in question. The third and 
fourth categories (reducing offensiveness and corrective action) focus on 
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reducing offensiveness of the act in question. The fifth strategy (mortification) 
tends to ask for forgiveness to repair an image (Benoit, 1997, pp. 178-179).   
The IRT can be used by practitioners in the normative sense by offering 
strategies on how to respond to crises. For academics, it can be used for 
critical evaluations of crisis responses (Benoit, 1997, p. 177). These 
evaluations are usually applied in two ways: measuring appropriateness of the 
strategy, and/or effectiveness of the used strategy (Burns & Burner, 2000, pp. 
34-35). Yet, the IRT is criticised for oversimplifying the documentation and 
measurements in these assessments (ibid). In terms of appropriateness, the 
examiner assesses how well the ‘organisation’ used the available means of 
persuasion. For instance, it is argued that when “the cause of a crisis is 
external to the entity, and requires less accommodation of its publics, the entity 
will more likely use advocacy-type image repair strategies, such as attacking 
the accuser and denial. If an entity has strong personal control over the crisis 
and strong perceptions of crisis responsibility exist… the entity will use more 
accommodative image repair strategies such as bolstering, corrective action, 
and apology” (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009, pp. 170-171). However, this 
overlooks the complexity resulting from interactions among multiple internal 
and external factors connected to the stance of the accused and the accuser. 
For example, the accused actor may use less accommodative strategies to 
avoid criminal charges and/or civil lawsuits (ibid; Benoit, 2014, p. 20). Yet, 
generally, measuring appropriateness helps the researcher to understand the 
context of the discourse (Burns & Burner, 2000, p. 35).   
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In terms of measuring the effectiveness of a strategy, “critics may try to 
document changes in the world, such as the extent to which public opinion 
changes. This approach is challenging, because of the questions of what to 
measure, how to measure it, and when to measure it” (ibid). Further, this 
approach cannot measure the specific relationship between image repair 
discourse and other phenomena, such as determining that image discourse is 
the cause of more positive media coverage on a certain issue. It is worth noting 
that I discuss the implications of using specific discourse strategies in BNA’s 
analysed content by drawing on insights from previous studies and the 
interviews regarding the context of the examined crisis. Nevertheless, it is 
beyond the focus of my research to systematically examine the effectiveness 
or appropriateness of the identified discourse strategies. I suggest that the 
impact of using specific response strategies in BNA’s content can be done in 
a more systematic manner by focusing on other phases of Scheufele’s (1999) 
framing model (e.g. frame setting).    
Instead of focusing on responses’ effects, I identify the frames reflected in 
the analysed messages to understand the underlying intentions of Bahraini 
public diplomacy and their promotion of specific versions of reality in 
government messages during the examined crisis. Moreover, my research 
offers insights on the background processes connected to the articulation of 
frames that depict specific discourse strategies in BNA’s content. As indicated 
earlier, this is done through applying Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) 
hierarchal model to a public diplomacy context to examine frame-building 
factors at five different levels: individual, professional, organisational, external, 
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and ideological.  A few previous studies focus on or at least mention the 
significance of culture in relation to crisis responses in different contexts. I 
discuss insights from these studies in the following section. Yet, none of the 
previous studies use Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model to understand 
different levels of influence on the construction of crises’ response. Thus, my 
research contributes to IRT research by applying it beyond the dominant 
Western, specifically American context (Maiorescu, 2016), and delivers 
insights on the background processes connected to the use of specific frames 
in public diplomacy response to crises.  
 5.3.  Crisis Response in Different National Contexts    
This section reviews studies using the IRT to examine a national or a 
government crisis context. The purpose is to deliver insights on the crisis 
response strategies employed in different types of crises in different cultural 
contexts, and whether culture or other factors contributed to the use of specific 
response strategies. Beyond the IRT, this section also delivers insights from 
previous research on public diplomacy responses to crises in different 
contexts.  
The IRT was first introduced in a corporate context but is used now to study 
different types of actors like individuals or nations in different types of crises 
(Avraham, 2015, p. 225). The focus in my research is on the use of this model 
in response to a national crisis that had negative implications on the state 
government's image among foreign media and publics. This is important 
because there is limited research on strategies of building public diplomacy 
messages in crises and how nations repair their image comparing to the 
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dominant focus on corporate contexts (Lyu, 2012, p. 779; Peijuan et al., 2009, 
p. 214; Schultz & Raupp, 2010, p. 113; SiewYoong Low et al., 2010, p. 191; 
Zhang & Benoit, 2004, p. 162). As indicated earlier, the examination of national 
images is significant because “nations have images, and relations between 
countries have always been shaped by images” (Zhang & Benoit, 2004, p. 
161), and foreign media’s coverage on a nation can negatively affect its image 
among foreign publics (Avraham, 2015; 2016). A nation’s image is crucial for 
its status in the international relations arena (Wang, 2006 in Peijuan et al., 
2009, p. 213), and public relations and public diplomacy are used to enhance 
this image (Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 213; Vaxevanidou, 2016, p. 111). As 
mentioned earlier, image can be understood as perception of a group, person, 
or nation held by others (Benoit & Brinson, 1999, p. 145).  
The work of Zhang and Benoit (2004) is one of the earliest attempts that 
employed the IRT to address its limited use to study national crises. They study 
a Saudi campaign to deal with post 9/11 damaged reputation. American 
publics accused Saudi of supporting terrorism, and of failing to support a 
possible US attack on Iraq. The authors suggest that Saudi mostly used 
bolstering and denial strategies, arguing that this was partially successful at 
dealing with the first accusation and much less effective with the second one. 
They refer the success to the consistency between the discourse strategies 
and the Saudi actions, such as denying any connection with terrorism and 
revoking Bin Laden’s Saudi citizenship. Denial was also successful in this case 
due to the adoption of third-party endorsement.  
 114  
  
Peijuan, Pei and Pang (2009) examine the strategies used and the images 
these strategies generated for China in the context of the crisis of continuous 
product recalls in 2007. While they find that the initial response by the Chinese 
authorities was denial to “defuse criticism”, they highlight that China could not 
continue using strategies that minimise its responsibility for the offensive acts. 
The authors suggest that piling evidence of its responsibility was connected to 
the shift toward a ‘corrective action’ strategy (p. 216). They emphasise that 
showing sincerity in solving the problem is significant for image repair (see 
also Benoit, 2004). Nevertheless, nations are less likely to employ a 
mortification strategy where guilt is admitted (Benoit, 1997; Peijuan et al., 
2009, p. 216). Saving a nation’s image in this regard is significant for its 
empowerment and dignity; therefore it is more likely to implicitly admit guilt 
through corrective action to save face (Peijuan et al., p. 216)  
Siew-Yoong Low, Varughese and Pang (2010) examine the influence of 
culture on image repair in Western (US) and Asian (Taiwan) governments 
which faced similar accusations of slow response to natural disasters in their 
countries. They highlight the role of uncertainty avoidance in the difference 
between the responses of both governments. One of the key differences 
between both governments’ responses to the crises was the use of 
mortification and corrective action. The authors argue that Taiwan has a 
significantly higher uncertainty avoidance index, meaning that its culture seeks 
rules, structure and formality. Uncertainty reduction requires explicit, logical 
and direct information on the part of the communicator. Thus, the Asian culture 
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is a likely contributor to the dominant use of mortification strategy at the height 
of the crisis in Taiwan.  
The role of uncertainty avoidance is also observed by Maiorescu (2016) in 
her examination of the Deutsche Telekom spying scandal. Although this study 
looks at a corporate context of crisis, it highlights the role of culture in image 
repair. The author suggests that the German cultural environment is 
characterised by a high level of uncertainty avoidance. Meaning that in the 
German culture individuals do not tolerate ambiguity to the extent to which 
they do in the US. She argues that this propensity for uncertainty avoidance 
can explain why the company’s crisis communication focused majorly on 
corrective action comparing to other response strategies.  
Discussions on national or government crises or public diplomacy activities 
during crises are not limited to studies employing IRT. Note for example 
section 4.2 of this chapter. While it focuses on studies that examine frame-
building in public diplomacy, all the studies look into a crisis situation, such as 
war or migrant crisis (Jungblut, 2017; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Sheafer et al., 
2014; Yarchi et al., 2013). They mainly deliver insights on the articulation of 
public diplomacy messages to attract media attention and successful framing. 
A number of other studies (Andreasen, 2008; Lindholm & Olsson, 2011; Mor, 
2009; Olsson, 2013; Van Ham, 2003; Zaharna, 2004), deliver insights on 
public diplomacy responses to crises in different contexts. Although some of 
these studies have a normative approach focusing on how public diplomacy 
should be practiced in crises, they offer insights on factors connected to 
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specific public diplomacy responses to a crisis. These insights can help us 
understand whether the Bahraini government’s responses to the examined 
crisis were connected to similar factors or not, and how.     
Zaharna (2004) and Van Ham (2003), for instance, offer recommendations 
on how to practice public diplomacy in a crisis more effectively by examining 
the American crisis post 9/11 and the military action in Iraq. They argue that 
the American style of communication is more direct, where it aims for precise 
presentation of facts. In other cultures with indirect communication style (e.g. 
Arab culture), “when saving face is important, one’s skill is not in how directly 
one can state criticism, but rather in how cleverly one can disguise it” (Zaharna, 
2004, p. 136). Moreover, while Americans practiced one-way transition of 
information other cultures, such as Arab cultures, prefer relationship building 
as without a rational base to interpret information the information is 
meaningless (ibid, p. 141). This review on American public diplomacy delivers 
insights on how communicating with foreign publics may be related to using 
the same rituals of communicating locally without attention to any cultural 
differences and the consequences they may cause.  
Mor (2009) investigates how Israel justified the use of power in the 2006 
war with Lebanon. The study aims to understand how the use of power is 
presented through public diplomacy, especially as a nation’s use of force 
triggers foreign publics’ attention (p. 219). The author suggests that looking at 
different cultural contexts of practicing public diplomacy signifies questioning 
how the actors design their messages in a specific way to achieve their goals 
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(225). In this regard, the author suggests that a common message design 
strategy to deal with negative publicity or defend a nation’s image is attacking 
the other (p. 228), which resonations with Benoit’s (1997) ‘attack the accuser’ 
or ‘shifting the blame’ strategies. Mor (2009) suggests that if an actor’s image 
is under threat due to its own behaviour, the actor would employ blame 
avoidance. A strategy of blame avoidance consists of arguments designed to: 
(1) avoid or reduce perceived responsibility for actions or outcomes; and/or (2) 
reduce perceived negativity of actions or outcomes (p. 230). On the other 
hand, when the image of an actor is threatened because of credit attributed to 
the opponent, it is likely that this actor will tend to deny this credit (credit 
denial). This can be done through strategies that “(1) deny or reduce the 
perceived responsibility of the opponent for positive actions and/or outcome; 
and/or (2) reduce perceived positivity of actions and/or outcomes for which the 
opponent is credited” (p. 231). This suggests that in public diplomacy response 
to crises, states may use rhetorical strategies of known patterns to protect or 
enhance their images among foreign publics in a way that may contribute to 
the articulation of specific versions of reality on a certain issue.        
            Andreasen (2008), Lindholm and Olsson (2011), and Olsson (2013) 
deliver insights on the Danish and Swedish practice of public diplomacy on 
behalf of separate cartoon incidents that triggered outrage among foreign 
publics, specifically in the Arab and Muslim worlds. While Andreasen (2008, 
p. 203) highlights the significance of fast response to crises to avoid 
misconceptions (see also Avraham, 2015, p. 231), it is mentioned that one 
way of responding in crisis public diplomacy is to “stick your head in the sand”, 
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where it is assumed nothing is wrong and any response may just make it 
worse. This can also be the approach for those who are not courageous 
enough to face the situation in hand (p. 205). It is found that in certain contexts 
when the organisation used a “no comment” strategy, it generated significantly 
more trust in the organisation, and the organisation was viewed as having less 
responsibility for the offensive act (Lee, 2004 in Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009, 
p. 169). This is related to cultural differences between Western and Eastern 
societies, where Eastern societies would be more tolerant of a “silent, reserved 
gesture” (ibid). It is worth noting that Avraham (2015) suggests that “ignoring 
or limiting the crisis” is a popular response by Arab countries to problematic 
situations even before the Arab Spring events. Such response tends to 
suggest any damage reported by the media is minor and there is no serious 
crisis (p. 228).   
Lindholm and Olsson (2011) draw attention to crises’ creation of new 
groups of stakeholders, and how crisis communicators tend to focus on 
stakeholders they are familiar with and whom they perceive powerful (p. 257). 
They suggest that the Danish government’s framing of the situation changed 
based on the change in their perception of which the important stakeholders 
are (p. 264). At the beginning of the crisis, when the cartoons depicting Prophet 
Mohammad as a terrorist outraged publics in Muslim and Arab worlds, the 
initial response by the Danish government framed the issue as a local matter 
that guarantees the right to freedom of expression. When the situation 
escalated and Danish products were boycotted and the flag was burnt in a 
number of Arab and Muslim countries, the Danish government changed its 
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response with recognition to the significance of foreign publics. The Swedish 
government, on the other hand, learnt from the Danish experience when a 
Swedish newspaper published offensive cartoons toward the Muslim world, 
and therefore immediately addressed this foreign public group in its response 
to the crisis, helping contain the situation without further escalation (Olsson, 
2013). “The government’s core message was centred on the idea that while 
the free speech principle is constitutionally protected in Sweden, so too is the 
idea of religious tolerance” (p. 228). Thus, these studies suggest that a 
government’s response to a crisis may be connected to familiarity with routines 
of communication with specific segments of the public, perceptions of the most 
important public group, and previous experiences or lessons learnt from other 
actors’ crises.    
These examples of studies on crisis public diplomacy deliver insights 
on the practice from different contexts. Yet, as indicated earlier, these studies 
are mostly prescriptive as they analyse different public diplomacy responses 
to crises to suggest how it could be done differently in a way that maximises 
the effectiveness of the response. This, however, should not undermine the 
insights these studies offer on how different actors responded to crises through 
public diplomacy, and the factors connected to specific responses. These 
studies suggest that a specific crisis public diplomacy response may be related 
to rituals of communicating locally without attention to any cultural differences 
and the consequences they may cause (Zaharna, 2004); use of known 
patterns of rhetorical strategies (Mor, 2009); previous experiences or lessons 
learnt from other actors’ crises (Olsson, 2013). These insights have potential 
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in understanding how the Bahraini government (IAA/BNA) responded to the 
2011 crisis. My research can investigate whether such factors were related to 
specific response strategies employed by the Bahraini government.   
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter was to review the most important 
theoretical frameworks and concepts that support answering this research’s 
questions. It highlighted the focus on public diplomacy’s informative rather 
than relational functions. It also reviewed the three stages of conceptualising 
public diplomacy, highlighting the perception of public diplomacy from a realist 
standpoint.  
The chapter also illustrated the significance of studying public diplomacy 
and public relations closely. It argued that the social constructivist paradigm is 
a more fruitful approach to examine how public diplomacy activities may 
contribute to the co-construction of specific versions of reality through 
government messages. 
After this, the concept of framing was reviewed as framework to 
systematically examine the construction of specific versions of reality in texts 
communicated through public diplomacy. This project particularly focuses on 
frames communicated by the Bahraini government through public diplomacy.    
The chapter also reviews studies on frame-building in public diplomacy, 
framing of the 2011 Bahraini crisis, and public diplomacy and framing in 
relation to the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon. Research on frame-building in 
public diplomacy suggests the focus on factors that contribute to the success 
or failure of public diplomats at promoting their preferred frames to foreign 
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media. My research, however, looks into the factors related to the articulation 
of public diplomacy frames by public diplomats in public diplomacy rather than 
media content. Therefore, the chapter then discussed Shoemaker and 
Reese’s (1996) model, and how the extension of this media theory has 
potential to study frame-building in public diplomacy. My research also 
contributes to academic research on the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon by looking 
at the frames communicated by the Bahraini government.   
The chapter also discussed Benoit’s (1995) image repair theory and linking 
the analysed frames to the crisis response strategies offered by the theory.  
The next chapter discusses the philosophical standpoints underpinning this 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
  
  
1. PROJECT AIMS AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW   
This project aims to study public diplomacy frames used in media relations 
during a time of crisis and its aftermath, and the factors connected to the frame 
construction process. It focuses on frames present in Bahraini affairs news 
published on the website of Bahrain News Agency (BNA) during different key 
moments of the 2011 crisis in Bahrain. Additionally, it studies the factors 
connected to the production of these frames by public diplomacy professionals 
working for the IAA/BNA. I specifically focus on media relations among the 
different aspects of public diplomacy because foreign media have important 
role in building national image and reputation among foreign publics and are 
therefore a key priority in public diplomacy (Zhang, 2005; Zhang & Meadows, 
2012). Further, in crisis situations, public diplomacy is a reactive form of 
communication, where actors need to act to a short notice warning to limit any 
damage (Andreasen, 2008, p. 203). The short-term and reactive features of 
crisis response are mostly practiced through media relations, especially 
through one-way forms of communication (e.g. news), as they can 
communicate a nation’s standpoint on a specific issue or correct 
misinformation (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 15).  
The analysis of government messages offers insights on how a 
government promotes certain interpretations of an issue over others in their 
communications with foreign media and publics (Brewer, 2006; Pinto, 2014, p. 
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164). In this thesis, I analyse messages delivered through online content 
published in news format on the website of the BNA to understand the Bahraini 
government frames during the examined crisis. I analyse frames promoted 
through the BNA because it is the state-owned governmental news agency in 
Bahrain responsible for providing the official perspective of the country to 
foreign media ("About BNA", 2017). As indicated in the Introduction chapter, 
the BNA is not an independent agency but works under the umbrella of the 
Bahraini Information Affairs Authority (IAA) – the main governmental body in 
charge of local and international communications ("organisational structure",  
2015) 7 . One of the Authority’s main roles is to design the government’s 
communication strategies and promote its messages, and BNA’s website is 
one of its main communication channels ("Vision, Mission & Goals", 2014). 
Even when other governmental bodies (i.e. ministries) engage in 
communications with foreign media through their own networks, they will still 
use the BNA as an official outlet for their messages. Thus, the IAA and BNA 
provide an important source of governmental messages communicated to 
foreign media, which puts them in a central position in Bahraini public 
                                            
7 The first governmental authority for information affairs in Bahrain was established in 1965. In 2010 a royal 
decree was issued changing the title form the ‘Ministry of Culture and Information’ to the ‘Ministry of Culture’. 
And, at the time, the ‘Information Affairs Authority’ (IAA) was established, and put in charge of all information 
affairs in Bahrain ("About the Ministry", 2014). The main difference between working as ‘ministry’ and 
‘authority’ in Bahrain is that the authority has a board of directors, and is led by a chief executive officer and not 
a minister. Nevertheless, the ‘authority’ still has to work under the management of a specific ministry, and be 
represented by a minister in the Parliament. Other implications of working as an ‘authority’ are related to the 
employees’ payment schemes and how the authority manages the budget. In 2014, the IAA was changed to the 
‘Ministry of Information Affairs’.      
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diplomacy. Moreover, they played a central role in offering the government 
perspective on the protests during the examined crisis.  
I focus my analysis on online content published on BNA’s website during 
three key moments of the Bahraini crisis: the first week of protests (14-19 
February 2011); the deployment of the Gulf Peninsula Shield Forces (PSF)8 in 
Bahrain (14-16 March 2011); and the publication of the Bahrain Independent 
Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report (23-25 November 2011). The next section 
of this chapter offers further details on the timeframe and context of each of 
the three examined key moments. The rest of the chapter presents the 
philosophical standpoints underpinning this project and the methods and 
sampling strategies used for data generation and analysis. Section 3 
discusses the role of the social constructivist paradigm in my thesis and how 
it is associated with idealist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. From 
these philosophical positions, it then presents the research questions I aim to 
answer and discusses how the thesis adopts a qualitative methodology. The 
chapter then discusses the use of qualitative frame analysis with the sampled 
website content. It illustrates how the analysis combined existing “issue-
specific” frames (de Vreese, 2005) from previous research with new issue-
specific frames that emerged from the data. The frame analysis is combined 
with semi-structured interviews with selected IAA communicators to explore 
the frame production processes across the three key moments, and the factors 
                                            
8 The PSF is the military arm of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It is intended to deter and 
respond to military aggression against any of the GCC members: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait.   
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related to the frame-building. This research design aims to deliver insights on 
Bahraini public diplomacy processes which have a potential to contribute to 
the co-construction of specific versions of reality during a crisis and its 
aftermath. 
  
2. PROJECT TIMEFRAME    
Regarding the timeframe of my research, I focus on the 2011 protests and 
their aftermath in Bahrain because they reflect a critical time in the nation’s 
public diplomacy, and studying it can deliver insights on how public diplomacy 
is practiced in response to a crisis in such under-researched cultural context. 
As explained in earlier chapters, the Bahraini authorities were criticised for 
human rights’ abuses and violence against the demonstrators during these 
protests. Different international media reports emphasised these accusations 
which consequently led to generating negative publicity about the country 
across foreign publics (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011; Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, 
p. 82). The death of protestors since the first day of demonstrations after 
clashes with security forces drew international attention to the Bahraini 
protests (Govers, 2012), especially because similar incidents escalated to 
regime overthrows in Egypt and Tunisia around the same time (Karolak, 2012, 
p. 180). This negative publicity challenging the Bahraini government and 
authorities overlaps with Benoit’s (1997) understanding of a crisis situation, 
which is based on two premises: first, an actor is accused of offensive acts, 
and second, a salient sector of the public perceives the accusations as 
offensive behaviour (p. 178; see also Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Benoit, 2004). 
Here, the Bahraini authorities were accused of the abuses, and the violation 
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of human rights is internationally viewed as an offensive act. Therefore, based 
on Benoit’s understanding of a crisis situation, the Bahraini protests are 
discussed as a crisis situation for the Bahraini government.  
 2.1.  First week of protests (14-19 February 2011)  
The first key moment focuses on the first week of the protests in Bahrain. 
It covers the period from 14 February 2011 when the protests started, until 19 
February when the situation relatively calmed down and the protests were 
allowed by the Bahraini authorities.  Between 14 and 19 February, the protests 
were not legal from the perspective of the Bahraini law, because the protestors 
did not follow the official procedure of requesting the permission of the Ministry 
of Interior to demonstrate at a specific location and date (BICI, 2011, p. 68). In 
a gesture to calm the situation, the Crown Prince ordered the security forces 
on 19 February to authorise the protests  
(ibid, p. 83).  
14 February 2011 marks the 10th anniversary of the National Action Charter 
(NAC) - a political document composed by a number of Bahraini legislators, 
ministers, academics, etc. based on a request by the head of state to set the 
roadmap for comprehensive national reforms in the country (Al-Hasan, 2015). 
It was endorsed by 98.4% of Bahraini voters in a national referendum that took 
place on 14 February 2001. Since the end of January 2011, different social 
media platforms (Facebook; Twitter; online forums) were used to call for 
demonstrations across different areas of Bahrain. The protestors’ demands 
ranged between revising the Constitution, undertaking political reform and 
achieving greater socio-economic justice, and regime overthrow (BICI, 2011, 
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p. 163). The protests were designed to echo revolutions that took place earlier 
that year in Tunisia and Egypt (Al-Hasan, 2015; Weatherby & Longworth, 
2011, p. 92; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). The death of protestors after clashes with 
security forces at an early stage of the crisis radicalised the protests. This 
increased the level of violence, and, as mentioned above, increased negative 
publicity about Bahrain (Govers, 2012). Dalacoura (2012, p. 56) states:  
In Bahrain, which faced longstanding political conflict between the Sunni 
monarchy and a Shi’a majority, protests erupted on 14 February 
resulting, a few days later, in the police storming Manama’s Pearl 
Square, which was occupied by protesters, and killing seven of them, 
some asleep in tents. Demonstrations restarted on 21 February, but were 
met by even bigger pro-government events. Repression radicalized the 
movement, which called for a republic and a march on the royal palace 
on 11 March. King Hamad invited Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
forces, led by Saudi Arabia, into the country on 14 March to help 
suppress the uprising and declared a state of emergency.   
  
Therefore, I focus on the first week of protests to analyse frames promoted 
through the BNA website as the crisis unfolded.   
 2.2.  Deployment of the PSF in Bahrain (14-16 March 2011)  
The second examined moment focuses on the arrival of the PSF, a joint 
military force among GCC members, to Bahrain on 14 March 2011. The period 
between 20 February and 13 March 2011 marked a relatively calm phase of 
the Bahraini 2011 crisis (BICI, 2011, p. 126). During that time, the 
government’s policy and approach toward the protests changed as 
demonstrations across different areas of Bahrain were allowed, and the 
security forces practiced more self-control (ibid). However, 13 March was a 
turning point as levels of security dropped considerably across Bahrain (ibid). 
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Vandalism of private and public properties, assault against individuals, and 
sectarian clashes were recorded.  
Moreover, negotiations between the government and the opposition to start 
the national dialogue reached an end. Since 18 February 2011, the Bahraini 
Crown Prince (CP) was delegated by the King to call for a comprehensive 
national dialogue to solve the situation and meet people’s demands. In the 
beginning, the opposition showed interest in this dialogue. Yet, according to 
BICI’s (2011) investigations, with the escalation of demonstrations, the 
opposition kept changing its position on participation and adding preconditions 
to participate. By 13 March, the opposition changed its stance again by 
apparently eliminating the dialogue option in favour of electing a Constituent 
Assembly. From the opposition’s view, their hesitance to enter the dialogue 
was due to mistrust of the government, which, in their opinion, did not fulfil all 
the promises of the NAC.  On the other hand, the CP and his team concluded 
that the opposition was not willing to participate in a dialogue with the 
government. The CP believed that drafting a constitution through this 
assembly would alienate other members of the Bahraini society, which was 
unacceptable for both the CP and the King (BICI, 2011, p. 131; Ulrichsen, 
2013, p. 3). Thus, the negotiations ended.  
As the dialogue option did not work at that point, and the nation’s stability 
was threatened by escalated violence and clashes; Bahraini authorities 
considered the necessity of taking strict measures to solve the situation and 
restore order. On the night of 13 March, the King decided that Bahrain needed 
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military help from GCC members to protect Bahrain from what they believed 
was possible Iranian interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs. The arrival of the 
troops was controversial. As the authorities considered it a strategic measure 
against potential foreign threat, the opposition viewed the arrival of the PSF as 
illegal use of GCC troops to confront popular demands. Further, they 
presented the invitation of foreign troops as a sign that the Bahraini authorities 
lost all legitimacy to an extent that it was unable to address the internal 
situation, which forced it to request GCC assistance (alwefaq, 2011). Iranian 
media platforms went to present it as a ‘massacre’ against Bahraini civilians 
(Belfer, 2014).  
I focus on this key moment to understand the frames communicated 
around an event that triggered further accusations of human rights’ violations, 
and when the authorities turned to a military measure to contain the situation. 
I analyse BNA’s news published on 14 March 2011 when the troops arrived at 
Bahrain until 16 March. On 17 March the focus shifted to another strict 
measure to restore order in Bahrain, which is a three-month ‘State of National 
Safety’.  
 2.3.  Publication of BICI report (23-25 November 2011)     
The third key moment is the publication of BICI report. BICI was established 
following a request by King Hamad of Bahrain in July 2011, yet it worked as 
an independent commission. To ensure its independence, the Royal Order 
appointed five renowned, non-Bahraini individuals who have expertise in the 
fields of international law and international human rights law to act as 
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Commissioners ("The BICI Commissioners", 2011). The purpose of the 
Commission was to “investigate and report on the events in Bahrain in 
February/March 2011, and any subsequent consequences arising out of the 
aforementioned events, and to make such recommendations as it may deem 
appropriate” (BICI, 2011. p. 1). The significance of this report lies in its 
consideration by Western officials as a progress to the situation in Bahrain, a 
milestone in the Bahraini government’s strategy for taking the initiative to 
request an investigation of what happened, and documentation of any human 
rights’ violations in the country during that time (Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). 
“Such inquiry has not been attempted previously in Bahrain or elsewhere.” 
(Weatherby & Longworth, 2011, p. 91)   
The Bahraini authorities aspired to achieve image recovery through this 
initiative, but it resulted in a more challenging situation in November 2011, 
when BICI report confirmed violations of human rights by some members of 
the state security forces. Another challenge at the time was the report’s 
inability to find evidence on Iranian role in the unrest in Bahrain. To understand 
frames communicated around the publication of the report, I analyse news 
published on 23 November when the report was published, and the two 
following days.  After that, BNA’s online content shifted focus on the Royal 
Order of establishing the National Commission to review the recommendations 
of the BICI issued on 26 November 2011 (biciactions, 2011).    
As this section discussed the timeframe of focus in this research, the 
following section discusses the philosophical standpoints taken in the 
exploration of this context.   
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3. PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS AND PARADIGMS   
My research works within the social constructivist paradigm which aims to 
understand the subjective world of human experience. It emphasises the 
researcher’s direct involvement in the development of this understanding 
rather than just having an observer role (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011, p. 
17). Social constructivism does not support social investigation through natural 
science methods, as it does not view human behaviour to be ruled by law-like 
regularities. Instead, social constructivists suggest that it is more appropriate 
to explore the social world through understanding the participants’ own 
perspectives and interpretations of the world surrounding them (Ormston et. 
al, 2014, p. 24). This paradigm offers a framework to generate an 
understanding on the diversity of realities constructed on a specific matter, and 
this project specifically aims to explore versions of reality communicated 
through Bahraini public diplomacy during a crisis and its aftermath. The 
paradigm is also beneficial to deliver insights with the communicators on the 
messages used by IAA/BNA in key public diplomacy moments, what were the 
framing processes, and what factors were connected to it. The benefit of 
applying this paradigm lies in offering sophisticated, deep, and more informed 
understandings of the specific context under research (Lincoln, Lynham & 
Guba, 2011, p. 108). Further, it recognizes my involvement as the researcher 
in constructing and interpreting these views, instead of trying to claim 
objectivity.  
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As the social constructivist paradigm addresses how the researcher’s 
personal stances and background may influence the research process and 
analysis, it is worth noting that my personal stance, as a Bahraini citizen, 
during the crisis was pro-government. Besides being a Sunni, my views during 
that time were influenced by the fact that I do not come from Bahraini origins. 
My parents moved to Bahrain from Jordan in the late 1970s, and my father 
worked with the Bahrain Defence force until early 2000. Thus, this background 
did not only influence my stance to be pro-government/regime, but also 
presented me among some of the protestors as a typical ‘mercenary’ who 
moved to Bahrain to support the status of an ‘oppressive’ regime and snatch 
‘original Bahrainis’ opportunities in the job market. This background is related 
to my understanding of the crisis as an aggressive attempt by some Shiite 
fundamentalists, intolerant of other social/religious groups, to destabilise the 
country and takeover. Yet, I followed recommendations offered by the 
literature to delimit my understanding of the crisis from one angle and develop 
a critical distance from my personal stances. These are detailed throughout 
this chapter, especially in the section discussing the frame analysis procedure 
(6.3).   
Philosophical standpoints depend on a set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Ontology refers to the nature of reality 
concerning the social phenomena being investigated (Creswell, 1998; Mason, 
2002, p. 14; Ormston et. al, 2014, p. 4). According to Saunders et al. (2012), 
ontology deals with “the nature of being” and explains assumptions about 
reality. This research has idealist ontology, where reality is argued to be the 
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product of an individual’s internal consciousness, rather than a realist 
worldview where reality is claimed to exist in the world external to the individual 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Ormston et al, 2014, pp. 4-5). This suggests that, in 
this research, public diplomacy in general, the analysed frames, and the 
factors related to the frame production processes are understood through 
“collective reconstructions” (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, 2011, p. 101) of different 
individuals’ perceptions, instead of viewing these factors, the frames, and the 
studied phenomenon as external reality that has only one correct form 
regardless of how different individuals understand it.   
Epistemology looks at the nature and forms of knowledge, how to acquire 
it, and how to communicate it to fellow human beings (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, 
p.1; Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011, p. 6). Two competing and contrasting 
positions on epistemology are positivism and interpretivism. Positivism argues 
that knowledge exists independently of any individual’s consciousness and 
that this knowledge can be studied in a systematic fashion without reference 
to any individual (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Positivism is often associated with 
quantitative research and aligns to natural science methods. Within this realm, 
the researcher has an observer role and seeks to establish causality (Cohen, 
Manion &Morrison, 2011, p. 6; Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 2-3). Interpretivism, 
on the other hand, seeks to understand the world in which individuals live 
through developing subjective meanings of the participants’ experience, with 
recognition of the variety and multiplicity of these meanings, and one way of 
doing so is through conversations (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). Adopting a specific 
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epistemological position affects how knowledge about social behaviour will be 
generated (Cohen, Manion &Morrison, 2011, p. 6). Epistemology should help 
in generating knowledge and explanations about the ontological components 
of the social world (Mason, 2002, p. 16; Ormston et. al, 2014, p. 6). Thus, with 
idealist ontological position, I adopt an interpretivist approach which is often 
associated with social constructivism (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). This approach 
aims to help in understanding the subjective views of the communicators 
actively involved in public diplomacy activities regarding the factors connected 
to the frame construction in content published through the BNA during the 
2011 crisis and its aftermath. Further, it has implications on how framing is 
understood and studied in this project, through considering the inseparability 
of the analysed frames from the political and cultural contexts in which they 
are studied (Snow D., 2004, p. 385).  
  
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Departing from the above mentioned philosophical standpoints, framing in 
public diplomacy texts is viewed in my research as “selection and highlighting, 
and the use of the highlighted elements to construct an argument about 
problems and their causation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman, 1993, p. 
53). By bringing attention to some aspects of reality while concealing others, 
frames promote certain understandings of reality. Examining public diplomacy 
frames aims to understand what building-blocks Bahraini public diplomacy 
attempted to contribute to the (co)construction of social realities in foreign 
media about Bahrain during the crisis and its aftermath. Examining what 
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factors influenced IAA’s “frame-building” (Scheufele, 1999; 2000) decisions 
attempts to understand the factors related to the production of these building-
blocks of the social world within the Bahraini context. In order to do so, I focus 
on answering the following research questions:  
RQ1. What frames were present in news items on Bahraini affairs 
published on BNA’s English website during the 2011 crisis and its 
aftermath?  
1.1.  How were these frames used across the analysed texts and the 
examined key moments?   
1.2.  Were these frames unique or consistent through the examined key moments?  
1.3. How do the analysed frames depict the use of specific crisis response 
strategies by Bahraini public diplomacy?  
RQ2. What factors were connected to the frame-building process in IAA 
during the 2011 crisis and its aftermath?   
2.1. How did IAA construct public diplomacy frames to address foreign media 
across the examined key moments?  
2.2.  How did Bahraini public diplomacy work during the crisis and its aftermath?   
 To answer these research questions, the following sections provide more 
details on the qualitative methodology employed in this thesis, and the two 
research methods I used.   
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY   
Qualitative research aims to reveal and interpret how meaning is 
constructed, and how people make sense of their lives and their worlds 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Interviewing is widely used in this regard to provide 
in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world through learning 
about the participants’ own experiences, social and material contexts, and 
their perspectives and histories (Creswell, 2014, p. 9; Ormston et. al, 2014, p. 
23). Generally, qualitative research is described as an interpretive approach 
where the researcher attempts to study a phenomenon through the 
participants’ perspectives (Ormston et. al, 2014, p. 3). Yet, “as well as 
expressing their views in talk, people also write - to create records, to plan, 
play or entertain, to establish norms and rules, and to argue over controversial 
issues. So texts, as well as talk, are about people's thoughts, feelings, 
memories, plans and arguments, and are sometimes more telling than their 
authors realise.” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000. pp. 131-132) This highlights the 
benefit of using texts as data sources in qualitative research. The interpretivist 
approach associated with qualitative research underpins three main points in 
my methodology: the significance of the  understandings and interpretations 
of different phenomena provided through the interview participants and the 
analysed texts; the role of the researcher in building these understandings and 
in interpreting them; and finally the inseparability of the surrounding social, 
cultural and historical factors from the way participants understand their social 
world and the way the texts are produced and understood.   
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I use a “mixed methods”9 design by combining two qualitative methods, 
where one of them is a core method and the other is supplemental (Morse, 
2003, pp. 191195). The core method here is frame analysis of public 
diplomacy texts; specifically news items about Bahraini affairs published on 
BNA’s English website during the selected key moments. These items were 
intended as news sources for foreign journalists and the website constitutes a 
key platform through which Bahraini authorities disseminate content to 
international media.   
The supplemental method is in-depth semi-structured interviews that aim 
to understand how specific versions of reality are represented in Bahraini 
public diplomacy messages. The interviews aim to generate knowledge on the 
messages IAA intended to promote to foreign media across different 
timeframes of the crisis, how the frame-building processes worked, and what 
factors were related to the production of public diplomacy frames during that 
time.   
The following sections offer more details on how I employed these two 
methods, with attention to research ethics and quality issues. Validity and 
reliability are principles used to evaluate research quality. Validity can be 
understood as “the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers”, while reliability is “the degree of consistency 
with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers 
                                            
9 The term ‘mixed methods’ is usually used to refer to the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods in one project. Yet, using Morse’s (2003) understanding of ‘mixed methods’, the term is still 
applicable in this project (Morse, 2003, p. 207).  
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or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley, 1990 in 
Silverman, 2010, p. 275). Validity “should be seen as a matter of degree rather 
than as an absolute state (Gronlund, 1981). Hence at best we strive to 
minimise invalidity and maximise validity” (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011, 
p. 179). Regarding reliability, the term’s suitability for qualitative research is 
contested with terms such as ‘credibility’ and ‘consistency’, because reliability 
criteria for quantitative research do not apply to qualitative research (ibid, p. 
201). More details on how reliability and validity were considered in each 
method used in the current study are offered in the following sections.   
  
6. FRAME ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TEXTS   
 6.1.  The method  
In this part of the research, I analyse public diplomacy texts published on 
BNA’s website in the form of news stories about Bahrain targeting foreign 
media. As I mentioned earlier, focusing on foreign media relations within public 
diplomacy acknowledges the significance of foreign media coverage in 
building national reputation and image cultivation across foreign publics 
(Zhang, 2005; Zhang & Meadows, 2012). It also represents the specific 
‘informative’ aspect of public diplomacy focused on in this project. The 
selected format of texts can be labelled as “naturally occurring” materials, 
meaning that they were produced without my intervention (Creswell, 2014, p. 
51; Daymon & Holloway, 2011, p. 277; Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011, p. 529; 
Silverman, 2011, p. 229). Texts are important in qualitative research as they 
may offer different information from what can be obtained from other methods 
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of data generation (Daymon & Holloway, 2011, p. 297). In a political context, 
for example, texts can reveal how political actors promote certain realities over 
others to influence audience reactions and opinions (Entman, 1993, p. 55). 
Moreover, texts, especially in news format, are one of the most used public 
diplomacy tools in response to a crisis situation (Vaxevanidou, 2016, p. 112). 
When used with other methods, such as interviews, texts allow getting a bigger 
picture of the phenomenon under study (Creswell, 2014, p. 190; Daymon & 
Holloway, 2011, p. 280). The analysis of the news written by public diplomacy 
communicators aims to understand the frames used to promote certain 
problem definitions, causal diagnoses, moral judgments, and solutions 
(Entman, 1993) during the 2011 crisis and its aftermath. I focus on analysing 
news items from BNA’s website because, as I explain earlier, BNA and IAA 
were central actors in Bahraini public diplomacy and foreign media relations 
during the crisis and its aftermath. BNA was an extension to the main 
governmental communication authority in Bahrain: IAA. Moreover, BNA’s 
website was a pipeline for Bahraini news sourced from different governmental 
organisations during the examined timeframe. Hence, it offered a platform for 
governmental news used to target foreign media and promote the 
government’s messages. In the following section, I discuss how I selected 
specific news for frame analysis.   
 6.2.  Sampling news items    
Four sampling criteria were taken into account in the collection process. 
First, as discussed earlier, the texts sampled were news items from BNA’s 
website because BNA and IAA had central positions in communicating the 
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Bahraini government’s stands to foreign media during the crisis and its 
aftermath. Second, the news items focused on Bahraini affairs, and therefore, 
where collected from the ‘Local News’ page of BNA’s English website. Third, 
the news sampled was written in the English language to reflect the focus on 
foreign media outlets. And finally, the news was published within the timeframe 
of each examined key moment: the first week of protests (14-19 February 
2011); the deployment of PSF in Bahrain (14-16 March 2011); and the 
publication of BICI report (23-25 November 2011).  
I collected each news story that met the sampling criteria from the website’s 
archive. A number of items were excluded from the analysis as they were: 
weather forecast, summaries of the local press headlines, or “short informative 
messages” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 95) such as announcements on events and 
photo captions. A total of 158 news items were used in the frame analysis. 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of items sampled in each 
examined moment and the number of the excluded items. From the first key 
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Table 2. The number of sampled and excluded news items in each examined moment  
  
  Date  Total items published  Excluded items  Sampled items  Total   
First moment:  
First week of protests  
14/2  18  5  13  59  
15/2  13  1  12  
16/2  16  3  13  
17/2  11  2  9  
18/2  6  2  4  
19/2  8  0  8  
Second moment:   
Deployment of the PSF  
14/3  11  0  11  40  
15/3  14  0  14  
16/3  15  0  15  
Third moment:  
Publication of BICI report  
23/11  40  9  31  59  
24/11  23  5  18  
25/11  15  5  10  
  
 6.3.  The procedure of frame analysis  
The frame analysis of news items published on BNA’s website aims to 
understand the frames promoted by IAA to foreign media in each of the three 
examined key moments in the crisis, whether IAA used consistent or unique 
frames at different points of the crisis and its aftermath, how specific frames 
were used in specific contexts, and whether these frames correspond to crisis 
response strategies suggested by the ‘image repair theory’ (Benoit, 1997).   
The frame analysis focused on “issue-specific” frames adapted from 
previous research, in addition to new original frames that emerged from the 
data. I focused on issue-specific frames because they “allow for a profound 
level of specificity and details relevant to the issue under investigation” (de 
Vreese, 2005, pp. 54-55; see also de Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001, pp. 108-
109; Matthes, 2009, p. 350). Issue-specific frames offer means to understand 
how Bahraini public diplomacy messages promoted specific versions of reality 
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about the crisis that has a potential to contribute to the co-creation of social 
reality about it. 
Yet, issue-specific frames are criticised for their limited ability to be used in 
the study of other contexts. In order to overcome this limitation, it is suggested 
to relate issue-specific frames to a more abstract “master” frame (Van Gorp, 
2007, p. 67). Master frames are “generic” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 138), 
meaning they are not context specific and are “inclusive enough so that any 
number of other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their 
campaigns” (Benford, 2013, p. 1; see also de Vreese, 2005, p. 54). As my 
thesis studies a context of demonstrations, I employ two pre-identified frames 
commonly used in the context of social protest as master frames, because 
they correspond with some of the issue-specific frames analysed in my 
research. These master frames are: “riots” and “protests” (Hertog & McLeod, 
2001, p. 157). These two master frames and other master frames developed 
in this research are discussed directly below.   
The “riot” frame portrays a conflict between the demonstrators and society. 
It presents the demonstrators’ actions as illegal or aggressive behaviour, while 
the police or security forces symbolize social order and lawful behaviour to 
protect bystanders (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, pp. 157-158). The “protest” 
frame, on the other hand, portrays conflict between the demonstrators and a 
powerful institution in society. The frame focuses on protest activities instead 
of clashes with the police. Within this frame, protestors are treated as 
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legitimate political group. Therefore, the above frames are employed as 
master frames in my research (ibid).  
As not all the issue-specific frames analysed in the current study focus on 
demonstrations, I developed another master frame to overcome the limitation 
of the specificity of these frames which tend to focus on the nation’s image in 
general instead of the demonstrations or a crisis situation. I labelled this 
master frame ‘national reform’, and developed it from the ‘non-demonstration’ 
frames’ consistent pattern of presenting Bahrain as a reformed nation. I also 
consulted literature on nation branding as it is the area that studies how 
governments consciously shape and design a place identity to promote it to 
foreign public groups (Jones, 2017). Previous research highlight that national 
reform is common approach in the entire GCC region to present their countries 
to foreign publics (Karolak, 2012, p. 3). For Bahrain in particular, their effort to 
present an image of a reformed nation to the international arena focused on 
cultivating an image of “western-friendly, stable, modern, and forward-looking 
country ripe for investment” (Jones, 2017, p. 326). Thus, ‘national reform’ is 
another master frame used in this research.   
Another relevant framing to the examined context is ‘revolution’, which can 
be generally understood as “a movement, often violent, to overthrow an old 
regime and effect complete change in the fundamental institutions of society” 
(Neitzel, n/d). The ‘revolution’ frame is considered in my analysis with specific 
attention as explained directly below.   
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As mentioned earlier, the examined Bahraini crisis coincided with 
upheavals in other Arab countries which were widely referred to as the ‘Arab 
Spring’- a term popularised by Western media in early 2011 when Tunisians 
successfully revolted against the regime and emboldened similar anti-
government protests in most Arab countries (Manfreda, 2018). I consider 
‘revolution’ as more abstract level of framing the Arab protests because, as 
indicated earlier, ‘Arab Spring’ defines these demonstrations as revolutions by 
oppressed people against dictatorships (Maguire & Vickers, 2013). Further, 
the term ‘Arab Spring’ was a reference to the revolutions in Eastern Europe10 
in 1989 which triggered the fall of communism and eventually the Soviet Union 
(Head, 2011; Manfreda, 2018), suggesting that Arab protests will also have a 
domino effect of overthrowing aging Arab dictatorships. Thus, ‘revolution’ is 
considered another master frame relevant to the examined context, while the 
‘Arab Spring’ is considered as a more specific variation of this master frame.   
 Nevertheless, Pinto (2014) mentions that the king of Bahrain refused the 
reference to the protests in his country as another ‘Arab Spring’. Therefore, it 
was expected that frames communicated through BNA’s online content will 
tend to contest the ‘Arab Spring’ framing. The implications of this on my 
analysis are two-fold. First, at the level of generic-frames, my analysis 
                                            
10  
 While some point to the domino effect that spread across Eastern Europe as being similar to the way 
protests are moving across the Arab world, there are also some distinct differences. For example, there 
was no consensus on the political and economic model that existing systems should be replaced with. 
The European revolutions, on the other hand, had international consequences of pushing back of 
Socialism (Head, 2011; Manfreda, 2018).   
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examined how the ‘revolution’ frame was contested with other social protest 
master frames (riot, protest; Hertog & McLeod, 2001). Second, at the level of 
issue-specific frames, my analysis aimed to understand how the ‘Arab Spring’ 
was “counter-framed” in BNA’s online content.   
“Counter-framing” is communicating a frame that contradicts a frame that 
is introduced at a prior date to the opposing frame (Chong & Druckman, 2011, 
p. 3). A counter-frame has three main elements (ibid). First, the counter-frame 
comes at a later time than the initial frame. This means that the public received 
and processed the initial frame before exposure to the counter-frame. In the 
examined case, the ‘Arab Spring’ frame was introduced by Western media 
following the uprising in Tunisia in January 2011, hence, before the beginning 
of the examined Bahraini protests which started on 14 February 2011. Second, 
a counter-frame promotes a position on an issue that is contrary to the initial 
frame. As the king11 of Bahrain refused the ‘Arab Spring’ frame, my analysis 
explores how the situation was framed differently through Bahraini public 
diplomacy. Third, it is assumed that the initial frame affected opinions on the 
issue, creating an incentive to counter-frame. As indicated earlier, the 
perception of the Arab protests as ‘Arab Spring’ provokes sympathy and 
support for the protesters (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1365), and legitimises 
regime overthrows and urgent international military intervention as a valid 
solution to help protestors bring down what was perceived as oppressive 
regimes (Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 129). It is also argued 
                                            
11 The Introduction chapter drew attention to the connections between the king and governmental 
entities such as the IAA/BNA.   
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that the Bahraini protests were designed to echo revolutions in other Arab 
countries, emboldened by the success of uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia (Al-
Hasan, 2015; Weatherby & Longworth, 2011, p. 92; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). 
Therefore, the frame analysis in this thesis examines how the ‘Arab Spring’ 
was contested in BNA’s online content during the three examined key 
moments, offering insights on versions of reality communicated through 
Bahraini public diplomacy.    
The analysed frames are also discussed in relation to the most common 
crisis response strategies proposed by the image repair theory (IRT), and 
these are: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of events, 
corrective action, and mortification (Benoit, 1997; 2004). I discussed these in 
detail in the Literature Review chapter, drawing attention that the term 
‘strategy’ does not necessarily involve strategic intent by the organisation or 
individuals putting the message together. The purpose of linking the analysed 
frames to strategies suggested by the IRT is to offer insights on framing in 
BNA’s contesting of the ‘Arab Spring’ frame, and thus response strategies 
used by Bahraini public diplomacy at a time of crisis and its aftermath.   
The analysis of frames comprised detailed exploration of their presence 
and use in narratives and discourses employed by IAA/BNA in news targeted 
at foreign media. To do so in a systematic manner, I followed analysis steps 
suggested by Van Gorp’s (2007; 2010) constructionist approach to frame 
analysis. The first step in the analysis procedure is inductive reconstruction of 
the set of elements that manifest a frame in a text. Each frame can be 
presented in a text through a “frame package” which is “a cluster of logical 
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organised devices that function as an identity kit for a frame” (Van Gorp, 2007, 
p. 64). A frame package12 consists of manifest framing devices, and manifest 
or latent reasoning devices (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 398; Gamson, 1981;  
Gamson, 1992; Gamson, 2001; Gamson & Lasch, 1981; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). The framing devices can be word choices, exemplars, 
descriptions, metaphors, and arguments. The reasoning devices are: “explicit 
and implicit statements that deal with justifications, causes, and consequences 
in a temporal order, and which complete the frame package” (Van Gorp, 2007, 
p. 64; see also Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 398; Gamson, 1981; Gamson, 
1992; Gamson, 2001; Gamson & Lasch, 1981; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
The reasoning devices are connected to the framing functions launched by 
Entman (1993): problem definition, causal interpretation, treatment 
recommendation, and moral evaluation (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 64). Identifying 
elements of a news text and linking them to a central framing idea requires 
some interpretation by the person who is doing the analysis (Van Gorp, 2010, 
p. 90). This is important as human-judgment is essential to induce the meaning 
of a text, question what is in the content and what is not, and discover new 
insights as part of the coding process (Tankard, 2001, p. 154). With this, it 
seems unavoidable to have some level of subjectivity in the analysis. To 
minimize the subjective bias and enhance the validity and reliability of the 
frame analysis, the inductive reconstruction of frame packages involved a 
                                            
12 It is worth noting that Gamson and Modigliani (1989) coined the term “media package” in 
their study of frames in media context. Van Gorp (2007, p. 74), however, replaces it with the 
label “frame package” to delimit the understanding of framing as a process only conducted 
by journalists or in media context.  
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systematic analysis of the framing and reasoning devices related to a specific 
frame. Frame packages should enable independent analysts to determine the 
presence of the frame in a subsequent deductive phase of the frame analysis, 
and decrease the level of subjectivity in the frame analysis (Van Gorp, 2010, 
p. 92).  
The frame packages gradually take shape during the collection, coding, 
and analysis of the sampled texts (ibid, p. 93). To reconstruct frame packages, 
it is important to be familiar with the culturally available frames on the 
examined topic (Gamson, 1992, p. 215). To grasp an understanding of the 
diverse available frames on the examined crisis, I followed Van Gorp’s (2010, 
p. 94; see also Tankard, 2001, p. 150) advice on reading materials from 
different sources on the examined issue. My reading included the news 
sampled for analysis; coverage of several news outlets on the Bahraini crisis 
(e.g. BBC; CNN; Al-Jazeera; Al-Arabiya); discourse published by the 
opposition political societies in Bahrain; previous academic studies on the 
framing of the Bahraini crisis (Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2015; Bowe & 
Hoewe, 2011; Pinto, 2014); and coverage and academic research on protests 
in other Arab countries at the time (the Arab Spring) (e.g. Hamdy & Gomaa 
(2012): Egypt; Maguire & Vickers (2013): Libya). I also watched several 
YouTube videos on the Bahraini crisis that varied between interviews with 
Bahraini officials and citizens who support the government, and opposition 
representatives and protestors (e.g. "Mushaima Talks to Al-Alam TV", 2011; 
"Bahrain Demands Further Reforms", 2011; "Thousands Protest to Overthrow 
Bahraini Government", 2011). This step helped me understand the multiplicity 
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of how different actors may talk about the Bahraini crisis in a way that invites 
the recipient to understand the situation in a specific manner. Moreover, I am 
a Bahraini citizen who was in Bahrain during the crisis, suggesting my insider 
cultural background on how the protests were discussed by different social 
groups in Bahrain, and in the media either national or international. Despite 
my insider background, I followed Van Gorp’s (2010, p. 94) advice on reading 
material from different relevant sources to assure my understanding of the 
available frames is not limited by my own personal experience and opinions.  
After this exposure to the diverse arguments on the examined crisis, I used 
relevant previous academic studies to collect an inventory of elements that 
could contribute to the understanding of the examined situation in a specific 
manner. Due to my insider cultural background, I noticed similarity between 
the frames systematically analysed in previous studies and how the 
government and its supporters talked about the crisis at the time. Moreover, 
as I read the entire set of data during the phase of exploring the culturally 
available frames, I noticed that frame elements offered in some of the relevant 
studies overlap with some arguments in my data (‘events’ (Maguire and 
Vickers, 2013; ‘existential threat’ (Pinto, 2014; Al-Rawi (2015)). Yet, my 
analysis was not limited to frames from previous studies.  
Other frames analysed in this research were new original frames that 
emerged from the analysed data (‘reform’; ‘supported leadership’; 
‘sovereignty’; ‘unprecedented achievement’). The identification of elements 
and the construction of frame packages for these frames depended on the 
engagement with the analysed news sample. The engagement involved 
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reading and re-reading the data several times; and coding elements through 
three main phases: open; axial; and selective coding which do not necessarily 
work in this specific order (cf. Stauss & Corbin, 1998). In the open coding, I 
listed each element that could indicate the understanding of what is at stake 
in a specific manner. In the axial coding phase there was a higher level of 
abstraction as different elements were listed under each specific central idea 
that they may imply. The selective coding phase comprised even higher level 
of abstraction, where some elements from the axial coding may have been 
deleted.   
The final step in the reconstruction of frame packages is labelling each 
package (frame) in a way that reflects the core idea abstracted (Van Gorp, 
2007; 2010). As the elements of each frame were identified and connected to 
the relevant frame packages, I started filling the “frame matrix” (Gamson & 
Lasch, 1983), which contains the frame packages that comprise each frame. 
Each package in the matrix developed in this project contains two main 
sections: a list of elements serving as framing devices; and a reasoning 
devices section broken down into Entman’s (1993) four framing functions: 
problem definition, causal interpretation, treatment recommendation, and 
moral evaluation. The matrix is displayed in the Frame Analysis chapter (4) in 
Table 3. 
As indicated above, I used relevant previous studies to collect an 
inventory of elements for some of the frame packages. One of these frame 
packages builds on ideas from Maguire and Vickers (2013) whom I used their 
work to develop the ‘events’ frame. I consider their finding on the portrayal of 
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the situation in Bahrain as ‘events’ as a possible frame that could emerge from 
narratives used by IAA/BNA to promote such an interpretation of what was 
happening in Bahrain to foreign media. The textual elements identified through 
Maguire and Vickers’s (2013) discourse analysis suggesting this 
representation were employed as potential elements of this frame. The frame 
is present if the texts:  
• Refer to participants as protestors.  
• Suggest the normality of protesting in Bahrain: it is similar to protests in 
the  
UK, part of peoples’ political rights.   
• Suggest that protests’ demands can be met through reform and 
dialogue.  
• Suggest that protests are under control and do not necessitate urgent 
actions or international intervention.  
• Suggest that the events led to deaths among the protestors: they were 
not killed by policemen, deaths were almost accidental, unplanned.  
The frame analysis in my thesis also revealed an additional element of this 
frame which is:  
• Suggestions of intentional misrepresentation of Bahrain in foreign 
media which signifies the necessity to convey the ‘truth’.  
Another frame that I was able to employ building on previous studies is 
the ‘existential threat’ frame adopted, with minor adjustments, from Pinto 
(2014) and Al-Rawi (2015). Both authors suggest the framing of the protests 
in Bahrain as “an Iran-backed conspiracy against the Gulf in an attempt to 
spread Shiism and infiltrate into the region” (Al-Rawi, 2015, p. 25). They both 
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offer the same reasoning devices in their separate studies, but different 
framing elements. To identify the “existential threat” frame, I used these 
elements form (Pinto, 2014) in the form of the following points:    
• Bahraini authorities asking for foreign military intervention.  
• References to the implications of Iranian threat on other GCC countries 
and their monarchies.  
• References to Iran/Shiites as a threat.  
On the other hand, Al-Rawi (2015) measures the dominant words and 
phrases in the comments of Bahraini online activists on YouTube videos about 
the Bahraini crisis. He also measures the most recurrent associations between 
them. As mentioned in the Literature Review, I use his insights on the 
implications of the most recurrent word associations found in his analysis to 
develop elements for the ‘existential threat’ frame. Therefore, besides the 
elements adopted from Pinto (2014), a text was taken to include the ‘existential 
threat’ frame if it contained:   
• Reference to collaborations between Bahraini leadership, government, 
prime-minister and the Saudi ruling family against protestors, Shi’a.13   
• Reference to majorities or minorities in the country in terms of Sunni or 
Shi’a.14   
• Negative references to the regime, king, government, ruling families in 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Al-Khalifa, al-Saud), Shi’a.14  
                                            
13 This element was developed from Al-Rawi’s (2015) insights on associations between: “down with”, “Al-Khalifa”, 
“Saud”.  14 
 This element was developed from direct references to Sunni and Shi’a.  
14 This element was developed from Al-Rawi’s (2015) insights on associations between: “Allah’s curse”, “Hamad”, 
“Khalifa”, Bahraini and Saudi governments. This depends on the affiliation of the element’s source, i.e. if the 
source is Shiite and refers negatively to the government, it indicates a sectarian conflict.   
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• Expressions of hatred between religious groups (i.e. Sunni and Shi’a).15  
• Reference to wishes, prayers of victory to the Gulf Peninsula Shield 
Forces  
(PSF).16  
• Reference to foreigners given Bahraini nationality as “mercenaries”.17  
My analysis also revealed two additional elements of the ‘existential threat’ 
frame:  
• References to riots, violence, vandalism, continuity of demonstrations 
and its consequences on the nation’s safety and stability.   
• References to strict measures to restore order.  
As indicated earlier, the remaining of the analysed frames in this research 
are new issue-specific frames that emerged from the analysed data. I also 
discussed above the procedure of developing the frame packages for these 
frames. These frames are: ‘reform’; ‘unprecedented achievement’; ‘supported 
leadership’; and ‘sovereignty’. The elements used in the deductive phase of 
analysing the ‘reform’ frame are:  
• References to NAC’s 10th anniversary as a celebration.  
• References to the leadership’s role in reform.   
• References to the NAC and the reform project achievements.   
• References to the protests and their consequences as “sporadic 
incidents”.  
                                            
15 This element was developed from Al-Rawi’s (2015) insights on associations between: “killing”, “dogs”, “death”, 
“Sunnis”, “Shiite”.   
16 This element was developed from Al-Rawi’s (2015) insights on associations between: “let Allah bring 
them victory”, “security forces”. PSF represent Sunni GCC monarchies.   
17 This element was developed from Al-Rawi’s (2015) insights on associations between: “regime”, “killing”, 
“curse”, “mercenaries”. Granting Bahraini nationality to foreigners was seen by Shi’a as a form of changing 
the “majorly Shiite” demography of the Bahraini society.   
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• References to the leadership’s ‘democratic’ responses to the 
‘incidents’.    
• References to further governmental initiatives to meet citizens’ 
demands.    
The reasoning and framing devices for this frame and all other frames are 
summarised in the frame matrix in Table 3 in chapter 4.   
For the ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame, the elements are:  
• References to the BICI and its report as unprecedented achievement 
and democratic solution.  
• References to the acceptance of the report’s results.   
• References to the report’s contributions to the future of Bahrain.   
• Excluding government breeches asserted by the report.  
The elements for the ‘supported leadership’ frame are:  
• Supporting the leadership and its initiatives.   
• Supporting Bahrain’s stability and security.  
• References to GCC unity, strong ties, historic relations, support.  
• International support, ties, cooperation.  
• References to loyal, patriotic citizens.  
And, finally, the elements for the ‘sovereignty’ frame are:   
• References to the authorities’ determination and ability to protect the 
nation, citizens, residents.  
• No impunity for criminal acts and their perpetrators.  
• Order is restored successfully, return to normality.  
To add more in-depth understanding of Bahraini public diplomacy’s role in 
the construction of specific versions of reality in its messages during the crisis, 
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I also explore what factors were connected to the construction of the frames. I 
conducted interviews with selected IAA communicators to deliver insights on 
these factors and the processes of articulating public diplomacy messages. 
The following section details the role and procedure of these interviews in my 
thesis.   
  
7. IN-DEPTH SEMI-STRUCTURED QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS   
 7.1.  The method  
Interviews with IAA communicators aim to understand the factors related 
to the frame-building process in order to generate insights on Bahraini public 
diplomacy processes that contribute to the construction of specific versions of 
reality as communicated through their messages. A qualitative interview has 
the purpose of producing knowledge through the interaction between the 
interviewer and the participant to understand the world from the participant’s 
viewpoint (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 4; Kvale, 1996). This works in line with 
the social constructivist approach overarching this research and discussed 
earlier in section 3 of this chapter. In-depth interviewing allows the researcher 
to explore “complex, contradictory, or counterintuitive matters, [and] portray 
on-going social processes” (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 4). A semi-structured 
research interview is an interview with the purpose of generating deep 
descriptions of the “life world” of the interviewee in order to interpret the 
meaning of the described phenomena (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 32). As 
my research paradigm highlights my involvement as a researcher in the 
knowledge production process, my role as the interviewer comprises actively 
following up on the participants’ answers, seeking to clarify and extend the 
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interview statement (Brinkman & Kvale, 2015, p. 10; Bryman, 2004, p. 113). 
From a constructivist viewpoint, the interview data reflects one version of 
reality that is constructed by both the interviewer and the interviewee, instead 
of treating the data as a reflection of the interviewee’s reality outside the 
interview (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 51-52). Therefore, the interview is a 
process of data generation rather than data collection, and it is judged for its 
“richness, vividness and accuracy in describing complex situations or cultures” 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 16; see also King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 22). Further, 
instead of treating its findings as generalizable rules, the quality of the 
generated data can be assessed through its transferability, where “the reader 
can assess the extent to which conclusions drawn in one setting can transfer 
to another” through the researcher’s provision of adequate rich detail on the 
examined topic and the research process (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 160). 
Moreover, as working within the social constructivist paradigm highlights my 
interpretive rather than observer role in the data generation, a certain level of 
subjectivity in the process cannot be denied. Therefore, to establish validity 
and reliability in this method I provide detailed and transparent description of 
my research and analysis procedure, in addition to evidence from the data to 
support inferences and arguments made in the analysis (Silverman, 2006, p. 
282). I also provide a copy of the interview guide in Appendix 1, and a full 
translated transcript of one interview in Appendix 3.   
 7.2.  Sampling interview participants  
The BNA, the governmental news agency whose website content I analyse 
in the frame analysis, worked under the management of the IAA. The IAA did 
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not have a separate public diplomacy department, and practiced public 
diplomacy without using this label. Rather, IAA activities that were in line with 
the definition of public diplomacy adopted throughout this thesis were labelled 
‘external communication’ or ‘media relations’. Those involved in public 
diplomacy communications, hereafter called ‘communicators’, did not work 
within one department specifically responsible for communicating with foreign 
publics. Public diplomacy activities were practiced through the departments of 
External Communication, and Bahrain News Agency (BNA). Before starting 
my field-work, I searched the website of IAA (Ministry of Information Affairs at 
the time) for different communicators who had the potential to contribute to my 
project. I also contacted the head of the Public Relations Department who 
acted as research informant to identify potential participants. This helped me 
select the first interviewee, who was highly involved in different foreign media 
relations activities within IAA, especially during the 2011 crisis and its 
aftermath. Thereafter, I employed a snowballing approach.   
In the “snowballing” approach (Strydom & Venter, 2005), every time I 
interviewed a communicator I asked him or her to recommend other 
colleagues who have experience in my topic and could potentially contribute 
to the research project. In order to be included in my sample the recommended 
interviewees needed to meet specific criteria. They had to be involved in IAA’s 
foreign media relations activities during the examined crisis, and they had to 
have a role in making decisions on messages promoted to foreign media 
during the timeframe of my study. Before approaching each new interviewee, 
I needed to be introduced through the participant who recommended them. I 
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did not interview all the suggested communicators because some of them 
either refused to participate due to work restrictions (1 recommended 
interviewee) or did not meet the criteria of inclusion (2 potential interviewees 
recommended by others focused on local communications through social 
media instead of mainstream international media). To ensure that the 
interviewees’ experiences are relevant to my research I also interviewed 
communicators who worked at different government positions outside the IAA 
(3 communicators) and were asked to join the IAA at different points during 
the crisis and its aftermath as consultants, for their communication skills and 
expertise. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite their relevant 
experience, the participants’ insights could be limited by their ability to recall 
accurate memories about the examined phenomena, and their willingness to 
share sensitive information (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 71-76). I stopped 
interviewing more participants when the generated data reached a “saturation” 
point, where no new information or themes were observed in the data (Guest, 
Bunce & Johnson, 2006, p. 59). Saturation in specific themes started to build 
up in the third interview. From 7 recommended communicators I interviewed 
4, bringing the total number of interviews to 5. Of these, one participant was 
highly engaged in foreign media relations during the crisis and its aftermath, 
two participants were responsible for monitoring different media platforms to 
help in designing IAA messages and responses through foreign media, and 
the other two were responsible for designing and approving different key 
messages and communication strategies related to the crisis and its 
consequences.  
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 7.3.  Interview procedure   
To interview the communicators, I prepared a series of main, follow-up, and 
probing questions in the general form of an interview guide (Appendix 1) (King 
& Horrocks, 2010, pp. 35-41; Kvale, 2007, pp. 60-66; Rubin & Rubin, 2005, 
pp. 134144). The main questions are the questions that guide the 
conversation; probing questions attempt to clarify responses or extract 
examples; and follow-up questions aim to uncover the implications and hidden 
assumptions in the answers provided to the main questions (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995, pp. 145-146 in Warren, 2002, p 86). I did not use the interview guide in 
the same form throughout each interview, as I only used it to remind me of the 
core questions and themes I needed to discuss with the participants, the 
follow-up questions I could use to extend the discussion of certain topics, and 
the main purpose of discussing specific issues. I also asked questions that 
were not in the guide but resulted from the discussion flow and were necessary 
to generate clear understanding of what the interviewees were suggesting. In 
order to generate data on the factors connected to framing during the 2011 
crisis and its aftermath, I asked the communicators to share how the IAA/BNA 
communicated with foreign media, and what strategies, activities, and goals it 
had in this regard. I also asked them about the processes of texts’ production; 
who was involved in it, how it was done, and who was it targeted at. Moreover, 
we discussed the different messages used by IAA in its communications with 
foreign media across the three key moments of focus. A sample of the 
interview guide is in Appendix 1.   
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The initial contacts with the participants were made through phone 
conversations after gaining access through the participants who 
recommended them. To work in-line with the University of Stirling’s code of 
ethical research, and the ethical considerations in research interviews (King & 
Horrocks, 2010, p. 108), I asked the participant at each interview to sign a 
consent form that contained all terms and conditions we agreed on during the 
initial contacts (“Code of Good Research Practice”, n/d, p. 11). Mainly, the 
forms document the participants’ right of confidentiality, agreement to audio 
record the interview by the researcher, and their right to withdraw from the 
project at any time. The forms also contain agreements on the use of the 
interview data in academic publications originating from this project, in addition 
to the secure storage of interview records for five years. A template of the 
consent forms used in my project is in Appendix 2.   
The interviews took place face-to-face in the interviewees’ offices or in 
coffee shops depending on the participant’s convenience. With the approval 
of the interviewees, I recorded each interview to transcribe it and use the 
transcriptions in data analysis (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 204-205; 
Matheson, 2007, p. 548). Additionally, audio recordings helped me focus on 
the conversation and my topic rather than taking extensive notes. The 
participants spontaneously switched between Arabic (their and my first 
language) and English during the interviews. I transcribed the interviews as 
they are in terms of the language the interviewees spoke. As this research is 
presented in English, I only translated Arabic text to English when the quote 
was used in the interview analysis chapter as evidence of specific 
 161  
  
interpretation. Appendix 3 offers an example of an interview transcript which I 
fully translated into English to help the reader follow the discussion flow.  
The interviews took place between December 2015 and February 2016. A 
follow-up took place with one of the interviewees in January 2018 to clarify 
significant implications observed in the data, and assure they are interpreted 
by the researcher in accordance with what the participant meant. The interview 
data were analysed through three main phases detailed in the following 
subsection.    
 7.4.  Analysing interview data   
When analysing interviews from a social constructivist viewpoint the goal 
of the analysis is to produce knowledge concerned with how the interviewees 
actively create meaning (Silverman, 2011, p. 182). Such analysis should not 
be reduced to “what” the participants present as knowledge, as it also has to 
show the dynamic interrelatedness with “how” they present it (Gubrium & 
Holstein in Silverman, 2011, p. 186; Holstein & Gubrium, 2011a, p. 364, 
Holstein & Gubrium, 2011b, pp. 162-163). It is important to keep an eye on the 
contexts in which the participants share certain insights in order to assure what 
they mean is clear and accurate (Corbin & Strauss, 2008. p. 57).  There is not 
one fixed method to analyse qualitative interview data, but there are common 
approaches to do so (Kvale, 2007, p. 103). One of these is a three-step 
approach suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998), and includes: 1) open 
coding; 2) axial coding and 3) selective coding. I employed these three steps 
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to analyse what was represented by the participants and generated as 
“particular versions of reality” in this research (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 22).   
  As the interviews were transcribed, the first step was ‘open coding’ of 
the data. This comprises of closely examining the data to find concepts and 
group them under categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 62). Finding 
concepts, or the conceptualising process includes giving each discrete part of 
the data (sentence; paragraph; or observation) a name that represents what it 
stands for (ibid, p. 63). This is done by asking questions to understand what 
the data stands for, and making comparisons to categorise concepts and avoid 
a proliferation of categories. In the conceptualising process, the analyst needs 
to make sure they are not just summarising the data (ibid, p. 64). Rather, they 
need to take a step back and interpret what this data is about. Open coding is 
“designed to break open the data to consider all possible meanings” and 
generate ideas that will help in getting closer to the data (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008, pp. 58-59). It is important to be open to data at the earliest stages of the 
analysis to prevent “early foreclosure or jumping to conclusions … that might 
prove wrong later on as the analysis proceeds” (ibid, pp. 52-53). Thus, through 
reading and re-reading interview data, I coded each passage in every 
transcript by writing notes on how each passage helps in understanding the 
interviewees’ perceptions and experiences. Once these notes were developed 
I categorised them through grouping the concepts that seemed related to each 
other (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 65).   
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  The second step was ‘axial coding’ and reorganising data by making 
connections between categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This was 
operationalized through reorganising, classifying and categorizing data to 
begin generating assertions about the studied topic (Roulston, 2014, p. 305). 
I further compared the categories generated in phase one, grouped the 
categories that share some common meaning, and interpreted the meaning of 
each group in light of my research questions and topic. New categories can 
be developed in this stage through further immersion in the data (King & 
Horrocks, 2010, pp. 154-156).    
The third step of the analysis comprised ‘selective coding’ where I went 
through the data and the categories again to decide whether any categories 
can be discarded or any categories can be put together. This resulted in 
number of overarching themes reflecting key concepts in the analysis. I 
reduced the number of overarching themes as much as possible and 
supported each one with evidence from a substantial number of interviews 
(King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 156). Nevertheless, I considered that a theme can 
still be identified when it only occurred in one or two interviews if its 
identification is significant to the whole analysis. When the overarching themes 
were identified, I discussed them in relation to theoretical concepts or ideas 
related to my topic, with the use of data excerpts to support these 
interpretations (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 156; Roulston, 2014, p. 305). These 
insights are then discussed in relation to the frames identified through the 
frame analysis to develop in-depth understanding of Bahraini public diplomacy 
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processes which promoted certain realities in their messages during the crisis 
and its aftermath.  I also used Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model to 
organise the discussion of the analysed factors of influence on five different 
levels: individual, professional, organisational external, and ideological. 
Chapter 5 presents the interview analysis.  
Therefore, this chapter discussed the philosophical standpoints adopted in 
this study, the research questions, and the methods used. The next chapter 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 FRAME ANALYSIS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION  
  
  
1. INTRODUCTION   
This chapter presents the frame analysis of news items published on the Local 
news page of Bahrain News Agency’s (BNA) English website during three key 
moments of the 2011 crisis in Bahrain: the first week of protests (14-19 
February 2011), the arrival of the PSF to Bahrain (14-16 March 2011), and the 
publication of BICI report (23-25 November 2011). As explained previously, 
the BNA website is operated by the Bahraini government and functions as a 
key tool for communicating its perspective on current affairs to foreign media 
and publics. Through the lens of the social constructivist paradigm, my 
qualitative frame analysis of this content aims to identify the different frames 
present in the analysed news. It explores the textual elements that give the 
frames support and reinforcement to promote specific interpretations of issues 
over others. Moreover, it examines how the BNA communicated the analysed 
frames through these texts across the studied moments, and explores what 
common crisis response strategies as offered by Benoit’s (1995) image repair 
theory (IRT) correspond to the analysed frames. Hence, the analysis 
generates an understanding of what public diplomacy frames were 
communicated to foreign media and, consequently, public during a national 
crisis and its aftermath, how were these articulated, and how the frames 
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evolved across time. The purpose of this is to deliver insights on how public 
diplomacy contributes and what role it plays in construction of the messages 
promoting specific versions of reality during a crisis and its aftermath. 
My analysis of BNA’s content published during the three examined 
moments argues that the majority of the analysed frames do not portray the 
examined context as a crisis (e.g. ‘reform’; ‘events’, ‘unprecedented 
achievement’, ‘supported leadership’), and even if they do they present the 
cause as foreign conspiracy and not internal issues as in ‘Arab Spring 
countries’ (e.g. ‘existential threat’, ‘sovereignty’). The analysis revealed that 
the frames communicated to foreign media by the BNA change across the 
examined moments, representing several crisis response strategies offered 
by the IRT. The represented strategies vary between denial, minimisation, 
shifting the blame, bolstering, differentiation, and attacking the accuser. The 
combination of these frames and crisis response strategies in BNA’s analysed 
content suggests the Bahraini government did not address the internal 
problematic issues causing a crisis, and, instead, tended to limit or externalise 
the crisis in the examined public diplomacy content. Despite communicating 
different frames and strategies across different moments of the crisis, all the 
analysed frames maintain consistent tendency to contest the ‘Arab Spring’ 
with the aim to prevent representing Bahrain within this frame  in the foreign 
coverage in relation to Bahrain (the interview analysis discusses efforts by the 
BNA/IAA not to present the examined crisis as ‘revolution’). Hence, instead of 
a ‘revolution’ master frame, the analysed frames tend to fall within ‘national 
reform’, ‘protest’, or ‘riot’ master frames as explained in the following sections. 
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The analysis suggests that Bahraini public diplomacy framing of the crisis 
corresponds to realist conceptualisations of public diplomacy, where it is a 
‘power tool’ in the hands of the sponsoring government to maintain its power 
position in the international relations environment (Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 
383).   
The Methodology chapter detailed how I employed a constructivist 
approach (Van Gorp, 2007; 2010) in my analysis. All the issue-specific frames 
and the elements comprising them are summarised in Table 3. As indicated in 
previous chapters, this table represents the signature matrix for the Bahraini 
2011 crisis. It contains six frame packages; each of them represents one of 
the analysed frames: ‘reform’, ‘events’, ‘existential threat’, ‘unprecedented 
achievement’, ‘supported leadership’, and ‘sovereignty’. The first column 
represents the reasoning devices. According to Van Gorp (2007; 2010), the 
reasoning devices represent the four framing dimensions established by 
Entman (1993): problem definition, causal interpretation, treatment 
recommendation, and moral evaluation. The column labelled ‘Elements’ 
represents the framing devices, and these are the frame elements developed 
in the inductive phase of the analysis and used to explore the frames’ presence 
in the deductive phase. The unit of analysis was the news item. The presence 
of a framing device in a unit illustrated the presence of a frame. Each unit was 
coded for up to two frames.    
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Table 3. Signature Matrix for the Bahraini 2011 Crisis  
Frame Label 
 

















Bahrain is a reformed nation 
where political, social and 
economic developments have 
been taking place for ten years 
through a comprehensive reform 
project initiated by the King in 
2001. The leadership follows 
democratic rather than oppressive 
approaches. Within this context 
the protests and their 
consequences are only “sporadic 
incidents”. 
 References to 
NAC’s 10th 
anniversary as a 
celebration. 
 References to 
the leadership’s 
role in reform.  
 References to 
the NAC and the 
reform project 
achievements.  
 References to 





 References to 
the leadership’s 
‘democratic’ 
responses to the 
‘incidents’.   





















The frame does not problematize the 
situation. Thus, the “sporadic incidents” 
are caused by ‘regrettable’ individual 
actions rather than pre-organised public 






















Probe committee to investigate 
the “sporadic” events, and 

















The reforms achieved national 
accomplishments and enhanced 
citizens’ welfare. The protests, on 
the other hand, are just 
‘regrettable’ individual incidents. 


















This frame acknowledges the 
demonstrations but downplays 
their significance. It presents them 
as protests that can happen in any 
democratic country, portraying 
them as unproblematic practice of 
freedom of expression.  
 Suggestions 
that the events 




























While the frame does not 
problematize the situation, the 
cause of the protests is the 
democratic atmosphere in 
Bahrain that allows freedom of 
expression.  






















“Further reforms” and “dialogue”, 







solutions.   
 Suggestions of 
intentional 
misrepresentati
on of Bahrain 













Unproblematic expression of 
demands.  
3 Existentia

























Iran backed plan against GCC 
members to invade the region and 
spread Shi’ism.   





 References to 
implications of 





 References to 
Iran or Shiites as 
a threat.  







on the nation’s 
safety and 
stability. 
 References to 
the need for 
strict measures 
to restore order 
and protect 
Bahrain.  




minister and the Saudi 
ruling family against 
protestors, Shi’a. 
 Reference to majorities 
or minorities in the 
country in terms of 
















Iran triggered “riots” and 
“dangerous escalations” to 




















“Strict measures” to restore order: 
“requesting” GCC military 
support; declaring a State of 
National Safety; and a security 
operation to clear demonstrations 












Any form of foreign interference in 
Bahrain’s internal affairs is 
“rejected” by all GCC members. 
The “interference” is a “hostile 
action” that “contravenes the 
principle of good neighbourly 
relations”.  
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 Negative references to 
the regime, king, 
government, ruling 
families in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia, Shi’a. 
 Expressions of hatred 
between Sunni and 
Shi’a. 
 Reference to wishes, 
prayers of victory to the 
PSF. 
 Reference to 
foreigners given 























Bahrain is a reformed country with 
a “wise” leader who took a “brave” 
and “pioneering step that won 
international recognition” to invite 
an “independent” commission to 
investigate the events of February 
and March 2011. 
 References to 






 References to 
the acceptance 
of the report’s 
results.  
 References to 
the report’s 
contributions to 
























Having such ‘democratic’ solution 
refers to the ‘wise’ leadership that 
took a national decision to invite 























The authorities’ acceptance of 
BICI report and their vows to 
implement its recommendations 














The BICI is a “historical 
achievement”, an “instrument of 
self-evaluation”, and a 
“contribution for the future of 
Bahrain” that will lead to the 


























Unlike regimes in ‘Arab Spring 
countries’, the Bahraini 
authorities’ legitimacy is not at 
stake. It is supported by 
international leaders and Bahraini 
citizens.  
 Supporting the 
leadership and its 
initiatives.  
 Supporting Bahrain’s 
stability and security. 
 References to GCC 
unity, strong ties, 
historic relations, 
support. 
 International support, 
ties, cooperation. 
 References to loyal, 




















The reformed system and the 
leadership’s democratic initiatives 
and responses justify the 














Overthrowing the regime is not 
appropriate since it is a legitimate 
government. Rather, the political 
system should remain and its 
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International leaders’ support 
confirms the Bahraini leadership’s 
legitimacy and proves it is a 
government with democratic 
values, whose rule benefits the 
stability and future of Bahrain.  
6 Sovereig











Despite the unrest and the critical 
situation in Bahrain, the frame 
presents the authorities’ in a 
power position.   
 References to 
the authorities’ 
determination 































The authorities’ determination and 
readiness to protect the publics 
and national achievements from 















Pledging to stop ‘illegal acts’ and 














The authorities’ firmness 
protected the nation and restored 
normality.  
 
Table 4 summarises the presence of frames in the analysed texts 
across the three examined moments. It illustrates how the ‘reform’ and ‘events’ 
frames were most prominent in BNA’s online content in the first examined 
moment; the ‘existential threat’ frame in the second, and the ‘unprecedented 
achievement’ in the third. The following sections discuss the analysed frames, 
explaining how the frames evolved over the examined moments, how they 
combined with each other to present a certain construction of the issue at 
different times, and how these constructions depict specific crisis response 
strategies offered by the IRT. Although applying the analysed frames to other 
studies is limited by their situation-specific focus, I suggest they could be 
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useful as a starting point for comparison with government communications in 
other situations of national crises, particularly within the border context of the 
‘Arab Spring’. Moreover, drawing connections between the analysed frames 
and the strategies offered by the IRT can deliver insights on Bahraini public 
diplomacy framing strategies in contesting unfavourable coverage in foreign 
media, including the ‘Arab Spring’ frame.    
Table 4. The presence of frames in the analysed texts across the examined moments  
  
  
Moment   First moment  
14-19 February 
2011  
Second moment  
14-16 March  
2011  
Third moment  
23- 25 November 
2011  















Reform  27  45.76%  -  -  3  5.08%  
Events   22  37.28%  -  -  -  -  
Existential threat  1  1.69%  27  67.5%  9  15.25%  
Unprecedented achievement  -  -  -  -  25  42.37%  
Supported leadership  15  25.42%  13  32.5%  19  32.2%  
Sovereignty   3  5.08%  10  25%  4  6.77%  
2. THE ‘REFORM’ FRAME  
This frame presents Bahrain as a reformed nation where improvement 
in different sectors (political, economic, social) had been taking place for the 
previous ten years through a comprehensive reform project initiated by King 
Hamad bin Isa AlKhalifa in 2001 (Table 3, row 1). The emphasis that items 
carrying this frame place on a decade of reforms tends to suggest that Bahrain 
had been engaged in reform for a long time before the protests. This tends to 
discredit the need for public demonstrations and thus avoids associations with 
the Arab Spring where citizens were revolting against ‘dictatorships’ that do 
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not peruse genuine reforms (Joffe, 2011, p. 508). Despite the fact that Bahrain 
has a non-elected hereditary monarchy system, the frame emphasises the 
democratic approaches of the leadership. The frame suggests the reform 
project scored several national achievements that improved Bahrain’s profile 
as a reformed nation and the citizens’ welfare. As outlined in earlier chapters, 
the National Action Charter18 (NAC) sets the reform goals and strategies.  
According to the ‘reform’ frame, the introduction of the NAC in 2001, 
and the achievements attained under the reform project addressed long-
standing democratic deficits in Bahrain, and restored trust between the 
leadership and the citizens, specifically those from the Shiite sect (Karolak, 
2012; 2017). Moreover, it depicts the King as the initiator of a “bold” reform 
project presenting him as a monarch with democratic rather than authoritative 
approaches. While the frame emphasises democratic achievements since the 
introduction of the NAC, it does not acknowledge the on-going conflict 
between the Sunni authority and groups of the Shiite sect in Bahrain, 
specifically regarding what some Shi’a perceived as insincere government 
efforts to deliver NAC’s promises (Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, the frame 
presents the protests only as “sporadic incidents” instead of pre-organised 
public demonstrations.  
                                            
18 A political document composed by a number of Bahraini legislators, ministers, academics, etc. 
following a request by King Hamad to set the roadmap for comprehensive national reforms in Bahrain. 
It was endorsed by 98.4% of Bahraini voters in a national referendum that took place on 14 February 
2001. Politically, the major achievement of NAC and the reform project was restoring democratic 
approaches through reintroducing municipal and parliamentary elections in 2002, after the absence 
of the legislative authority for 27 years.    
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The analysis suggests this frame correspond to the ‘national reform’ 
master frame. As discussed in the Methodology chapter, I developed this 
master frame building on literature on nation branding. It focuses on nations’ 
“conscious attempt” of presenting themselves to foreign publics (Kavaratzis & 
Ashworth, 2010, p. 1), where national reform is an approach employed by the 
entire GCC countries (Karolak, 2012, p. 3). In terms of Bahrain, it portrays the 
country as “western-friendly, stable, modern, and forward-looking country ripe 
for investment” (Jones, 2017, p. 326).  This frame was dominant in the BNA’s 
content on the first day of the protests (in 10/13 items published on 14 
February). This could be seen as normal, since 14 February was the NAC’s 
10th anniversary, and it could be expected the IAA/BNA focused its 
communications of the day to highlight the occasion. Nevertheless, the country 
witnessed another major event on that day: public protests demanding rights 
and questioning reforms promised by the NAC itself had been planned for that 
day via social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, Online forums) since the 
end of January 2011 (Al-Hasan, 2015; BICI, 2011, p. 65; Weatherby & 
Longworth, 2011, p. 92; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). Thus, the authorities and its 
communication channels (e.g. BNA; IAA) were likely to have expected the 
protests. Therefore, the choice to focus on the perceived achievements of 
reforms on that day could potentially suggest a strategic choice of emphasis, 
shifting foreign media’s attention away from the demonstrations and distancing 
Bahrain from Arab Spring protests in other countries. Yet, the interview 
analysis chapter suggests that frame-building at this stage of the crisis was 
not so much driven by pre-emptive strategy but rather related to the absence 
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of decision making, and IAA/BNA communicators’ lack of experience in 
handling crises. This is discussed further in chapter 5 in addition to other 
frame-building factors at this stage of the crisis.    
The analysis suggests this frame represents a ‘denial’ response strategy  
(Benoit, 1995), because it does not acknowledge mass public demonstrations 
demanding political, social, and economic reforms, which escalated to clashes 
with security forces, resulting in deaths among protestors. Note that according 
to the IRT, simple denial takes place by stating the offensive act did not occur. 
In the examined case, however, the denial of a crisis is implied by the 
reconstruction of the situation as a celebration of a national reform milestone. 
When ‘regrettable’ incidents were acknowledged on the day after, they were 
only addressed as ‘sporadic incidents’. This acknowledgement suggests 
elements of Benoit’s (1995) ‘minimisation’ strategy, but ‘denial’ still prevailed 
because the major focus of the frame remained on the celebratory aspect. As 
noted earlier, the use of the term ‘strategy’ in relation to the IRT does not 
necessarily involve strategic intent by the organisation or people who put the 
message together. This is discussed further in the interview analysis. 
The elements articulating this frame in the texts analysed were 
references to: the 10th anniversary of the NAC as a celebration of reform 
achievements rather than a beginning of demonstrations questioning the 
reform project’s promises; the role of the Bahraini leadership in reform; and 
the achievements attained under the umbrella of the NAC and the reform 
project. However, when two protestors died in the first two days of 
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demonstrations after clashes with security forces, the frame evolved through 
the presence of additional elements. These elements portray an image of a 
reformed nation with non-oppressive approaches through: references to the 
leadership’s response to the escalating situation; references to the protests as 
only “sporadic incidents”; and references to further governmental reform 
initiatives to meet citizens’ demands. Hence, the frame continued to present 
Bahrain as a reformed nation while it portrayed the protests as ‘sporadic 
incidents’. I explain each of these elements directly below and illustrate with 
examples how they were manifested in the texts.    
On the first day of protests, marking NAC’s 10th anniversary, the ‘reform’ 
frame mainly appeared in news items that portrayed the anniversary as a 
celebration. For example, on the morning of that day BNA published a news 
item announcing:   
1. Bahrain celebrates today the 10th anniversary of its historic 
National Action Charter and it is appropriate to assess the State of 
the Nation in terms of the achievement of its aims, objectives and 
directions.  
The Charter is … taking into account the aspirations of people…  It 
set a new path for Bahrain's … people and help them continuously 
achieve higher levels of progress and prosperity. (bna.bh, 
14.02.2011)  
  
The frame is not only manifested through the direct statement of the 
celebratory aspect (“Bahrain celebrates […] the 10th anniversary”). Noteworthy 
is also the use of the terms “appropriate to assess”, which imply an attempt to 
direct attention to the reform project achievements instead of the protests. This 
is important as it implies the NAC is a success, thus contradicting protestors’ 
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claims that it failed to deliver its promises. Despite the long history of tensions 
between the government and groups of Shi’a citizens; the protestors were 
emboldened19 to demonstrate after uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (AL-Hasan, 
2015; BICI, 2011, p. 56; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 28). The upheavals in these 
countries were widely presented by international media as revolutions by 
oppressed people against dictatorships (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). The ‘reform’ 
frame, by contrast, denies a crisis and emphasises celebrating a reform 
milestone thus seemingly avoids foreign media direct comparisons between 
Arab uprisings and the Bahraini protests. Further, while the Bahraini protestors 
demanded political, economic, and social reforms (BICI, 2011, Ulrichsen, 
2013), the BNA presented the NAC as a project “taking into account the 
aspirations of people”, and “help them continuously achieve higher levels of 
progress and prosperity”. This reinforces implications that Bahrain should not 
be perceived like countries where people were protesting to have their 
aspirations taken into account and to achieve progress and prosperity; 
because the Bahraini government had already been catering for these since 
the reform process started a decade before.   
The frame was also articulated and supported by a range of other 
elements in the texts. The following excerpt, for instance, illustrates how the 
emphasis on celebrations combined with references to the role of the 
                                            
19 Note that these demonstrations are not the first demonstrations ever; Bahrain witnessed several 
protests before. But what happened here is that these demonstrations were unprecedented in terms 
of the number of protestors and exposure to international audiences.  
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leadership in reform. It is from a news item covering congratulations passed to 
the leadership from the Chairman of the Representatives Council:    
2. [He] sent a cable of congratulations to His Majesty King Hamad … 
marking the 10th Anniversary of the National Action Charter.   
[He] extended his sincere congratulations to HM King Hamad, 
describing the occasion as a landmark historical achievement 
reflecting HM’s aspirations outlined in HM the King pioneering 
Reform Project. (bna.bh, 14.02.2011)  
  
While the example highlights celebrations of a “historical achievement”, 
it presents this reform project as the King’s idea, and describes it as a 
“pioneering” one. The text also mentions wishes of “further progress and 
prosperity under [the King’s] wise leadership”, which reinforces the ‘reform’ 
frame by emphasising the role of the leadership in initiating democratic and 
national achievements. Hence, it implies that without the king’s “landmark” 
initiative, reform would not have been introduced in Bahrain. Thus, the frame 
denies a crisis situation by emphasising the role of the leadership in reform, 
and tends to distance Bahrain from the ‘Arab Spring’. Note that the ‘Arab 
Spring’ frame suggests that Arab publics were revolting against oppressive 
regimes which, instead of seeking genuine reforms, they focus on maintaining 
their power positions (Joffe, 2011, p. 508).   
A further element of this frame involves references to achievements 
attained by the NAC and the reform project. The next example is from another 
item congratulating the leadership on NAC’s anniversary. It provides evidence 
of specific reform achievements in Bahrain:  
3. Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments Minister … hailed the 
kingdom’s achievements in terms of democratic development, 
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popular participation, boosting the role of civil society institutions, 
protecting freedoms and promoting human rights and the role of 
women. (bna.bh,  
14.02.2011)  
  
These particular achievements imply an image of a reformed nation 
where human rights are respected and freedoms are protected. Demonstrating 
democratic values and respect towards human rights are significant in building 
a nation’s image and reputation among foreign media and publics (Kunczik, 
1997, p. 238). Therefore, portraying Bahrain as a country with such values is 
important for its international reputation. The leadership’s role is also 
highlighted at the end of the text, implying a reminder of its central role in 
achieving these accomplishments, especially when it is connected in the text 
to the “improve[ment] of citizens’ welfare”. This also tends to deny any 
problematic situation in Bahrain. Another main achievement that suggests the 
democratic accomplishments of the NAC and the reform project is the 
reintroduction of an elected assembly in 2002, after 27 years of suspending 
the previous short-lived (2 years) parliamentary experience in 1975. 
Nevertheless, the addition of an upper house of royal appointees lowered 
confidence in the sincerity of political reform and led to a range of political 
societies boycotting the 2002 elections (Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 2). This 
problematic aspect related to the reforms is not addressed in the frame. 
Hence, as the frame emphasises the achievements of the reform project, it 
does not address the problematic aspects erupting from the methods of 
implementing these reforms.   
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Until now, the examples illustrate how the frame was manifested 
through references to celebrations, the leadership’s role, and reform 
achievements. Yet, additional elements of the frame emerged the day after 
when the situation worsened.    
On 15 February, new elements started to appear within this frame. 
Despite the death of two demonstrators during the first two days of protests, 
BNA’s content continued to focus on an image of a reformed country and deny 
a crisis situation involving accusations of violence and human rights’ breaches 
by security forces representing the government and the regime. This appeared 
in the analysed news through references to: the leadership’s response to the 
escalating situation, government work to achieve public demands, and 
presenting the public protests only as “sporadic incidents”. The following 
example is from an item about the King’s address to the nation on 15 February:  
4. …in celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday… King 
Hamad [said] … "In light of the sporadic incidents that have taken 
place yesterday and today, where, with regret, there were two 
deaths among our dear sons. We extend our sincere condolences 
to the families and ask God to grant them endurance and 
consolation." … "We have asked … Deputy Prime Minister to form 
a special committee to determine the reasons behind these 
regretful incidents."   
[The King reasserted] his Government’s commitment to reform… [He] said:  
"Reform is a continuous process that will not stop…” (bna.bh, 15.02.2011)   
  
The original item covering the King’s speech refers to “protests” and 
“marches” in Bahrain. Nevertheless, the above example illustrates how these 
are downgraded to “sporadic incidents” instead of pre-organised public 
protests. This is reinforced by presenting the address to take place in 
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celebration of the anniversary of Prophet Mohammad’s birthday rather than a 
crisis. Further, the leadership’s response to the deaths is portrayed as a 
democratic rather than an oppressive approach. This is reinforced by the 
King’s expression of condolences to the families of those who “regret[fully]” 
died and his reference to them as “dear sons”. This suggests a concerned and 
responsible leadership as it did not refer to those who died using negative 
references, nor portray their deaths in the context of their participation in anti-
government activity. On the other hand, regimes in other problematic Arab 
nations responded differently to the death of protestors in their countries. In 
Libya, for instance, the overthrown late president Muammar Gaddafi referred 
to his opponents as “drug addicts”, “gangs”, “rats”, “cockroaches”, and “stray 
dogs” (Rojas, 2011). In Egypt, pro-government newspapers referred to the 
protestors as “unemployed thugs, foreign conspirators, and delinquent and 
violent youth who did not have the national good at heart” until President 
Mubarak stepped down (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012, p. 198). By contrast, King 
Hamad’s response does not alienate the protestors, but offers a sympathetic, 
inclusive response through references like: “dear sons”, “sincere 
condolences”, and “God grant them endurance”. Thus, this emphasis on a 
democratic and sympathetic response implies the frame’s tendency to 
promote to foreign media that Bahrain is not like other ‘Arab Spring’ countries 
where the regimes were portrayed as oppressive authorities and dictatorships 
(Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Maguire & Vickers, 2013). Moreover, democratic 
approaches are implied through not concealing or denying the deaths. 
Nevertheless, noteworthy is that all this emphasis on remedy procedures and 
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sympathy shifts attention from the fact that the deaths occurred after clashes 
with security forces. Hence, it tends to distance Bahrain from other Arab 
countries where the security forces were accused of violence and human 
rights’ abuses (Du, 2016). Furthermore, the frame is articulated through 
references to the government’s work to meet the citizens’ demands. The 
excerpt, for instance, mentions that “Reform is a continuous process that will 
not stop”.   
Therefore, the articulation of the ‘reform’ frame portrays an image of a 
reformed nation with democratic values instead of highlighting the 
demonstrations. The manifestation started with references to: NAC’s 10th 
anniversary; the role of the king in reform; and reform achievements. It then 
evolved to include references to: “sporadic incidents”; democratic and 
sympathetic responses; and continuous government work. The change of 
elements illustrates how the frame evolved within a day from completely 
ignoring the protests to presenting them only as ‘sporadic incidents’ and 
minimising their relevance. Nevertheless, the major focus continued to 
suggest a reformed nation where democratic responses are applied.   
The analysis also suggests the frame tends to ‘deny’ (Benoit, 1997) and 
when occasionally referring to it ‘minimise’ a crisis which could justify the 
reference to the Bahraini situation as another ‘Arab Spring’. The denial here 
specifically refers to denying a national crisis caused by mass public protests 
similar to that in, for example, Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, the analysis suggests 
that public diplomacy early response to a crisis can deny a problematic 
situation by promoting a version of reality that defeats the existence of any 
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causes of a crisis, such as highlighting reforms to refute lack of democracy 
and development that could legitimise a revolt.   
Note that denial strategies aim to remove any connection between an 
organisation (e.g. government) and the crisis (Coombs, 2007, p. 171). “If 
stakeholders, including the news media, accept the no crisis frame of denial, 
the organisation is spared any reputational harm.” (ibid) Nevertheless, in the 
examined case, foreign news media do not seem to accept the Bahraini 
government’s denial of a crisis. Conversely, and as stated earlier, the death of 
protestors at a very early stage of the crisis after clashes with security forces 
drew international attention to the protests in Bahrain (Govers, 2012), raising 
concerns on human rights’ violations and violent oppression of demonstrations 
(Bowe & Hoewe, 2011; Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). Moreover, the 
Interview Analysis chapter highlights how the IAA/BNA changed its daily 
routines of responding to the crisis to handle the escalating negative coverage 
across foreign media. This implies the Bahraini government’s failure to 
promote a ‘no crisis’ frame in the first few days of the protests, especially as it 
was inconsistent with the developments on ground.    
Besides drawing international attention to the crisis in Bahrain, 
protestors’ deaths after clashes with security forces led to significant 
escalation after the first couple of days (BICI, 2011, p. 163). Along with this, 
the ‘reform’ frame became less dominant in BNA’s news material. It did not 
appear at all during the second key moment, and appeared slightly in the third 
through references to the government’s continuous reform efforts (see Table 
4). With the decline of the ‘reform’ frame around 16 February, the ‘events’ 
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frame became more dominant for the rest of the first examined moment. The 
key difference between these frames is that ‘events’ acknowledges the 
protests as pre-organised public demonstrations across Bahrain and not only 
‘sporadic incidents’. However, like the ‘reform’ frame, ‘events’ does not present 
the situation in Bahrain as a crisis. I discuss the ‘events’ frame directly below.  
  
3. THE ‘EVENTS’ FRAME  
While the explicit acknowledgment of demonstrations within the ‘events’ 
frame suggests a transparent approach by the BNA, the analysis revealed that 
the significance of the protests and their demands was continuously 
downplayed, suggesting the frame represents a ‘minimisation’ (Benoit, 1995) 
crisis response strategy. A minimisation strategy suggests the offensive act is 
not serious (Benoit, 1997, p. 179), and this is depicted by the elements 
manifesting the ‘events’ frame in the analysed texts. Instead of implying a 
crisis, the frame downplays the seriousness of the situation in Bahrain by 
portraying the protests as tolerated practice of political rights guaranteed by 
the law and not as a revolution (Table 3, row 2). Further, it suggests that the 
situation can be solved through further reforms and dialogue instead of 
international intervention as suggested by the ‘Arab Spring’ frame.   
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, my conceptualisation of the 
‘events’ frame builds on ideas from Maguire and Vickers (2013). They used 
discourse analysis to understand how the Bahraini crisis was presented in 
official British communications in comparison to that in Libya. Their analysis 
reveals ‘events’ was the term used by British officials to refer to the Bahraini 
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crisis. Their explanation of how officials defined and used this term bears 
similarities with how the protests were defined in some of BNA’s texts 
discussed in this section. Therefore, I also use this term to describe this frame 
that emerged in my data.   
The analysis suggests that the ‘events’ frame falls within the “protests” 
master frame, mainly because the ‘protest’ frame treats the demonstrators as 
“legitimate political group, voicing opinions that merit consideration” (Hertog & 
McLeod, 2001, p. 158). This, and the ‘minimisation’ strategy’ is implied by the 
elements articulating the ‘events’ frame in BNA’s analysed content. These 
elements are: suggestions that the events led to deaths among the protestors 
rather than that protestors were killed by security forces; references to 
protesting as practice of political rights; suggestions that protests in Bahrain 
are similar to those in democratic countries; and emphasis on dialogue as a 
solution. I derived these elements by identifying observations made by 
Maguire and Vickers (2013) in my data and systematising them as frame 
elements. I also identified an additional element, not mentioned by Maguire 
and Vickers, that involves representing claims that the protests were anything 
more than ordinary democratic demonstrations as intentional 
misrepresentations of Bahrain, which need to be countered with the ‘truth’. I 
explain how each of these elements constructs the ‘events’ frame, strongly 
reflecting a ‘minimisation’ strategy below.   
One element that ‘defined the situation’ is reference to “deaths” among 
protestors rather than protestors being killed by policemen. On 14 February a 
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protestor died after clashes with security forces and a brief statement was 
issued without explaining why and how it happened. On the second day, 
another Bahraini died during the protestor’s funeral also after clashes with 
security forces at the location of the funeral. This time, the text explained how 
the death occurred suggesting it did not result from purposive violence by the 
police:  
5. … during the funeral of Ali Abdul-Hedi Mushaima today 
morning, some mourners got into clashes with members of four 
security patrol cars which were parked on the way.   
Three of the police patrol cars were summoned to help evacuate 
the fourth one which had broken down. Fadhel Salman Matrouk 
died at the hospital of an injury he sustained in the clashes and 
investigations are still underway. (bna.bh, 15.02.2011)   
This example demonstrates how the protestor “died” and was not killed. 
It suggests the police were not oppressive and tends to reduce their 
responsibility– they were at the incident’s location out of duty to assist a 
colleague. Yet, the text makes no reference to the reasons of the clashes as 
it does not mention the Shiite mourners were outraged by the presence of the 
security forces that caused the death of their relative (BICI, 2011, p. 70), and 
which represent the Sunni ruling regime. Thus, it conceals the sectarian 
connotations of the incident, especially as Bahrain has a history of conflict 
between the Sunni establishment and some Shiite citizens (Karolak, 2012; 
2014, Pinto; 2014). Moreover, this text tends to reduce the seriousness of the 
situation despite the fatalities. This downplay could potentially prevent 
international media or foreign publics from perceiving the situation similar to 
the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, where security forces used excessive 
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force to oppress demonstrations (Du, 2016, p. 112). Hence, it minimises the 
severity of the situation that resulted in fatalities, and the background sectarian 
aspect of the situation.   
Another ‘problem defining’ element is portraying the protests as practice 
of freedom of expression and as similar to those in democratic nations, which 
suggests the legitimacy of the demonstrations as in the ‘protest’ master frame, 
and tends to limit the perception of the situation as another ‘revolution’. The 
following example is from a news item covering a statement by the Minister of 
Foreign affairs where he said:  
6. … the reform programme of HM King Hamad bin Isa Al-
Khalifa remains on-going- a programme which guarantees the 
separation of powers, human rights principles, and the freedom of 
opinion and expression…  
“The protests seen in Bahrain could happen in any free democratic  
country.”   
[He] underlined that the right to freedom of expression is guaranteed by 
the National Action Charter, the Constitution and the law (bna.bh, 
16.02.2011)   
The association of the Bahraini protests with democratic countries 
implies distancing Bahrain from upheavals in other Arab nations. At the time, 
Tunisian and Egyptian protests developed to uprisings against what was seen 
as “dictatorships” (Maguire & Vickers, 2013). This suggests the importance of 
challenging foreign media associations of Bahrain with these upheavals. 
Therefore, the ‘events’ frame downplays the significance of the Bahraini 
demonstrations, presenting them as normal protests taking place in a reformed 
country. Yet, while the protests are not concealed, the protestors’ inspiration 
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by upheavals in other Arab countries is not exposed. Instead, the associations 
with freedom and democratic approaches are reinforced in the text by the 
simultaneous presence of the ‘reform’ frame. This is articulated here by 
stressing the role of the leadership in reform. It emphasises the continuity of 
the “King’s reform project”, and implies more associations with democracy by 
depicting it as “a programme which guarantees the separation of powers, 
human rights principles, and the freedom of opinion and expression”. Thus, 
this interplay between the ‘events’ and ‘reform’ frames implies BNA’s 
discourse attempted to limit foreign media associations of Bahrain with unrest 
in other Arab countries in two ways. First, it communicated the ‘events’ frame 
portraying the protests as tolerated practice of freedom of expression. Second, 
it reinforced this ‘problem definition’ by stressing Bahrain is a country with 
democratic values through the ‘reform’ frame.    
The definition of the situation as unproblematic was reinforced through 
suggestions that foreign media intentionally misrepresented the situation in 
Bahrain, which signifies putting across the ‘true’ picture. The following example 
is from a BNA news item discussing Bahrain TV’s broadcasting of the protests 
at a very early stage of the crisis. The Radio and Television acting director-
general said:  
7. "The step aims to foil and debunk all those attempting to project a 
wrong picture of what’s happening in Bahrain"… He pointed out that 
hiding the truth would only play in the hands of those who spread lies 
about Bahrain and enable them to achieve their private dubious designs. 
(bna.bh, 15.02.2011)    
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The protestors used the death of two demonstrators to present an image 
of violent security forces through social media (Jones, 2016). They presented 
Bahrain as of majorly Shi’a citizens fighting an oppressive Sunni ruling family. 
This portrayal extended to certain foreign media outlets. The Iranian Al-Alam20 
TV and the Hizbullah Al-Manar22 TV channels emphasised this image to incite 
Shi’a citizens against Sunni monarchs in the GCC (Yateem, 2014, pp. 99-100). 
Within this context, the ‘events’ frame tended to define the situation in Bahrain 
as ‘unproblematic’ by rejecting these media’s interpretations. Note that despite 
articulating the frame through an element that explicitly acknowledges the 
existence of ‘claims’ that the situation is more serious, the content of these 
allegations was completely excluded from the analysed texts. The interview 
analysis delivers insights on BNA/IAA’s process of excluding negative 
narratives communicated by foreign media.   
The ‘events’ frame tendency to downplay the situation is supported in the 
above text with another element of the frame which highlights “Bahrain’s laws 
and the political leadership’s directives [that] allow the peaceful expression of 
opinion”. Thus, while the frame emphasises the normality of the situation it 
tends to depict a ‘minimisation’ strategy, distancing Bahrain from the Arab 
                                            
20 Arabic TV channel run by the Iranian government and used to influence Arab publics. “Al-Alam 
emphasises the Shiite protests against the Sunni monarchy in its news reports. In fact, the channel 
devotes a special section for Bahraini news in order to thoroughly cover the events taking place 
there.” (AlRawi, 2017. P. 883)  
22 The official TV station of Hizbullah: the umbrella group uniting religious Shi’a groups in Lebanon, 
and one that is supported by military and financial Iranian aid. Al-Manar is one of the top stations in 
the Arab world  (Baylouny, 2006, p. 8).  
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Spring through references to the ‘truth’, ‘deaths’ instead of intentional killing, 
and legitimate practice of political rights.    
Instead of international intervention, the ‘recommended treatment’ in the 
‘events’ frame is further reforms and dialogue. The following example is about 
the King’s delegation of the Crown Prince (CP) to call for a dialogue to 
overcome the situation:   
8. King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa announced that "all powers to fulfil the 
hopes and aspirations of all gracious citizens from all sections" would be 
granted to… [the CP] to resolve the current situation through dialogue. 
(bna.bh, 18.02.2011) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Noteworthy here is the presentation of dialogue as a solution to the 
“current situation”. The text does not use any expression suggesting a 
problematic condition. The night before this delegation, the CP appeared on 
Bahrain TV calling for calm, and stating “this nation is not only for one section 
- it is not for Sunnis or Shi’as. It is for Bahrain and for Bahrainis”. This 
appearance was not planned as he interrupted a live evening show discussing 
the situation, and expressed concerns of social division and suggested a 
national dialogue to understand and meet all sections’ demands. This action 
and statement suggest both the problematic and sectarian nature of the crisis.  
Nevertheless, BNA’s content minimised the severity of the situation, portraying 
dialogue as just a measure to “fulfil the hopes and aspirations of … citizens 
from all sections”. Furthermore, while a sectarian conflict was a major issue at 
the time (BICI, 2011; Stoller, 2014, p. 116; Yateem, 2014, p. 98); the text does 
not refer to sects, Sunnis, or Shi’a. It only refers to those invited to participate 
in the “nationwide” dialogue as “all parties”, “all sections”, and “sons of our 
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beloved Bahrain”. This suggests the frame attempted to shift foreign media’s 
attention from the sectarian conflict threatening Bahraini society at the time, 
and which could present the situation as a crisis resulting from internal 
conflicts. Instead, it downplays the depth of the conflict by suggesting it is a 
disagreement that can be resolved simply with dialogue. The emphasis on 
such non-military solution tends to minimise any problematic aspect, 
especially because, at the time, foreign military intervention was presented as 
a possible solution to other Arab Spring countries like Libya (Cofelice, 2016, 
p. 103; Maguire & Vickers, 2013; Nuruzzaman, 2015; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 
129).  
Thus, the above discussion illustrates how the ‘events’ frame was 
articulated in BNA’s news during the first moment, representing a ‘protest’ 
master frame (Hertog & McLeod, 2001) and ‘minimising’ (Benoit, 1997) the 
situation by using several elements: references to ‘deaths’ instead of killings; 
right of freedom of expression; claims the situation was misrepresented and 
there was a need to reveal the ‘truth’, and dialogue.   
This frame highlights two points on the promotion of specific versions of 
reality through public diplomacy responses to a crisis. First, the change of the 
dominant frame (reforms to events) suggests the response can change in a 
short time. Second, it suggests how a government can address a controversial 
event (that protests happened), yet continue not to address it as a crisis and 
minimise it instead. Avraham (2015, p. 228) suggests that “limiting” or 
“minimising” a crisis in the media is a common strategy employed by Arab and 
Middle Eastern countries before the Arab Spring. He suggests that this was 
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particularly practiced by Egypt and Turkey to promote their nations as tourist 
destinations. Yet, Bahraini authorities had other factors influencing their 
framing. This is explained in the interview analysis chapter which discusses 
connections between ‘minimisation’ rituals and Bahraini public diplomacy 
activities during the examined crisis.   
The ‘events’ and the ‘reform’ frames are compatible frames that 
dominated during the first week of the crisis. The combination of these frames 
in the coverage of particularly the first key moment contributed to a 
representation of a reformed nation where achieving reforms and political 
rights is not done by revolt but by democratic processes. Both frames distance 
Bahrain from the Arab Spring: the first does so by ‘denying’ and slightly 
‘minimising’ a crisis and instead presents Bahrain as a reformed nation, and 
the second by fully ‘minimising’ the significance of the protests and portraying 
dialogue as the solution. Distancing Bahrain from the Arab Spring by 
communicating these frames to foreign media and publics suggests preventing 
proposals for international intervention like, for instance, foreign military 
involvement, which was seen as an appropriate solution in other Arab 
countries.  
The implications of minimising the Bahraini crisis seem to vary among 
different foreign public groups. In terms of foreign authorities, for example, my 
previous discussions of Maguire and Vickers (2013) highlight how British 
officials referred to the Bahraini protests as ‘events’ in their official 
communications, while they referred to those in Libya as a “revolution”. There 
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is no evidence that the British officials’ reference to the Bahraini protests as 
‘events’ is a result of successful framing by Bahraini public diplomacy. 
However, adopting the same frame by such a foreign authority is important for 
Bahrain, especially when we consider the understanding of public diplomacy 
from a realist viewpoint. Realist public diplomacy emphasises the dual goal of 
nations’ engagement in public diplomacy, where the end goal is to influence 
foreign authorities in favour of the sponsoring government, and not only to 
influence foreign publics (Yun & Toth, 2009, p. 494; Szondi, 2009. p. 292). In 
the case of Bahrain, a ‘favourable’ framing by senior British politicians was 
significant as the UK was one of the international powers which supported the 
decision to send the NATO air forces to Libya to help civilians from Gaddafi’s 
oppressive responses to demonstrations in his country (Maguire & Vickers, 
2013; Nuruzzaman, 2015). Thus, to maintain their power position as a ruling 
regime, it is critical for the Bahraini authorities that a significant international 
actor like the UK government also holds a ‘minimised’ perception of the 
situation. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this has to do with geopolitics 
more than mere perceptions of the situation. In the case of Libya, for example, 
sending the NATO air forces is controversial from a human rights perspective 
because their operations did result in the death of civilians, suggesting the 
move was to aid certain world powers and geopolitics to get rid of Gaddafi and 
not specifically to aid Libyan civilians (Nuruzzaman, 2015).  In Bahrain, 
conversely, Britain was merely “concerned” at events, and the strongest 
reaction was to “urge” both the government and the opposition to take part in 
“dialogue” (Maguire & Vickers, 2013). It is argued that this “passive” reaction 
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by British officials to the Bahraini crisis is connected to the “friendship” 
between both countries, and the strong naval ties Bahrain has with both the 
UK and the US (ibid, p. 21), which holds the UK back form harshly criticising 
its ‘friend’s’ responses to the protests as it did to Libya.    
In terms of foreign media, it seems that minimising the Bahraini crisis was 
not convincing. For instance, between January and March 2011, the coverage 
of the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post was 
overwhelmingly against the Bahraini government (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). 
While the ‘events’ frame minimises the situation to tolerated practice of political 
rights in a reformed country with democratic values, the coverage of these 
major newspapers presented the Bahraini government as an authority against 
democratic change (ibid). Moreover, one of the interviewees in my research 
indicated that not engaging in a crisis narrative from the beginning “backfired” 
because the government was “late” when it engaged in crisis narrative. 
According to the interviewee, this gave the protestors the opportunity to 
dominate in foreign media, especially as their narrative was more “convincing” 
due to its “consistency with the escalated situation on ground” (I4). Therefore, 
the implications of minimising the Bahraini crisis varied among different 
relevant foreign public groups.  
Despite attempts to contain the situation through dialogue, the situation 
escalated again in the second examined moment as the country was 
threatened by social division and unrest due to escalating riots, and the failure 
of negotiations to start the national dialogue (BICI, 2011, pp. 126-131; 
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Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). During this time, the Bahraini authorities itself asked for 
military help from its GCC neighbours. With this, the ‘existential threat’ frame 
started to appear in BNA’s news. The following section discusses how this 
frame presents the situation in Bahrain as a crisis, yet externalises its causes. 
The discussion also highlights how the frame continued distancing Bahrain 
from the Arab Spring despite employing military measures.  
  
4. THE ‘EXISTENTIAL THREAT’ FRAME   
An important turning point in the second examined moment is the  
communication of the ‘existential threat’ frame which presents the situation as 
a crisis, and where military solutions are emphasised after avoiding urgent 
international intervention in the first moment. It dominated (27/40 items 
published in the second phase) around the arrival of the PSF to Bahrain (14-
16 March 2011). As indicated above, the situation escalated as negotiations 
to start a national dialogue failed, and vandalism of private and public 
properties, assault against individuals, and sectarian clashes were recorded. 
Despite acknowledging there is a crisis, the frame continues to distance 
Bahrain from the Arab Spring by presenting the cause of the crisis as ‘foreign 
interference’ that justifies the need for military measures, instead of internal 
conflict between the establishment and social/religious groups like in other 
Arab countries.   
The analysis suggests the frame represents a strategy of ‘shifting the 
blame’, which is a variation of the ‘denial’ strategy (Benoit, 1995). ‘Shifting the 
 196  
  
blame’ argues that another actor (e.g. person, corporate, country) is 
responsible for the offensive act (Benoit, 1997, p. 180). The ‘existential threat’ 
frame tends to deny the crisis was anything like ‘revolutions’ in other Arab 
Spring countries by blaming ‘foreign interference’ for the unrest. With this, the 
analysis suggests that the ‘existential threat’ frame represents a ‘riot’ master 
frame. ‘Riot’ portrays the demonstrators’ actions as illegal or aggressive 
behaviour, while the police or security forces symbolize social order and lawful 
behaviour to protect bystanders (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 157).  
This is illustrated in the discussion below.        
As explained in the Methodology chapter, the ‘existential threat’ frame 
was adapted from Pinto (2014) and Al-Rawi (2015). It defines the situation in 
Bahrain as Iranian backed plan against GCC members to infiltrate into the 
region and spread Shi’ism (Table 3, row 3). My analysis extended this 
definition to include the ‘causal interpretation’ was “riots”, “vandalism”, and 
“dangerous escalation” triggered by Iran. Thus, the demonstrations are no 
longer considered a legitimate practice of political rights, but “threatening” acts 
“alien to Bahrain society” backed and incited by Iran. Furthermore, the 
demonstrators are depicted as vandals violating human rights, threatening 
publics, and harming the economy and national unity. Therefore, the frame 
could legitimise any future strict measures to contain the protests as defending 
the nation from external threat. These measures were deploying the PSF; 
declaring ‘State of National Safety’; and security operation to clear 
demonstrations from strategic locations. Moreover, the frame emphasises 
Bahrain’s and other GCC members’ “rejection” of any form of foreign 
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interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs, especially by Iran. It portrays this 
‘Iranian interference’ as a “hostile action” that “contravenes the principle of 
good neighbourly relations” and “underscores respect of states’ independence 
and sovereignty”. By contrast, the arrival of the PSF is presented as 
“requested” support rather than interference. Further, Bahrain’s membership 
in the PSF is emphasised to limit interpreting the military aid as foreign. While 
the troops were invited to Bahrain as a support in case of a potential foreign 
threat (BICI, 2011, p. 387), the frame does not refer to the Bahraini authorities’ 
fear of protestors’ takeover, just like in other Arab countries when protests 
escalated. Further, it tends to prevent assumptions that Bahrain and GCC 
members applied military measures in fear that Shiite uprising would tumble 
their monarchs (Al-Rawi 2015, p. 26).  
Pinto’s (2014) frame analysis of Bahraini authorities’ messages targeted 
at other GCC countries revealed several elements of this frame. These include 
references to: the Bahraini authorities’ request for GCC military support; the 
implications of Iranian threat on other GCC countries; and Iran or Shiites as a 
threat. Regarding Al-Rawi (2015), the Methodology chapter details how I 
developed elements from his quantitative frame analysis of the sectarian 
aspect of the ‘foreign threat’ in Bahraini activists’ comments on YouTube 
videos about the crisis. These elements of the frame involve references to: 
collaborations between Bahraini leadership, government, prime-minister and 
the Saudi ruling family against protestors and Shi’a; majorities or minorities in 
the country in terms of Sunni or Shi’a; negative references to Shi’a, the regime, 
king, government, and ruling families in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; 
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expressions of hatred between Sunni and Shi’a; wishes of victory to the PSF; 
and reference to foreigners given Bahraini nationality as “mercenaries”. My 
analysis revealed none of the elements (framing devices) building on Al-Rawi’s 
work appeared in the analysed news, probably because he examined an 
informal context where the elements would not be used in an official 
government context like the one studied here. Additionally, although the official 
Bahraini TV was accused of sectarian discrimination and defamation of some 
Bahraini Shi’a during the crisis (BICI, 2011, pp. 421-422); it seemed 
sectarianism was not given salience in BNA’s discourse. Instead, my analysis 
revealed additional elements reaffirming the foreign threat aspect: references 
to riots, violence, vandalism, continuity of demonstrations and its 
consequences on the nation’s safety and stability; and references to strict 
measures to restore order. I explain below how each of these elements 
articulated the frame in the analysed texts, with a tendency to depict a strategy 
of ‘shifting the blame’ and a ‘riot’ master frame.     
  The ‘problem definition’ within the ‘existential threat’ frame is articulated 
through references to Iran or Shiites as a threat, and the consequences of this 
Iranian interference on the entire GCC. Hence, while it addresses the unrest, 
it denies it is anything like ‘revolutions’ in other Arab Spring countries caused 
by accumulated political and economic tensions and challenges that have not 
been resolved by Arab leaders but, instead, artificially repressed in search for 
stability for their authority (Joffe, 2011, p. 508). The frame, conversely, blames 
Iranian interference and Iranian incited riots for the crisis. One example of this 
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is from a statement by the Secretary-General of the GCC, at the time, 
Abdulrahman Al-Atiya:   
9. He … reiterated that the GCC countries’ strongly reject any 
foreign interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs, asserting that no 
one will be allowed to undermine the kingdom’s national unity.  
"Jeopardizing Bahrain’s security and stability and sowing 
dissension among its citizens is a dangerous encroachment of the 
security and stability of the GCC region,"…  
Regarding Iran’s threats … Al-Atiya expressed the GCC states’ 
rejection of any interference in Bahrain... (bna.bh, 15.3.2011)  
   
 The example illustrates how foreign attempts to shake social unity in Bahrain 
are the problem. This is manifested through the GCC ‘rejecting’ any foreign 
interference in Bahrain. Yet, this frame is not manifested through references 
to sectarian conflicts in Bahrain in any of BNA’s analysed texts. Some of the 
analysed news items acknowledge conflicts between social groups, but 
completely exclude any references to internal sectarian division in the country. 
Thus, the crisis is defined as foreign attempts to create unrest in Bahrain, yet 
nothing explicitly related to Shi’aSunni tensions as in the elements developed 
from Al-Rawi (2015). Instead, the excerpt openly presents Iran as threat. 
Further, it shows how the problem is defined by extending the consequences 
of the threat to the whole GCC. This is explicitly manifested by portraying the 
interference as “dangerous encroachment of the security and stability of the 
GCC”. It is worth noting that reference to Iran could implicitly suggest the 
sectarian aspect of the situation. This is related to historical ideological 
tensions between Iran and Arab nations in the Gulf region. For Bahrain in 
particular, in 1971 for instance, when Bahrain gained independence from 
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Britain, and Iran was still a monarchy, Shah Pahlavi argued Bahrain was part 
of Iran (Pinto, 2014, p. 169). This represents a rivalry over ethnical hegemony 
in the region between Iran (Persian ethnicity) and Arabs. Following the 1979 
Iranian revolution, relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iran 
deteriorated significantly due to the strong anti-monarchy ethos of the 
revolution (ibid). In more recent years, Bahrain is one among other Arab Sunni 
GCC monarchs (especially Saudi) that aim to maintain strategic power in the 
region and resist the Iranian Republic, with its Shiite ideology,  attempts to play 
a more strategic role in the region (Mabon, 2012). Thus, despite explicit 
references to Iran as threat, the sectarian aspect is not explicitly manifest in 
the analysed texts, but can still be implicitly suggested by references to Iran. 
Therefore, the frame defines the problem through references to “Iran’s 
threats”, and the danger of this for stability in the entire GCC region, not just 
Bahrain. This threatening situation for inter-national stability, therefore, could 
justify to foreign media the need for military action.  
Another element of the frame is references to riots and violent acts. 
Within the existential threat frame though, riots are not understood as internal 
unrest (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 156), but as the result of ‘foreign 
conspiracy’, which in this frame is the ‘causal interpretation’ of the crisis. The 
following excerpt is from a statement by the Minister of Interior where he talked 
about the escalating situation:   
10. [He] pointed out the dangerous escalation and the acts of vandalism  
 gripping  Manama  and  various  other  parts  across  Bahrain.   
He deplored acts being orchestrated to sow chaos by blocking roads and 
disrupting people’s interests…   
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He described the sordid acts as alien to Bahrain society and genuine 
ethics and deep-rooted traditions. (bna.bh, 15.3.2011)  
  
 The example shows the Bahraini demonstrations are no longer presented as  
legitimate practice of political rights like in the ‘events’ frame (‘protest’ master 
frame; ‘minimisation’ strategy). Rather, they are portrayed as “riots”, which 
consequently suggest their illegality, the aggressive behaviour of the 
demonstrators, and the security forces symbolisation of social order and lawful 
behaviour (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 156). Regarding the ‘foreign 
interference’ aspect of the ‘existential threat’ frame, it is stated that these acts 
are “alien to Bahrain society”. This implicitly hints at the ‘foreign interference’ 
dimension, especially because the frame presents the protests as incited and 
financed by Iran to spread chaos and invade the GCC (AlRawi, 2015, p. 35; 
Pinto, 2014, p. 172). Although Iran is not explicitly mentioned in this particular 
excerpt, the previous example (excerpt 9) overtly suggests the Iranian role. 
Note that none of the analysed texts uses an official Bahraini source whenever 
Iran is explicitly mentioned as a threat. Rather, Bahraini officials seem to 
implicitly hint at foreign interference. In the above excerpt, for instance, the 
Bahraini Minister of Interior uses terms as “acts alien to Bahrain” to suggest 
the external connections with the illegal acts. Excerpt 9, conversely, illustrates 
how Iran is explicitly mentioned by the Secretary General of the GCC. 
Communicators interviewed in this project also did not speak openly about Iran 
as will be discussed in the next chapter. The frame analysis suggests that 
presenting the demonstrations as Iranian instigated “riots” threating peoples’ 
lives and breaching human rights justifies to international media the need for 
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strict measures to contain the situation. It also tends to distance Bahrain from 
the Arab Spring by refuting any framing of the situation as a ‘revolution’ and 
instead ‘shifts the blame’ to foreign interference.   
  The analysis revealed that strict measures were the proposed 
‘treatment’ within the ‘existential threat’ frame. The following example 
illustrates this besides another element where the presentation of the PSF 
deployment as a Saudi invasion, especially by Shiite protestors and Iranian 
media (Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Belfer, 2014; BICI, 2011), is refuted and Bahrain’s 
‘request’ for GCC support is emphasised instead:    
11. The United Arab Emirates has today decided to dispatch troops 
to take part in preserving order and security in Bahrain. "The move 
is in response to a request from the Kingdom of Bahrain for 
assistance and in contribution to maintaining security and stability", 
UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs … stated.  (bna.bh, 
14.3.2011)  
The excerpt directly presents military intervention as a solution. Besides 
asserting the arrival of troops was a “response to a request”, the statement is 
given by a GCC member other than Saudi Arabia. These both imply the 
measure was taken based on Bahrain’s demand, and it is not limited to Saudi. 
Hence, it is not a Saudi invasion, but a strategic action by the entire GCC. As 
indicated above, the significance of emphasising ‘request’ refers to the fact the 
PSF deployment was presented in a number of foreign media outlets as an 
“invasion by Saudi troops” and a Saudi “massacre” against Bahrainis and 
“foreign interference” by Saudi against Bahrainis (Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Belfer, 
2014; BICI, 2011; reuters.com, 2011). The “invasion” aspect triggered 
international concerns of human rights’ violations and oppression- an image 
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Bahraini authorities were already struggling with due to questions around 
protestors’ death at an early stage of the crisis. Moreover, despite warmly 
welcoming the PSF by some groups of Bahraini society (mainly Sunni); the 
frame does not refer to the fear of the troops among some Shiite communities. 
Although investigations asserted the PSF did not engage with the public in any 
form and was only present to protect Bahrain in case of potential foreign 
interference (BICI, 2011, p. 387), some groups of Shi’a citizens believed the 
deployment was to specifically oppress them, mostly due to Iranian media 
channels presenting the deployment as a “massacre” (Belfer, 2014; BICI, 
2011). Therefore, BNA’s news communicated the ‘existential threat’ frame to 
foreign media by highlighting Bahraini authorities’ request for GCC military 
support to vindicate the necessity of inviting these troops to protect Bahrain in 
light of the ‘potential foreign threat’, and to defeat any claims this was a Saudi 
invasion to oppress Shiite citizens.  
 Therefore, the analysed texts manifested several elements that 
articulated the ‘existential threat’ frame, with a tendency to depict a ‘riot’ master 
frame and a strategy of ‘shifting the blame’ to foreign interference instead of 
internal conflicts. These elements are:  presenting Iran as a threat; 
consequences of Iranian interference on the GCC; Iranian triggered “riots”; 
Bahrain “requesting” GCC support; and strict solutions.   
Unlike the frames dominating the first moment (‘reform’, ‘events’), the 
‘existential threat’ frame acknowledges there is a crisis. Its core focus however 
lies in presenting Bahrain as being under Iranian threat, suggesting the crisis 
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was not caused by internal issues as in other ‘Arab Spring countries’. Thus, 
the ‘existential threat’ frame, just like the frames presented earlier, also 
distanced Bahrain form the Arab Spring, but this time by blaming the crisis on 
‘foreign conspiracy’ instead of internal issues connected to a history of conflict 
between the government and Shi’a citizens.   
As mentioned earlier, the frame presents a turning point in BNA’s 
discourse, where military solutions are emphasised after avoiding urgent 
international intervention in the first moment. This framing provides an 
example of a change in versions of reality communicated through public 
diplomacy messages from completely avoiding the implication of a crisis to a 
severe situation necessitating military and strict measures. According to Mor 
(2009), “attacking the other” is common public diplomacy response to defend 
a nation’s image in crises and reduce its responsibility for wrongdoing. This 
common response resonates with Benoit’s (1997) strategy of ‘shifting the 
blame’ represented here by the ‘existential threat’ frame.   
Similar to the ‘events’ frame, the implications of communicating the 
‘existential threat’ frame and ‘shifting the blame’ varied among different foreign 
public groups. In foreign media, for example, several Western foreign news 
media do not seem to adopt the ‘existential threat’ frame, and instead referred 
to the deployment of the PSF as a “Saudi invasion” (Bronner & Slackman, 
2011; Noueihed & Richter, 2011). In pan Arab news media, conversely, the 
coverage of Al-Arabiya adopted the ‘existential threat’ frame ("the PSF enters 
Bahrain", 2011). This could be connected to the ownership of this media 
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organisation by Saudi businessman Sheikh Walid Al-Ibrahim and his close 
relationship with the Saudi ruling family as a brother-in-law of the late Saudi 
King Fahd (el-Nawawy & Strong, 2013). On the other hand, it is argued that 
Al-Jazeera Arabic’s coverage of Bahrain conformed to GCC foreign policy, 
while AlJazeera English’s coverage was categorised as ‘anti-GCC framing’ 
(Abdul-Nabi, 2015, p. 275). This is because the majority of the Arabic articles 
legitimised and justified the deployment of the PSF, while the majority of the 
English coverage presented its role as “quelling the protestors” (ibid, p. 287).    
In terms of foreign authorities, Pinto (2014, p.163) argues that the 
decision to send the PSF to Bahrain is already a sign of the Bahraini 
government’s successful portrayal of the crisis as Iranian threat to the entire 
GCC monarchs. Regarding the frame's implications in the West, Western 
authorities stood “completely disinterested” in supporting the Bahraini 
protestors when the PSF arrived at Bahrain despite allegations of human rights 
breaches by these troops (Nuruzzaman, 2015, p. 8). Human rights’ violations 
are of major concern to the West. Yet, it does not seem as the decisive element 
explaining Western reactions to the situation in Bahrain. Rather, regional 
competition for dominance, and Western geopolitical interests surpassed 
humanitarian concerns (ibid, p. 12). Russia and China, as well, remained silent 
and "preferred not to disturb the status quo in the Gulf sub-region while 
indirectly accepting Saudi intervention" (ibid, p.8). In China, in particular, the 
Chinese media framing of the upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen 
bares similarities with the articulation of the ‘existential threat’ frame and the 
strategy of ‘shifting the blame’ found in BNA’s analysed content. The 
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protestors’ actions were usually portrayed by Chinese media as illegal 
behaviour, robbery, violence, vandalism, and attack, while the actions of the 
governments were depicted as restoration of stability and peace, and the 
responses of the police were presented as necessary measures to maintain 
social order (Du, 2016). It is suggested that this framing is related to the 
Communist ideology, which steered newspapers in mainland China not to 
adopt the ‘Arab Spring’ frame (ibid), which triggers sympathy towards the 
demonstrators and presents them as outbreak of democracy (Harlow & 
Johnson, 2011, p. 1365; Joffe, 2011, p. 507). Rather than political dictatorship 
and oppression, the Chinese media attributed the social instability in the 
affected countries to social and economic problems (Du, 2016, p. 110).  
Nevertheless, Bahrain’s focus on ‘Iranian threats’ was challenged by the 
findings of the BICI report that was not able to confirm Iranian interference. 
The report, published in November 2011, states “Given that most of the claims 
by the GoB [Government of Bahrain] related to allegations of intelligence 
operations undertaken by Iranian operatives, sources of which by their nature 
are not publicly available, the Commission has not been able to investigate or 
independently verify the allegations of Iranian involvement in the events of 
February/March 2011.” (BICI, 2011, p. 241) Moreover, the findings challenged 
the government’s focus on reform and democratic approaches when it 
confirmed individual acts of human rights’ violations against detainees by 
some members of the security forces during February-March 2011 (ibid, p. 
417).   
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This creates a critical mismatch between the examined public diplomacy 
messages and actual events. The following section discusses the 
‘unprecedented achievement’ frame, which prevailed in BNA’s news during 
the third examined moment. This phase focuses on the publication of BICI 
report, which was presented by Bahraini authorities as a solution to the 
Bahraini crisis. The following discussion also highlights how the Bahraini 
government responded when the report could not support its ‘Iranian 
conspiracy’ argument.   
  
5. THE ‘UNPRECEDENTED ACHIEVEMENT’ FRAME  
The formation of the BICI commission on 29 June 2011 aimed to 
investigate the events of February and March 2011 and determine whether 
they involved violations of international human rights’ law and norms 
(bici.org.bh, 2011). King Hamad’s order of establishing this commission was 
presented as another initiative under the umbrella of his reform project which 
emphasises the “policy of democracy” and the “commitment to principals of 
human rights” (bna.bh, 2011). It was also perceived among Western officials 
as progress to the situation in Bahrain (Matthiesen, 2013, p. 81). Nevertheless, 
the publication of BICI report on 23 November 2011 further challenged the 
image of a reformed nation with democratic policies when it asserted violations 
of human rights by some members of security forces (ibid, pp. 82-83). The 
report suggests the most common methods of mistreatment used on detainees 
included: “blindfolding; handcuffing; enforced standing for prolonged periods; 
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beating; punching; hitting the detainee with rubber hoses …; electrocution; 
sleep-deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures; verbal abuse; threats of 
rape; and insulting the detainee’s religious sect (Shia).” (BICI, 2011, p. 417) 
Further, as indicated above, the report could not confirm Iranian interference 
(ibid, p. 214).  
In this key moment examined in the thesis (23-25 November 2011), the 
framing in BNA’s content manifests a ‘bolstering’ response strategy (Benoit, 
1997, p.180), namely a way to ‘reduce offensiveness’ by stressing positive 
aspects of the situation and offsetting any negative feelings connected with 
the crisis. This strategy is manifested in the ‘unprecedented achievement’ 
frame (Table 3, row 4), which dominated the BNA’s content in this period (it 
was present in 24/59 items).   
This frame blurs the ‘negative’ results of the report and focuses instead 
on presenting the BICI as a responsible initiative that resolved the crisis. 
Similar to the ‘reform’ and the ‘events’ frames, the ‘unprecedented 
achievement’ frame tends to directly portray Bahrain as a reformed country 
and does not imply any crisis situation in Bahrain. Therefore, it also 
corresponds to the ‘national reform’ master frame. Yet, the ‘unprecedented 
achievement’ frame specifically emphasises a reformed nation with 
democratic policies by presenting the King as a “wise” leader who took a 
“brave” and “pioneering step that won international recognition” to invite an 
“independent” commission to investigate the events of February and March 
2011. The frame extends the reformed presentation to the government, 
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portraying it as a responsible one ready to implement all the report’s 
recommendations, and accept the fact it was guilty in certain occasions. 
Although the frame acknowledges there had been violations on the part of the 
government, it does not mention what these were. It also distances the political 
system from these breaches by presenting them as individual behaviours 
rather than government policy. The recognition of guilt is very limited 
comparing to the frame’s general emphasis on remedy actions, which 
suggests elements of the IRT’s ‘corrective action’ strategy. Nevertheless, the 
‘bolstering’ strategy prevailed through the frame’s general emphasis on the 
‘positive’ aspects of establishing BICI and publishing and accepting its report. 
The frame also constructs BICI as a “historical achievement”, presenting it as 
an “instrument of self-evaluation”, and “contribution for the future of Bahrain” 
that will lead to the “beginning of a new era”.   
The trend of presenting Bahrain as a reformed nation with democratic 
approaches, established by the frames in the earlier points of the crisis, 
continues in this third key moment, through the dominance of the 
‘unprecedented achievement’ frame (and its occasional appearance alongside 
the existential threat frame - see table 3). As I mentioned earlier, the 
prevalence of the ‘reform’ and the ‘events’ frames in the first key moment 
tended to distance Bahrain from the Arab Spring by portraying Bahrain as a 
reformed nation, and depicting the protests as legitimate practice of political 
rights. Even when the situation escalated in the second moment, BNA’s 
discourse seemed to employ ‘Iranian interference’ to justify the unrest, 
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suggesting that without this ‘foreign conspiracy’ Bahrain would not have gone 
through the crisis. Nevertheless, as BICI published its report confirming 
government breaches of human rights, and inability to prove Iranian 
interference, the ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame continued to present 
Bahrain as a reformed nation with democratic policies. Moreover, the frame 
occasionally appeared alongside the ‘existential threat’ frame, which 
continued to appear in BNA’s analysed content despite BICI report’s inability 
to prove Iranian role. The interplay between these two frames during the third 
moment seemed to reinforce Bahrain is a reformed country that was a victim 
of external conspiracy even though there was no convincing evidence for it 
based on BICI’s investigations.   
The elements articulating the ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame in the 
analysed texts are: references to BICI and its report as democratic 
achievements; references to the government acceptance of the report’s 
results; references to the report’s contributions to the future of Bahrain; and 
not mentioning any findings about government violations. The following 
paragraphs discuss how this frame was manifested in the analysed items.  
The frame presents BICI and the report as unparalleled national 
achievement. The following excerpt is from a news item about an interview 
Commission Chair Professor Bassiouni had with Al-Arabiya TV after the 
publication of the report in November, where he talked about the establishment 
of BICI and its findings. The example also shows how government violations 
are obscured:   
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12. According to the legal expert, the formation of the commission 
is an unprecedented in the entire world as Bahrain called for it under 
a national decision, gave it all powers and allowed its members to 
enter all places… (bna.bh, 24.11.2011)  
The example directly emphasises the ‘unmatched’ ‘national decision’ of 
inviting external investigation committee. On the other hand, this text, and all 
the analysed texts, excludes any BICI findings about the authorities’ violations. 
Rather, the text provides extensive examples of BICI findings presenting the 
demonstrators negatively. For instance, it mentions Salmanya Medical 
Complex’s (SMC) Shi’a staff mistreatment of patients during the crisis on a 
sectarian basis, but excludes references to deaths resulting from clashes with 
security forces during the security operation on 16 March (BICI, 2011, p. 235). 
Instead, it highlights “there were several instances of self-restraint and 
discipline success by the security agencies”. Moreover, the analysis revealed 
the demonstrators’ violations were given high salience in BNA’s news to the 
extent of devoting a news item for every single violation reported by BICI (e.g. 
“BICI: Enough evidence shows South Asian workers were targeted”, 
23.11.2011; “BICI Report Uncovers many Medics' Crimes”, 23.11.2011). Thus, 
instead of communicating all the findings transparently, the frame focused on 
portraying BICI and its report as ‘unparalleled’ solution to a national crisis, and 
hence depicting a ‘bolstering’ strategy. This hints at presenting Bahrain as a 
nation with democratic policies, especially as it was the King’s’ decision to 
invite a foreign investigation committee made up of international human rights 
and legal experts. It tends to distance Bahrain from the Arab Spring by 
emphasising ‘unmatched democratic solution’ instead of oppression.    
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The frame was also articulated through references to the government’s 
acceptance of the report. This also tends to suggest a ‘bolstering’ strategy by 
focusing on the positive aspect of accepting the findings, but not the ‘negative’ 
findings themselves. The following example covers the welcoming of the report 
by the Commander of the National Guards:  
13. [He] welcomed the report of the Bahrain Independent 
Commission of Inquiry (BICI) and the recommendations it included.    
Shaikh Mohammed also affirmed to His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al- 
Khalifa that he continues in implementing the monarch’s directives 
related to the recommendations and working towards achieving 
what His Majesty aspires to accomplish with regard to development 
and prosperity. (bna.bh,  
23.11.2011)   
Although the National Guard, in particular, was not held guilty of any 
violations in the report (BICI, 2011, p. 263), it is still one of the main arms of 
the security forces in Bahrain. The report asserted the security forces’ human 
rights violations through, for example, mistreatment of persons in custody (ibid, 
p. 285). However, the text does not make a single reference to any of the 
report’s findings confirming the security forces’ breaches. Even when the 
source vows to follow the King’s aspirations of further development and 
prosperity, it is presented generally. There is no reference to specific reforms 
related to the development of the security forces’ policies, although the report 
explicitly offers recommendations on “the use of force, arrest, treatment of 
persons in custody, detention and prosecution in connection with the freedom 
of expression, assembly and association.” (BICI, 2011, p. 423) Thus, 
‘unprecedented achievement’ is welcomed and accepted in this text. Yet, the 
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text and the frame, in general, exclude the specific recommendations to 
overcome the violations asserted in the report.    
The ‘moral evaluation’ within the frame is the report’s contribution to the 
Bahraini future. The following example covers a statement by a Member of the 
Shura Council21, where he talked about the report as a “positive sign” for 
Bahrain’s future:  
14. [BICI report], from indications available is a positive sign for 
Bahrain … [it is] a chance to re-organise the internal affairs of 
government machinery, particularly the law enforcers and the 
security system.  
"I see the report as an instrument of self-evaluation that needed 
feedback from an external source. The BICI has made an important 
contribution for the future of Bahrain," (bna.bh, 24.11.2011)     
Although the need for improvement is addressed, it is minimised to 
reorganisation of internal affairs. This tends to completely blur that some of 
these ‘law enforcers’ were involved in human rights’ violations of international 
law. Instead, Bahrain is presented here as a country with human rights’ values 
by highlighting the King’s initiative of establishing a human rights body for the 
GCC region instead of addressing the violations. Hence, this text also stresses 
good traits and presents the situation as an unparalleled accomplishment that 
will help Bahrain achieve a brighter future.   
                                            
21 The Consultative Council which is the upper house of the National Assembly, the main legislative body of Bahrain. 
The Council comprises forty members appointed directly by the King of Bahrain. The forty seats of the Consultative 
Council combined with the forty elected seats of the Council of Representatives form the National Assembly of 
Bahrain.  
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Therefore, the dominance of this frame during the third moment presents 
another turning point in BNA’s discourse by giving salience to external actors 
to imply the credibility of the authorities’ solutions. This is significant when 
compared to the first two moments when the frames excluded any sort of 
foreign intervention solution. In the first moment, the ‘reform’ (denial) and the 
‘events’ (minimisation) frames emphasised reform and non-oppressive 
approaches, refuting the need for international intervention suggested by the 
‘Arab Spring’ frame (Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 129). In the 
second moment, although troops from other countries were a ‘recommended 
treatment’; the ‘existential threat’ frame (shifting the blame) emphasised two 
main points. First, it presented the military aid as national request rather than 
foreign decision. Second, it emphasised the membership of Bahrain in the 
troops to downplay the foreign aspect. In the third moment, however, the 
foreign facet was given salience through emphasising the authorities’ 
unprecedented decision to invite independent international experts to 
investigate the situation, suggesting the credibility and independence of BICI, 
and hinting at the democratic aspect of the initiative.  
This frame, with its correspondence with the ‘bolstering’ strategy, suggests 
how public diplomacy framing in response to a crisis may reduce the perceived 
offensiveness of the wrongdoing by stressing good traits instead of giving 
salience to the negative aspects of the issue. In a Western context, where the 
IRT was developed, the use of ‘mortification’ is usually praised when an actor 
is accused of wrongdoing and held responsible for the offensive act (Benoit & 
Drew, 1997, p. 159). Nevertheless, studies in non-Western contexts suggest 
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that not all cultures appreciate direct admittance of guilt and instead tend to 
employ rhetoric of ‘face-saving’. For instance, face-saving is an important 
communication device in the Chinese culture, where protecting one’s face 
helps to preserve one’s dignity and empower oneself, especially if the 
audience is an important one (Lu, 1994 in Peijuan, 2009, p. 216). It is 
suggested that face-saving can be done when a nation admits guilt embedded 
in ‘corrective action’ (Peijuan, 2009, p. 216). Yet, in the case of Bahrain, it 
seems that ‘bolstering’ was used to save face when BICI confirmed human 
rights’ violations in certain occasions, and could not confirm Iranian 
interference. Generally, nations are less likely to employ a mortification 
strategy where guilt is admitted, because saving a nation’s image in this regard 
is significant for its empowerment and dignity (Benoit, 1997; Peijuan et al., 
2009, p. 216). In Arab culture, in general, “when saving face is important, one’s 
skill is not in how directly one can state criticism, but rather how cleverly one 
can disguise it” (Zaharna, 2004, p. 136).   
However, as mentioned earlier, the ‘existential threat’ frame continued to 
appear in BNA’s analysed content even after revealing BICI’s findings, 
suggesting that when Bahrain went through a crisis, it was caused by a foreign 
conspiracy and not internal issues.  
Although BNA’s framing around the publication of BICI’s report focused on 
the ‘positive’ findings of the Commission, the full report was published on a 
special section on the BNA website both in Arabic and English languages. 
Hence, full access was allowed to any interested member of the public such 
as foreign journalists. As indicated by one of the interviewees in this research, 
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it was “the King’s order to publish the full report as it is. So the full detailed 
report was published on BNA’s website to work as a scientific resource for 
anyone interested in the case of Bahrain” (I1). The analysis suggests that the 
‘bolstering’ discourse strategy in BNA’s content aimed to avoid giving further 
salience to the findings that challenged the government’s position, and this 
works in-line with public diplomacy’s typical goal of promoting the sponsoring 
government’s interests to foreign publics (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; L’Eatng, 2006, 
p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 139). Despite its challenging findings, 
the report was supported by a number of significant international actors.  
Several Western officials, for instance, perceived BICI as progress to the 
situation in Bahrain (Matthiesen, 2013, p. 81).   
The support the Bahraini government enjoyed during different phases of 
the examined crisis is discussed further in the next section, which looks at the 
‘supported leadership’ frame. This frame worked in-line with the 
‘unprecedented achievement’ frame, and the first three frames.   
  
6. THE ‘SUPPORTED LEADERSHIP’ FRAME  
In line with all the previous frames examined so far, the ‘supported 
leadership’ frame also functioned to distance Bahrain from the Arab Spring. Its 
particular focus was on the support the Bahraini government enjoyed from 
international leaders and Bahraini citizens (table 3, row 5). The frame thus 
served a ‘differentiation’ (Benoit, 1995) response strategy, because, as I will 
argue in this section, this national and international support implicitly 
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differentiated the Bahraini government from governments in Arab Spring 
nations, which were condemned by their own citizens and the international 
community (Cofelice, 2016, p. 103; Joffe, 2011, p. 508; Yli-Kaitala, 2014, p. 
129). The analysis suggests it also corresponds to the ‘national reform’ master 
frame.   
Elements articulating this frame in BNA’s texts are references to: 
international leaders and citizens supporting the leadership and its initiatives; 
supporting Bahrain’s stability and security; GCC unity, strong ties, historic 
relations and support; international support, ties, cooperation; and loyal, 
patriotic citizens. I discuss each of this frame’s elements directly below.   
The following example illustrates how the frame gives salience to 
supporting the leadership and its initiatives, supporting Bahrain’s security, and 
international ties:   
15. The US today backed the Kingdom of Bahrain, stressing support for  
His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa’s reform project. Foreign 
Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa 
received a phone call from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
who stressed her country’s keen interest in Bahrain’s security, 
urging all parties to rally together in support of HM the King’s 
project.  
She also highlighted historic bilateral relations bonding both friendly 
countries. Shaikh Khalid thanked Ms. Clinton for the US stance, 
which, he said, reflected deep relations, wishing to work together 
to promote strong historic relations further. (bna.bh, 17.2.2011)   
  
First, the text highlights support to the leadership and its initiatives stating 
the US “backed” Bahrain, and confirming support to the King’s reform project. 
This suggests the legitimacy of the regime, especially as it comes from a 
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country with high democratic values when the death of protesters raised 
questions on the government’s approaches. This tends to differentiate Bahrain 
from the Arab Spring by suggesting that credible international agents support 
the Bahraini leadership instead of urging it to step down as was the case in 
Egypt for example (usnews.com, 2011). Second, it explicitly emphasises 
support to “Bahrain’s security”. This reinforces legitimacy, specifically because 
the text links security to the King’s project. This implies that without supporting 
the leadership and its initiatives; Bahrain’s security would be endangered. 
Third, the text refers to international relations. This implies ‘strategic’, ‘friendly’, 
and ‘historic’ alliances between Bahrain and different nations.  Thus, the 
example illustrates three elements of the frame: international support for the 
regime and its initiatives, supporting Bahrain’s security, and international ties. 
Despite the concerning escalations at the time, the emphasis on international 
ties suggests the legitimacy of the regime by continuing to have alliances with 
several significant international actors.   
The frame is also articulated through specific references to GCC support 
and its ties with Bahrain. One example:   
16. His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa today received 
at Al-Safriya Palace Omani Interior Minister Humood bin Faisal Al-
Busaidi, who conveyed greetings from Sultan Qaboos bin Said, and 
wishes of further progress and prosperity for Bahrain and its 
people. He hailed the honourable stances of Sultan Qaboos in 
support of Bahrain's security and stability, and commitment to 
dispatch Peninsula Shield forces in line with the joint defence 
cooperation agreements. (bna.bh, 15.3.2011)   
 The excerpt directly demonstrates a GCC member’s support to Bahrain 
and its security. References to military support manifest the ‘existential threat’ 
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frame, which is also present in the excerpt. The interplay between both frames 
during the second examined moment took the route of promoting that ‘foreign 
conspiracy’, rather than the leadership’s legitimacy, was at stake. This is 
significant as Bahrain employed military methods to restore order and stop 
demonstrations, suggesting undemocratic approaches and more links with 
‘oppressive’ regimes. Thus, highlighting international support despite the strict 
measures reinforced the legitimacy of the leadership. The support during the 
second moment was not limited to GCC countries. Examples of other countries 
that supported Bahrain in BNA’s news content are Spain ("The Situation In 
Bahrain Is Different from Libya, Spanish Foreign Minister Said", 15.3.2011), 
Jordan ("Jordanian FM Praises National Dialogue Initiative", 16.3.2011), and 
the US ("BDF Commander-in-Chief Meets US 5th Fleet Commander",  
14.3.2011).  
Reference to loyal citizens is another element of the frame. An example of 
this is from coverage on rallies supporting the leadership:   
17. Over 100,000 citizens today took to Manama streets … and 
renewed their allegiance and loyalty to His Majesty King Hamad bin 
Isa Al-Khalifa and his wise leadership, voicing their love for the 
leader…  
Participants expressed their full support for HM King Hamad, 
rejecting all that may pose a threat to the cherished land's security, 
stability and national unity. (bna.bh, 18.2.2011)   
The significance of highlighting citizens’ support is suggesting the 
difference between Bahrain and ‘Arab Spring countries’, to prevent 
associations with ‘revolutions’ against ‘dictatorships’. It tends to suggest a 
 220  
  
differentiation strategy by suggesting Bahraini authorities did have supporters, 
unlike Tunisia and Egypt were majorly all citizens were against the regimes 
(Dalacoura, 2012). Thus, emphasising citizens’ support for Bahraini leadership 
implies its legitimacy. Further, as the ‘events’ frame was dominant in BNA’s 
content at the time of publishing the above public diplomacy text, the 
‘supported leadership’ reinforced the normality of the situation, and that 
achieving reforms in Bahrain is not done through revolt. The frame also worked 
in-line with the ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame in the third examined 
moment. For instance, when BICI report was published, the White House 
“welcomed” the report, and “commended King Hamad's decision to establish 
the Commission and described it as a ‘courageous decision’.” (bna.bh, 
24.11.2011) Thus, despite human rights’ violations, the interplay between both 
frames during the third moment suggests the legitimacy of the Bahraini regime 
through emphasising international support of the King’s decisions.       
Therefore, the analysis revealed the ‘supported leadership’ frame 
maintained its core idea of differentiating Bahrain form the Arab Spring across 
the three examined moments and worked together with the prevailing frames 
to limit foreign media and public associations of Bahrain with the Arab Spring. 
The support highlighted in this frame can be perceived as a third-party 
endorsement which, according to Zhang and Benoit (2004, p. 164), can 
increase the effectiveness of a response strategy in reducing an actor’s 
responsibility for wrongdoing or the offensiveness of their acts. However, 
several examples discussed earlier argued that foreign media was not 
convinced with the Bahraini government’s framing of the crisis, and instead 
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supported the protestors and raised concerns on human rights’ violations by 
the government (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011; Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 
82). By contrast, when it comes to foreign authorities, neither the West nor any 
Middle-Eastern countries supported the Bahraini protestors (Nuruzzaman, 
2015, p. 7). Again, there is no evidence 22  that the support of foreign 
governments to the Bahraini authorities is a result of successful public 
diplomacy communication, but it could be more related to geopolitical interests 
and interdependencies.    
Although the analysis revealed BNA’s discourse focused on reforms, 
democratic policies, and legitimacy to contest Arab Spring framing; the 
‘sovereignty’ frame shows how the BNA also employed arguments stressing 
authority and control to distance Bahrain from problematic countries. Like the 
‘existential threat’ frame, ‘sovereignty’ also portrays a crisis situation. I discuss 
the ‘sovereignty’ frame directly below.   
  
7. THE ‘SOVEREIGNTY’ FRAME   
This frame portrays Bahrain as a country with powerful authorities that 
would not compromise its sovereignty, nor tolerate “criminal acts”. It appears 
in the second examined moment alongside the ‘existential threat’ frame, 
reinforcing the ‘foreign conspiracy’ definition. As the latter hints at Iranian plot 
to destabilise Bahrain and infiltrate into the region; the interplay with the 
                                            
22 This is specifically the case for Western countries, because Pinto (2014) argues that sending the PSF to  
Bahrain was a result of the king’s successful framing of the crisis as Iranian plot to topple GCC monarchs.  
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‘sovereignty’ frame suggests the Bahraini authorities’ determination to 
maintain its power position. The ‘sovereignty’ frame corresponds to the “riots” 
(Hertog & McLeod, 2001) master frame, and tends to depict Benoit’s (1995) 
strategy of ‘attacking the accuser’, especially when it delegitimises the 
protestors’ acts and pledges to stop them. This is significant as, during the 
second moment, Iranian and Shiite media and the protestors insinuated that 
the deployment of GCC troops suggests as the Bahraini authorities’ loss of 
control and that the PSF was oppressing Shiite citizens in a severe violation 
of human rights (BICI, 2011, p. 134). Further, at an internal level, government 
supporters (mainly Sunni) doubted the authorities’ ability to maintain control 
and protect them in case of Shi’a takeover (Al-Hasan, 2015; Carlstrom, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the frame does not refer to the Sunnis nor authorities’ fear of 
potential takeover but emphasises a ‘powerful’ position. Thus, the ‘sovereignty’ 
frame limits foreign media associations with Arab countries where escalating 
chaos led to upheavals. Further, the frame’s depiction of a strategy of 
‘attacking the accuser’ is suggested by its emphasis on defeating “criminal 
acts”, which implies the demonstrators, and not the authorities, are the 
violators of human rights through their illegal acts threatening individual and 
social safety.   
The frame is manifested in BNA’s news through references to: the 
authorities’ determination and ability to protect the nation and publics; no 
impunity for criminal acts and their perpetrators; and successfully restoring 
order. I discuss these elements directly below.   
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The following example illustrates Bahraini authorities’ powerful position 
where public security is not given up, and unlawful behaviour is not tolerated. 
It is from a statement by the Bahraini Prime Minister:  
18. [He] reassured all the citizens that the government will not 
let their security and safety be compromised, asserting that 
uncivilized and unpeaceful means of expression will never be 
allowed… (bna.bh, 14.3.2011)   
The excerpt illustrates how riots, referred to as “uncivilized and un-peaceful 
means of expression” are not tolerated. It also demonstrates how the 
‘sovereignty’ frame reaffirms the ‘existential threat’ frame’s emphasis on the 
illegality of ‘riots’. Yet, the difference between the ‘existential threat’ and the 
‘sovereignty’ frames regarding ‘unlawful behaviour’ is the former’s portrayal of 
the demonstrations as ‘Iranian triggered riots’, while the latter attacks the 
accuser and pledges to stop these riots. The analysis of the ‘existential threat’ 
frame illustrates how it tends to justify to foreign media and publics Bahrain’s 
employment of strict measures. Yet, rather than sounding apologetic; the 
interplay between both frames in BNA’s news during the second examined 
moment suggests a firm stance by the authorities’ decision to apply military 
methods. This tends to contest the ‘Arab Spring’ frame by presenting the 
demonstrators as a threat to national stability and social harmony, instead of 
triggering sympathy towards them as fighters for democratic change.  
Emphasising return to normality is another element of the ‘sovereignty’ 
frame. The following excerpt is from a statement by the Bahrain Defence Force 
General Command following the security operation to clear strategic locations 
of demonstrators:  
 224  
  
19. The operation was carried out according to plan with high 
standards of competence and professionalism while ensuring the 
safety of all...  [He] congratulates all citizens on the start to regain 
of normalcy and stresses that it will take all necessary procedures 
and measures to assert security and public order and safeguard 
the country and the people. (bna.bh, 16.3.2011)   
  
The excerpt portrays the authorities in a powerful position by highlighting 
their ‘successes’ in restoring order. This is reinforced through ‘congratulating’ 
the citizens on this ‘achievement’, which suggests that normalcy is something 
good that citizens want and the government is helping them get it. This implies 
that the demonstrators’ acts are a deviation from the norm, suggesting their 
illegality and the significance of the security forces’ efforts to restore order. 
Thus, instead of presenting the protests as a desired movement to achieve 
democratic changes, the frame ‘attacks the accuser’ by presenting the 
protestors’ acts as unlawful behaviour that should be defeated. Here, too, the 
text tends to distance Bahrain from problematic Arab countries. Instead of 
losing control over the escalating situation, the authorities’ sovereignty is 
emphasised, showing foreign media that Bahrain is not following the scenario 
of upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia where the demonstrations’ escalation 
managed to topple their regimes (Du, 2016; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).   
Therefore, the ‘sovereignty’ frame provides an example of public diplomacy 
crisis responses that ‘attack the accuser’. Similar to the strategy of ‘shifting the 
blame’ which was represented by the ‘existential threat’ frame, the strategy of 
‘attacking the accuser’ bares similarities with a common message design used 
in public diplomacy to deal with negative publicity against a nation, or to defend 
its image, and this is “attacking the other” (Mor, 2009, p. 228).   
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Similar to previous frames, BNA’s communication of a frame that 
represents a strategy of ‘attacking the accuser’ had different implications 
among different publics. In terms of foreign media, for instance, it was not 
accepted or convincing, especially among outlets in democratic nations which 
support movements for democratic change (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). Yet, in 
terms of foreign authorities, it was not objected. Even if it was condemned, it 
did not lead to foreign military intervention such as in Libya, or Western 
leadership urging the Bahraini monarch to step-down like in Egypt. As 
discussed in the ‘supported leadership’ frame, by the time of communicating 
the ‘sovereignty’ frame (and the ‘existential threat’ frame in the second 
examined moment) a number of significant international actors supported the 
position of the Bahraini authorities by, for example, stressing the importance 
of restoring order under the leadership of King Hamad.   
Therefore, the analysis of the ‘sovereignty’ frame illustrates how despite 
portraying a crisis situation in BNA’s messages to foreign media and publics, 
it reinforces the argument of an external cause of the crisis, instead of 
addressing any internal issues that could result in a crisis.   
  
8. CONCLUSION: THE FRAMING OF THE BAHRAINI CRISIS OVER 
TIME  
My analysis demonstrates that the frames communicated in BNA’s 
news to foreign media and publics tend to distance Bahrain from other Arab 
countries in times of Arab Spring uprisings. Earlier chapters indicated that the 
Bahraini crisis coincided with upheavals in countries like Egypt, Libya, and 
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Tunisia, which were widely framed as the ‘Arab Spring’ (Avraham, 2015). 
Although the King of Bahrain rejected the reference to the Bahraini situation 
as another ‘Arab Spring’ (Pinto, 2014), several media outlets covered the 
Bahraini protests in a manner that could present these protests as another 
‘Arab Spring’. For example, major American newspapers (New York Times; 
Los Angeles Times; Washington Post) were sympathetic towards the protests 
and presented them as rallies for democratic rights (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). 
Iranian and Shiite media, on the other hand, referred to the Bahraini protests 
as revolution by oppressed Shi’a majority against Sunni minority (Abdul-Nabi, 
2015; Belfer, 2014; BICI, 2011; Yateem, 2014). Some studies also talk about 
the Bahraini crisis as protests inspired by other Arab upheavals, which imply 
it is perceived as part of the ‘Arab Spring’ (e.g. Al-Rawi, 2015; Dalacora, 2012). 
Very few others, on the other hand, discuss it as Iranian plan to invade the 
GCC (e.g. Belfer, 2014; Yateem, 2014), which suggests that the ‘foreign 
interference’ argument is not widely accepted even within academic contexts. 
With this contested framing of the Bahraini crisis, my research examines what 
versions of reality the Bahraini government promoted in public diplomacy texts 
published on BNA’s website, how were these realities framed, and how they 
evolved across time.   
My analysis of BNA’s content published during the three examined key 
moments argues that the majority of the analysed frames do not portray the 
examined context as a crisis, and if they do they present the cause as foreign 
conspiracy and not internal issues as in ‘Arab Spring countries’. The analysis 
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revealed that the frames communicated to foreign media by the BNA worked 
together to represent the situation in Bahrain as different from that in other 
Arab countries where popular protests were taking place around the same 
time. I suggest that despite communicating different frames at different stages 
of the crisis and representing different crisis response strategies, they all 
attempted to contest accusations of human rights violations to avoid 
comparisons between the Bahraini events and those in Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, for example. Instead, it promoted a favourable image of the Bahraini 
government as a reformed, credible, responsible, non-authoritative regime, 
which, according to some of these frames, was the victim of a foreign 
conspiracy. Thus, all the frames and the strategies they depict contest the 
‘Arab Spring’ frame by excluding a crisis portrayal or blaming the crisis on 
foreign conspiracy.  
The ‘reform’ frame dominated the news on 14 February, which marks 
both the 10th anniversary of the NAC and the beginning of demonstrations. 
Instead of acknowledging public protests, the frame represents a ‘denial’ 
image repair strategy as it presented Bahrain as a reformed country 
celebrating ten years of reform achievements, with minimal reference to the 
protests as ‘sporadic incidents’. However, when the situation escalated, the 
analysis revealed a shift towards the ‘events’ frame which represents a 
‘minimisation’ response strategy. Despite acknowledging the protests, the 
frame tends to downplay their significance by presenting them as normal 
practice of political rights like in any democratic country. These two frames 
prevailed in most of the official news items during the first examined moment. 
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Presenting Bahrain as a reformed nation, and the protests as unproblematic, 
the interplay between both frames tended to prevent foreign media 
associations with ‘Arab Spring’. The ‘supported leadership’ frame also 
appeared in this period and reinforced the previous frames. As the ‘Arab 
Spring’ tends to present the Arab leaders as dictators who deserve to be 
overthrown by their oppressed people (Maguire & Vickers, 2013); the 
‘supported leadership’ frame represents a ‘differentiation’ response strategy 
as it distances the Bahraini regime from such perceptions and suggests its 
legitimacy by emphasising citizen and international support.   
The most prevailing frame during the second examined moment, which 
focused on the arrival of the PSF, was ‘existential threat’ which represents a 
crisis response strategy of ‘shifting the blame’. It presents Bahrain under 
Iranian threat, and depicts the protests as ‘riots’ triggered by Iran to spread 
chaos and ease Iranian invasion. Despite the escalating situation at the time 
and the use of military measures, the frame continued to distance Bahrain from 
the Arab Spring by suggesting in their official messages on the BNA website 
aimed at foreign media that the cause of the Bahraini unrest is ‘Iranian 
conspiracy’ rather than internal conflicts. The ‘foreign threat’ aspect seemed 
to justify the strict measures of restoring order. The distance from the Arab 
Spring was reinforced by the communication of the ‘supported leadership’ 
frame too (‘differentiation’ strategy). By emphasising the Bahraini authorities’ 
legitimacy, the frame suggests Bahrain is not like other problematic Arab 
countries where the regimes were overthrown for their oppressive policies. 
Thus, the frames worked together to distance Bahrain from the Arab Spring.  
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Another frame communicated during the second moment is ‘sovereignty’, 
which represents image repair strategy of ‘attacking the accuser’. Its interplay 
with the ‘existential threat’ frame tended to distance Bahrain form the Arab 
Spring by emphasising the authorities’ control, and refuting protestors’ 
takeover. The combination of the strategies of ‘attacking the accuser’ and 
‘shifting the blame’ in BNA’s analysed content represents a strategy of 
“attacking the other”, which is a common public diplomacy response to defend 
a nation’s image in a crisis (Mor, 2009, p. 228).   
The third moment focused on the publication of BICI report which 
asserted human rights violations by some members of the security forces, and 
inability to prove Iranian interference. The ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame 
prevailed in the BNA news issued around this, depicting a ‘bolstering’ 
response strategy as it presents the BICI and its report as unparalleled solution 
to a crisis instead of highlighting the violations. While the full BICI report was 
published on a special section of the BNA’s website 23 , and BNA’s news 
acknowledged violations’ assertions, excluding what the violations exactly 
were from BNA’s news comes as an effort not to give the violations further 
salience and to reduce the perceived offensiveness of the government’s acts. 
The exclusion of details of the violations of human rights by number of security 
forces members during the crisis also tended to distance Bahrain from Arab 
nations where regimes were overthrown for their violation of human rights 
                                            
23 The full report is now available on the BICI website in both Arabic and English Languages 
(bici.org.bh). The BNA website offers a special section on the BICI Recommendations Implementation 
Follow-up Body’s report (bna.bh).     
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during protests in their countries. The ‘supported leadership’ (differentiation) 
reinforced the dominant frame here too. Within a context where some Arab 
leaders were ousted for what was perceived as oppressive approaches; the 
‘supported leadership’ frame implied the Bahraini authorities’ legitimacy by 
highlighting the international support for and approval of BICI, especially as it 
was initiated by King Hamad.    
Therefore, the analysed frames and the response strategies they depict 
suggest that Bahraini public diplomacy tends not to address a crisis situation. 
Even when it does, it does not acknowledge all aspects of the problematic 
situation. Rather, it excludes reference to any aspect that may portray the 
situation as an internal issue. The communication of such messages shows 
how Bahraini public diplomacy’s response to the crisis is similar to how nations 
respond to crises, especially by employing responses that do not admit 
responsibility for guilt (Benoit, 1997; Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 216). This habit of 
not addressing problematic situations to and through the media by Middle-
Eastern countries is observed by Avraham (2015). He suggests that “ignoring 
or limiting the crisis” is a popular response by Arab countries to problematic 
situations even before the Arab Spring events (p. 228). While this is observed 
in the context of promoting Middle-Eastern countries as tourist destinations, 
the frame analysis in this thesis suggests it is an approach used by Bahraini 
public diplomacy to deal with accusations of human rights breaches. The 
analysis suggests that public diplomacy is practiced by the Bahraini 
government in a manner similar to realist conceptualisations of public 
diplomacy, where it is used as a ‘power tool’ in the hands of the sponsoring 
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government to maintain its power position in the international relations 
environment (Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 383).  
Although it is beyond the focus of my research to examine the effects 
of the analysed frames and image repair strategies, this chapter also 
discussed the messages in relation to foreign media reporting and political 
reactions based on insights from previous studies and not systematic analysis 
of implications.  It highlights  different, and even contrasting ‘implications’ of 
Bahraini public diplomacy messages among these stakeholders. Foreign 
media’s coverage was generally against the Bahraini government. Regarding 
foreign governments, other than Iran, which seems to devote its efforts to 
present the Bahraini protests as a revolution by oppressed Shiite majority 
against a ‘Sunni dictatorship; Western, Russian, and even Chinese 
governments’ responses to the Bahraini crisis was majorly passive.   
While this research aims to deliver an understanding of public 
diplomacy activities of constructing specific versions of reality in its messages, 
the frame analysis offered insights on the frames communicated through 
Bahraini public diplomacy during the 2011 crisis and its aftermath. This is 
significant because the account of the presentation of this crisis varies widely 
among different relevant actors (Karolak, 2012, p. 186), and previous research 
on the Bahraini crisis does not systematically examine how the Bahraini 
authorities presented this crisis through its official BNA channel aimed at 
foreign media and publics. Further, the analysis offers an example of 
government framing in the Arab Spring context. This is significant as previous 
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studies on the Arab Spring phenomenon focus on the framing of Arab 
upheavals by different foreign news media platforms, with a specific focus on 
the upheavals in Egypt (e.g. Du, 2016; Guzman, 2016), keeping a gap in how 
Arab governments framed the crises in their countries. Moreover, the analysis 
offers insights on Arab government practice of public diplomacy in the Arab 
Spring context.  Studies on public diplomacy during the Arab Spring focus on 
how Western state and non-state actors engage in public diplomacy activities 
in relation to the Arab Spring (e.g. Cofelice, 2016; Golan, 2013; Yli-Kaitala, 
2014). The frame analysis also offers insights on the crisis response strategies 
represented in Bahraini public diplomacy frames. The strategies are derived 
from Benoit’s (1995) image repair theory, which is developed and widely used 
in Western contexts. The frame analysis in this study extends the use of the 
theory by using it to examine the Bahraini crisis, and extend its application to 
study governmental crisis responses from a public diplomacy perspective.   
The next chapter discusses the analysis of interviews with selected 
communicators form the Information Affairs Authority (IAA), who were involved 
in frame-building processes. The chapter aims to deliver insights on 
background processes and factors connected to frame-building at the 
IAA/BNA during the examined crisis.   
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CHAPTER 5:  
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION   
  
  
1. INTRODUCTION   
The previous chapter explored the frames communicated through the BNA’s 
website during three key moments in the 2011 crisis. This chapter will shed 
light on the background processes at the time of communicating these frames 
by interviewing communication professionals who wrote that content. The 
chapter delivers an in-depth understanding of background public diplomacy 
processes and activities which contribute to the construction of specific 
versions of reality in its messages during crises. This is done by specifically 
looking at the factors and background processes connected to the production 
of public diplomacy frames during the Bahraini crisis and its aftermath.  
This chapter presents the analysis of interview data generated with five 
communicators from the IAA, who were engaged in text writing and/or decision 
making on communication and message design during the examined crisis. 
As indicated earlier, IAA was the main governmental communication body in 
Bahrain during the crisis and the overarching management of BNA.  
As explained in the Methodology chapter, in-depth semi-structured 
qualitative interviews are a supplementary method in my thesis. They aim to 
generate insights on the processes and factors related to IAA/BNA’s 
articulation of frames communicated through public diplomacy (hereafter 
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referred to as ‘frame-building’). Previous chapters also indicated I employ 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model of influences on media 
content to organise findings on frame-building factors in public diplomacy. The 
model, originally developed in media research, studies influences on 
journalistic frame-building at the: individual, professional routines, 
organisational, external, and ideological levels. Public diplomacy and 
journalism are different occupations and fields of research (Edwards & 
Pieczka, 2013, p. 7). Journalism can be generally understood as the 
communication field that aims to inform publics (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), 
while public diplomacy practitioners’ main goal is employing communication 
programmes to change or maintain foreign publics’ opinions for the benefit of 
their governments (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; L’Etang, 2006, p. 378; Signitzer & 
Coombs, 1992, p. 139). Nevertheless, both fields use available information 
selectively to articulate the communication content (Seib, 2009, p. 774; White 
& Hobsbawm, 2007, p. 287). Hence, frame-building is a central practice in both 
areas, where journalists and public diplomacy practitioners put frames into 
public discourse for publics to process (Gilboa, 2008, p. 64; Sheafer & Gabay, 
2009, p. 447). Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model offers a framework to 
understand different levels of influence on frame-building, and how these 
interact rather than work in isolation. It also helps explore how some frame-
building factors are intentional while others occur as a result of other actions 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 252). The model is extended in this research 
to public diplomacy context to understand how different levels of influence may 
be connected to frame-building in public diplomacy texts. The specific factors 
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influencing public diplomacy professionals may be different from those 
influencing journalists. However, the broad categories in which these 
influences fall (individual, professional, organisational, external, ideological) 
may be usefully transferred from one domain to the other to help us better 
understand public diplomacy frame-building. This is significant as public 
diplomacy framing research is dominated by focus on factors connected to 
success or failure of public diplomacy frames in appearing in foreign media’s 
content (Entman, 2008; Jungblut, 2017; Melki & Jabado, 2016; Sheafer & 
Gabay, 2009; Sheafer et al., 2014; Yarchi et al., 2013; Zhang, 2006). Using 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model shifts attention in public diplomacy 
framing research by looking at the factors related to professional 
communicators’ construction of frames in public diplomacy texts and not how 
journalists construct public diplomacy frames in media content.  
Using the hierarchal model, the interview analysis suggests 11 factors 
contributed to frame-building at the IAA/BNA during the crisis: 1) limited crisis 
communication experience (individual level); 2) absence of senior decision 
making (professional level), 3) promoting positive news (professional level); 4) 
redefining the situation by government representatives without addressing 
internal problematic issues in Bahrain (organisational level); 5) employing 
foreign public relations’ companies (organisational level); 6) visiting foreign 
media organisations (organisational level); 7) IAA/BNA’s unpreparedness for 
a crisis (organisational level); 8) foreign media’s negative coverage (external 
level); 9) social media (external level); 10) negotiations between the authorities 
and political societies (external level); and 11) the sectarian conflicts 
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(ideological level). These are summarised in Figure 3 which presents these 
factors following Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) structure of the model to 
highlight the interaction among different levels of influence.   
Figure 3. Levels of influence on Bahraini public diplomacy frame-building during the 2011 crisis  
 
The interview analysis argues that IAA/BNA’s frames tendency to 
differentiate Bahrain form the Arab Spring by communicating frames that do 
not present the situation as a crisis, or externalise the cause of the crisis 
started in a context of absent decision making, and lack of experience and 
preparedness for crises. While lack of organisational preparedness for a crisis 
remained, the frame-building then became connected to routines of promoting 
positive news to counter unfavourable coverage in foreign media, and maintain 
the Bahraini authorities’ power position. The remaining of the chapter 
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discusses how different levels of influence contributed to public diplomacy 
frame-building during the Bahraini crisis, and the background processes of 
articulating frames that represent specific crisis response strategies form the 
Benoit’s (1995) IRT.  
 
2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: LACK OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
EXPERIENCE   
The individual level analysis in this thesis looks at the communicators’ 
characteristics and how it may contribute to public diplomacy frame-building. 
One frame-building factor that emerged from the data is IAA/BNA 
communicators’ lack of crisis communication experience, which seems closely 
connected to frame-building in the first 3-4 days of the crisis. After 3-4 days, 
the analysis suggests the communicators were more involved in deciding what 
could be included in the communication content. This is illustrated by their 
ability to suggest communicative responses based on their observations of 
events in other Arab countries and foreign media’s coverage. Nevertheless, 
these were not full-time IAA communicators responsible for content production 
in ‘normal’ situations. Instead, this was the responsibility of an emergency 
media team which was formed after 3-4 days of the crisis unfold. I discuss 
below interview fragments that indicate the lack of crisis experience at the 
individual level, highlighting how it interacted with factors at other levels of 
influence. After this, I discuss how these background contexts are related to 
frame-building, especially at the beginning of the crisis.     
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When asked about how they, as government communicators, responded 
to the crisis starting from 14 February, all the communicators mentioned they 
did not know how to react, highlighting their lack of experience in handling 
crises. This is exemplified in the following quote, which also indicates 
interactions with other levels of influence as will be explained below:   
1. At the beginning of the 2011 crisis, we did not know how to 
deal with media regarding the events in Bahrain. Definitely, 
the situation was strange to us; no one expected it. We don’t 
have any previous experience in handling it. There were 
troubles in more than one country and we were watching. 
We were shocked. So the shock resulted, in the first 3-4 
days, in unclear media vision. What is our direction, where 
are we going with this, how to use language, what 
approaches should we use? We didn’t know. So, an 
emergency media team was formed [after 3-4 days]. It 
contained senior people from the IAA and communicators 
from other government entities. The team’s mission was to 
closely observe the situation: monitor, analyse, and then 
suggest how to deal with the situation... We started 
preparing news drafts ahead based on expectations and 
scenarios in the region. Then we tried to get approval on our 
messages and be ready. (I1)  
The excerpt suggests IAA communicators did not have experience with 
handling crises. It does not suggest though that they did not perceive a 
problematic situation or did not understand the significance of handling the 
situation through media. Rather, despite demonstrating awareness of the 
importance of communication, the communicators could not employ this to 
produce or suggest possible communicative crisis responses. This seems 
related to the “shock”, which highlights the interaction between the lack of 
experience and the unprecedented nature of the crisis to Bahrain- a factor 
working at the external level. Previous chapters indicated the Bahraini 
government could anticipate the protests because online platforms were used 
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since January to announce 14 February a day of mass public demonstrations 
(Al-Hasan, 2015; Weatherby & Longworth, 2011, p. 92; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). 
Yet, “in the beginning no one knew how to handle a political crisis in this way” 
(I4). Note that Bahrain has a history of public protesting (Karolak, 2012), 
meaning it is not completely new to handle protests in Bahrain. Further, the 
government may have been through “some crisis experiences on 
organisational level in ministries. But an unprecedented comprehensive crisis 
on military, security, economic, and political levels was a new experience [to 
Bahrain]” (I1). Thus, the “rapidly deteriorating situation” with so much 
international and “media exposure” (I4) was new to Bahrain. This is reinforced 
by all the participants as they indicated the “new” situation that Bahrain “never” 
went through before.   
The confusion resulting from the rapidly escalating crisis in Bahrain is not 
exceptional, as crisis communication literature draws attention to the difficulty 
of framing crises that unfold quickly (Coombs, 2011, p. 220), which was the 
case in the Bahraini crisis. Therefore, the above quote indicated the lack of 
crisis experience among the communicators, and highlights the interaction 
with the “new” crisis at the external level of influence.    
Another indicator of the limited experience in handling crises is implied 
by discussion on lack of certain skills needed to communicate through national 
and foreign media during the crisis:  
2. What happened in this crisis: the need for immediate 
response happened. There became a need for someone to 
come out, be ready, and answer. Someone to appear on 
screen, to appear life, to answer questions they do not know 
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on events that just happened. There became a need for 
someone to come out and have the information… we did not 
have this before. (I5)  
To deal with this lack of experience, the IAA/BNA asked communicators 
from other governmental entities in Bahrain to join an emergency media team 
at the IAA. As indicated in excerpt 1, the team was formed after 3-4 days of 
the crisis unfold. The formation of this team suggests an interaction between 
the individual and professional routine levels of the hierarchal model. The 
individual level is represented in the presence of ‘external’ ‘temporary’ 
communicators. Regarding the professional routine level, the formation of an 
emergency team highlights a change in BNA’s established processes of 
producing news to foreign media, and a shift in their approach in handling the 
crisis. Excerpt 1 indicates that forming the emergency team introduced the 
routine of preparing news drafts based on developments in other problematic 
Arab countries. The interrupted routine of content production by BNA worked 
as follows:  
3. As [government] news agency, we have more than one 
news source. We either have ready press releases received 
from ministries, or an event covered by the agency’s media 
team. We also have news published through Arab, Gulf, or 
foreign news agencies... We have agreements with some 
agencies so we publish their news, and they publish ours… 
After receiving news from different sources, we have a team 
comprised of editors and a chief editor. Tasks are allocated 
by the chief editor: you cover this story, you cover that. After 
this, the news returns to the chief editor and he/she 
publishes it on the wires service for international reach. Then 
we have the Internet team who takes the news from the 
wires system and publishes it on our website. (I1)    
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Note that the ‘temporary’ communicators do not specifically have 
previous experience in handling crises or qualifications in communication 
fields (e.g. public relations, public diplomacy, crisis 
communication/management, media/journalism). However, an observed 
pattern in their previous experience, qualifications, and workplace is related to 
having at least one academic degree from Western cultured nations (e.g. UK; 
US), spoke English more fluently comparing to other participants, and work in 
governmental organisations and positions with high international exposure. 
One participant indicated:  
4. We needed to bring more people to help with the English 
language. We needed support with translating from Arabic 
to English and vice versa. We needed support in writing and 
revising our statements to make sure it is accurate. We 
needed support in translation and articulation of messages. 
We needed to make sure the messages are clear and 
accurate. (I1).   
Note that BNA/IAA communicated with foreign media and publics in 
English language significantly before the crisis (bna.bh, 2017). Their emphasis 
on communicating in English language could be related to the need to 
communicate internationally during the crisis, especially because the death of 
protestors at an early stage of the crisis, and the success of revolutions in 
Egypt and Tunisia drew international media attention to the Bahraini 
demonstrations (Karolak, 2012, p. 180). With this attention came negative 
publicity accusing authorities of human rights breaches and violence against 
the protestors (Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82), which increased 
association between the Bahraini protests and the ‘Arab Spring’. Therefore, 
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the analysis illustrates that extra expertise was needed at the IAA/BNA to help 
with the crisis response. With this, the communication routine changed as the 
formation of the team introduced “monitoring”, ”analysing”, and “suggesting” 
messages to the crisis response processes at the IAA/BNA (excerpt 1).  
Comparing to the first few days of the crisis, the analysis argues that the 
lack of experience on the individual level had less connections with frame-
building in the second and third examined moments of the crisis as the 
communicators started to accumulate experience on daily basis, and adjust 
their response to different incidents:   
5. On the communicative level, no one was ready to handle a 
crisis like this. But we started to learn, every day we go 
through an experience and we learn from it. We also started 
to learn from others’ experiences. We started observing how 
other countries dealt with problematic events, and we started 
to correct our previous approaches (I1).  
The interview analysis suggests that the lack of crisis experience, in 
interaction with the established communication routines as well as the lack of 
routines of how to deal with the unprecedented nature of the crisis to Bahrain 
are factors of the background contexts connected to public diplomacy frame-
building in the first 3-4 days of the crisis. The frame analysis revealed the 
prominence of the ‘reform’ frame in BNA’s content in the first 3-4 days of the 
crisis, which represents a “denial” response strategy (Benoit, 1997) because 
it did not address the public protests and referred to them only as ‘sporadic 
incidents’. Referring to the protests as ‘sporadic incidents’ suggests elements 
of ‘minimisation’. Yet, the ‘denial’ prevailed because the general emphasis of 
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the frame remained on the celebratory aspect. At the time, the situation 
escalated in Bahrain, especially when two protestors died after clashes with 
security forces (BICI, 2011, p. 70). However, the frame excluded references to 
escalations and presented Bahrain as a reformed nation celebrating a 
democratic milestone. While the IRT suggests ‘denial’ is a common crisis 
response strategy to reduce actors’ responsibility for an offensive act (Benoit, 
1997; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Brinson & Benoit, 1999), the interview analysis 
suggests that lack of experience in crisis communication, in interaction with 
the unprecedented nature of the crisis, is also connected to the denial of a 
crisis in public diplomacy messages.   
Note that the ‘denial’ in the earliest response to the Bahraini crisis is not 
exclusively related to the communicators’ lack of crisis experience and the 
‘new’ crisis. The interview analysis argues that the ‘denial’ is also closely 
connected to, and dominated by the absence of higher authorities’ stance on 
the protests, which is discussed further in the Professional Routines section 
(3) of this chapter.  
The interview analysis also suggests that the involvement of 
communicators from other governmental entities, in combination with the 
change of the crisis response routines started to have relations with the frame-
building at the IAA/BNA after 3-4 days of the crisis unfold: “We only started to 
have messages after 3-4 days about what to say and what we need to do” (I1). 
The frame analysis revealed that after 3-4 days of the protests’ 
commencement, the most dominant frame in BNA’s content changed from 
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‘reform’ to ‘events’. The ‘events’ frame is different from the ‘reform’ frame in 
that it addresses the mass public protests in Bahrain. Yet, it presents them as 
normal practice of political rights and not a revolution as in other ‘Arab Spring’ 
countries. The frame analysis also suggested that the ‘event’s frame 
represents a “minimisation” response strategy (Benoit, 1997) because it 
downplays the significance of the protests and their demands. The interview 
analysis suggests that a change in the most prominent frames and crisis 
response strategies communicated through public diplomacy can be related to 
the change in the communicators responsible for crisis communication, and 
the change in response routines. Note that this is not the only contribution to 
frame-building at this stage of the crisis as will be discussed in other sections 
of this chapter.   
Therefore, this section discussed how the individual level of the 
hierarchal model, in interaction with factors from other levels contributed to the 
IAA/BNA’s frame-building of the Bahraini crisis, especially in the first examined 
moment. It argued connections between the communicators’ lack of crisis 
communication experience and early framings of the crisis when BNA’s frames 
tended to ‘deny’ a crisis. The literature suggests that denying a crisis is a 
common strategy to reduce oneself responsibility for an offensive act (Benoit, 
1997). Furthermore, professional communicators may strategically remain 
silent on specific aspects of a crisis not to give the story “oxygen” (Dimitrov, 
2015, p. 645), and prevent or limit the spread of news that may threaten the 
image or reputation of their sponsor among significant publics. However, the 
analysis argues that, besides strategic intents, denying a crisis can be also 
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related to public diplomacy practitioners’ lack of experience in addressing 
unprecedented occurrence of a crisis. Moreover, the analysis suggested that 
engaging ‘external’ communicators with specific communication skills, and 
changing the response routines can be connected to the change of the most 
dominant frames and crisis response strategies communicated through public 
diplomacy.   
As indicated earlier, the IAA/BNA frame-building during the first 
examined moment, when the frames and response strategies tended to limit 
the presentation of the situation as a crisis, is not exclusively connected to the 
lack of experience on the individual level and the interactions discussed above. 
The next section discusses the contribution of the professional routines level 
to IAA/BNA’s frame-building in different phases of the examined crisis.   
  
3. PROFESSIONAL ROUTINES LEVEL: ABSENCE OF DECISION 
MAKING, AND PROMOTING POSITIVE NEWS  
In media context, the professional routines level of the hierarchal model 
concerns journalistic rituals of producing media content (Shoemaker & Reese, 
1996). For example, Western journalistic criteria of news production 
appreciate balanced coverage, which means offering different views of actors 
in a story (Starkey, 2007 in Dekavalla, 2016, p. 14). Other than balance, 
journalists produce news that should, for instance, resonate with cultural 
values, be dramatic, recent, and conflict-oriented (Ihlen, 2009, p. 73). In this 
thesis, however, the professional level focuses on the routines, norms, goals, 
and constraints of producing public diplomacy messages, keeping in mind that 
public diplomacy is defined and examined in a governmental context, where 
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the general goal of public diplomacy communicators is to change or maintain 
foreign public opinion for the benefit of the sponsoring government (L’Etang, 
1996, p. 16; L’Eatng, 2006, p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 139). The 
aim of this section is to deliver insights on the contribution of this level to public 
diplomacy frame-building in response to the crisis, and how it interacted with 
other levels.    
Two frame-building factors emerged from the data on the professional 
routines level: 1) disruption of top-down routines of building government 
messages represented in the absence of decision making by government 
seniors in the first 3-4 days of the crisis, and 2) the goal of communicating 
positive news about Bahrain to foreign media and publics. The analysis 
suggests connections between these factors and the construction of versions 
of reality that do not present the examined protests as a crisis or as an internal 
crisis. I discuss this in the following subsections.   
3.1.  Disruption of top-down work routines: absence of senior 
decision making   
Rituals of producing government messages work in bureaucratic and 
top-down routines of decision-making processes (Lee, 2009; Sanders, 2011). 
The majority of participants (3/5) indicated the disruption of this norm when 
they discussed the absence of higher authorities’ stance on the protests when 
the crisis unfolded, and how it resulted in unclear messages about the protests 
to communicate with the media in the first 3-4 days of the crisis. This is 
exemplified in the following excerpt:   
6. We only started to have messages after 3-4 days about what 
to say and what we need to do. As I told you, we did not have 
information [about the authorities’ stance on the protests 
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before that]; there was an absence of decision making 
during a specific time. What is happening, what to say, we 
did not know. Journalists and media people would call and 
we did not know what to tell them. The situation was not 
clear, the information was not clear. (I1)    
The excerpt indicates the communicators did not have approved 
messages on how or whether to address the protests or what they seem to 
perceive as a problematic situation. The disruption of established work 
routines is a common feature of crises in general (Cloudman & Hallahan, 2006, 
p. 367; Coombs, 2006, p. 172; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997, p. 280). The 
disrupted routine discussed here specifically refers to the ritual of top-down 
message building at governmental organisations. The analysis suggests that 
the disruption of this ritual due to the absence of senior decision making on 
how or whether to address the protests is connected to IAA/BNA frame-
building in the first 3-4 days of the crisis. As indicated earlier, the frame 
analysis revealed that the ‘reform’ frame prevailed in BNA’s analysed content 
in the first 3-4 days, representing a ‘denial’ strategy. Thus, the analysis 
suggests that denying a crisis is not entirely connected to the communicators’ 
lack of crisis experience and the unprecedented nature of the crisis to Bahrain, 
but also closely related to the lack of instructions and approval from decision-
makers on how or whether to address a crisis.   
The analysis also suggests that even if the communicators demonstrate 
experience and skills in handling the crisis, they still need the approval of 
higher authorities on addressing the crisis. Note how the communicator 
indicates in excerpt  
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1 that even when the emergency team members were more engaged in 
suggesting crisis responses and preparing news ahead of events, they still 
needed to “get approval on our messages” (I1). This implies that professional 
routines can overrule the contribution of the individual level to public diplomacy 
frame-building in a crisis. While this dominance can be common due to the 
bureaucratic rituals of decision making in government organisations (Ihlen & 
Thorbjornsrud, 2014, p. 46; Lee, 2009; Sanders, 2011), the analysis suggests 
that denying a crisis in public diplomacy communications can be related to the 
disruption of top-down decision-making routines, and not necessarily to 
expertise or lack of a routine in containing a crisis.  
Note that the interview analysis does not suggest that the absence of 
decision making disrupted the entire process of message building at the 
beginning of the crisis. As evident in the previous chapter, the IAA/BNA 
published messages in the first 3-4 days of the protests, focusing on 
celebrating the 10th anniversary of the NAC. With the absence of senior stance 
on the unfolding crisis, it seems the BNA communicated the last approved 
messages they had, which is the celebration of NAC’s anniversary. The BNA’s 
online archive holds content showing that celebrating NAC’s anniversary was 
the focus of BNA’s online content even few days before 14 February 2011 (e.g. 
"GCC Secretary General lauds royal reform project" (13.2.2011); "Manama 
Municipality to hold festival" (12.2.2011); "HM King Hamad directs to pay BD 
1000 for every Bahraini family" (11.2.2011). Therefore, it is not the entire 
process of message building that was interrupted, but only decision making on 
addressing the crisis.   
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The individual level analysis argued that after 3-4 days of the crisis unfold 
the frame-building was connected to the formation of an emergency media 
team, and change in the response routines. The following subsection 
highlights another professional level factor that contributed to frame-building 
after 3-4 days of the protests’ commencement and other key moments of the 
examined crisis.    
 3.2.  Public diplomacy goals: promoting positive news  
Another frame-building factor that emerged from the data is related to 
the goal of public diplomacy practitioners, which is affecting foreign public 
opinion for the benefit of their sponsoring government (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; 
L’Eatng, 2006, p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 139). Media is an 
important tool for governments to communicate their messages, and 
professional communicators, such as public diplomacy practitioners engage 
with the media from behind the scenes to influence media content (Edwards, 
2012, p. 2; Gamson, 1988, p. 168; Hallahan, 1999, p. 228; Ihlen, 2009, p. 73; 
Jungblut, 2017, p. 387). It is argued that journalists’ dependence on sources’ 
materials is increasing, which enhances public diplomacy chances to 
communicate its frames through the media (Edwards, 2012, p. 2). Two 
communicators discussed the significance of promoting government 
messages to foreign media outlets to assure it is present in media content and 
read by foreign publics. This approach started taking place after 3-4 days of 
the commencement of the protests, when communicators from other 
governmental institutions were asked to join emergency media teams at the 
IAA. One participant, for instance, discussed forming a new routine in their 
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crisis response processes, specifically promoting “positive news” in light of 
foreign media’s “negative” coverage:  
7. The [foreign] media outlets were… never on the side of the 
government. So we understood that, but it was our 
responsibility to get our story out there. And therefore, we 
formed a war room. Basically, we sat around the table every 
morning, and we jotted down and wrote down the positive 
aspects of the events of that day or the day before, and how 
to combat any negative press that came out in the last 24 
hours. So we need to immediately respond to the negative 
articles, and correct a lot of the mistakes that were out there. 
And we also need to take a proactive role in putting out the 
positive news, which was always taken for granted that 
everybody will know about it. No, people don’t know about it, 
and we need to make sure that the reader gets it. (I4)   
The excerpt suggests the communicators formed a new crisis routine 
while aiming to promote the government side of the story to foreign media and 
its audience. Note here that the participant discusses this effort in relation to 
what they present as “negative”, and also (from government’s perspective) 
incorrect media coverage. This suggests an interaction with the external level 
which looks at influences from outside the organisation practicing public 
diplomacy (see Section 5 of this chapter). Yet, it is worth noting here how the 
IAA/BNA communications changed their response routine to contest what is 
already out there by foreign media through promoting “positive news”.   
The analysis suggests that the ritual of “putting out the positive news” 
contributed to the articulation of frames that do not present the situation as a 
crisis (‘events’; ‘unprecedented achievement’; ‘supported leadership’), and 
their representation of discourse strategies that limit the presentation of the 
situation as a crisis (‘minimisation’; ‘bolstering’; ‘differentiation’). One example 
of a frame that tended to promote government messages with emphasis on 
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positive aspects is the ‘unprecedented achievement’ frame, which dominated 
in BNA’s analysed content during the third examined moment and represented 
a ‘bolstering’ (Benoit, 1997) response strategy. The third key moment focused 
on the publication of BICI report, which asserted human rights’ violations by 
some members of the Bahraini security forces, and inability to prove direct 
connection between Iran and the unrest in Bahrain. Despite revealing these 
findings by BICI, the frame analysis revealed that the ‘unprecedented 
achievement’ frame continued to focus on the positive aspects of the situation. 
3/5 communicators highlighted that despite these ‘negative’ findings by BICI, 
the governments’ main messages maintained its focus on the positive aspects 
of establishing BICI. One communicator, for instance, indicated that the “main 
messages” after the publication of BICI report were:   
8. The main message was: the report was unprecedented, 
voluntary [as the Commission was established by a royal order 
and not imposed by a third party]… [The report] was fully 
accepted by the King. It is okay if the report says there was 
systematic [mistreatment of detainees by some members of the 
security forces] but it is not [the political] system [policy]. So it 
[the violation] is an exception, a deviation from the norm. The 
main message is that we are prepared to implement all the 
recommendations [of the report]. (I5)  
This example illustrates how the ‘bolstering’ strategy depicted by the 
‘unprecedented achievement’ frame in BNA’s analysed content is related to 
the goal of “putting out positive news”. This is indicated in the above excerpt 
by emphasising the focus on the positive aspects of the BICI despite 
confirming human rights’ abuses.   
The process of “putting out positive news” also seems to contribute to 
other frames in BNA’s analysed content. For instance, the frame analysis 
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revealed that the ‘supported leadership’ frame, which represents a 
‘differentiation’ (Benoit, 1997) response strategy, tended to limit associations 
between Bahrain and the ‘Arab Spring’ by emphasising local, regional and 
international support for the authorities and its initiatives. Even when a frame 
tended to portray the situation as a crisis, the interview analysis suggests 
connections between the frame-building and the ritual of “putting out positive 
news”. The ‘sovereignty’ frame, for instance, presents the situation as a crisis. 
Yet, the frame is articulated in BNA’s news through references that emphasise 
the security forces’ success in restoring order and return to normality. Thus, 
the frames’ overarching tendency to limit the presentation of the situation as a 
crisis and differentiate Bahrain form the ‘Arab Spring’ seems connected to the 
ritual of promoting “positive aspects” about the situation.   
The above discussion suggests that offering ‘positive’ versions of reality 
by a government to contest unfavourable framing by foreign media during a 
crisis is related to a strategic choice of promoting positive messages on the 
sponsoring government. In public diplomacy, it is common to use state-owned 
communication platforms to promote content that pushes a government’s 
agenda on a certain critical issue (Zhang et al., 2017, pp. 239-240). The 
analysis in this research revealed the Bahraini government used BNA’s 
website to promote its favoured messages by specifically promoting positive 
news during the crisis. “The attempt by national actors to influence the media 
in foreign countries is the initial step in a public diplomacy process and involves 
dominating agenda building and frame-building” (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 
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448). Note though that the challenge to the Bahraini government at the time 
was not to gain foreign media’s attention to the situation in Bahrain (agenda 
building), as the success of the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt already drew 
international attention to the Bahraini protests (Karolak, 2012, p. 180). Rather, 
the challenge was to promote their favoured frames to foreign media outlets 
with the aim to present positive aspects of the government's actions and to 
tackle what they perceived to be incorrect information in media reporting.   
I argued in the previous chapter that foreign governments, especially in the 
West, were not concerned about human rights’ violations in Bahrain as much 
as in other Arab countries, such as Libya (Maguire & Vickers, 2013). Foreign 
media, on the other hand, had more negative reactions against the Bahraini 
authorities (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). It is argued that a nations’ success in 
promoting its agenda and framing to foreign media is related to cultural and 
political congruency between itself and the target nation (Sheafer & Gabay, 
2009, p. 463). Although it is beyond the focus of this thesis to evaluate the 
success of Bahraini public diplomacy frames in appearing in foreign media’s 
content, it is worth noting that the cultural and political congruency could be 
connected to the unfavourable coverage in foreign media, especially in 
Western contexts with high appreciation to democratic values. For example, 
major American newspapers were more supportive of the protesters, while 
they presented the Bahraini government as oppressive authority against 
democratic freedoms (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). One interviewee indicated that 
it was difficult to promote the Bahraini government’s messages to foreign 
media, especially because it came from a government that represents “an 
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Arab Gulf state, a kingdom that is not a democracy, so there is already bias 
against us” (I5). Thus, the Bahraini public diplomacy promotion of positive 
news, especially those focusing on reforms and democratic values do not 
seem the most convincing messages to promote to foreign media, especially 
because the country’s political system as a monarchy in the Middle-East raises 
questions on the level of democratic policies of governance.    
Therefore, this section discussed connections between public diplomacy’s 
professional routines and frame-building during the Bahraini crisis. First, it 
argued that the absence of seniors’ stance on the situation, in combination 
with the communicators’ lack of crisis experience and absence of crisis 
communication routines when facing the unprecedented nature of the crisis, 
has close connections with the earliest responses’ tendency to ‘deny’ a crisis. 
Then, the analysis argued that public diplomacy’s routines of promoting 
positive messages to combat negative coverage in foreign media contributed 
to the articulation of frames that represent response strategies that tend to limit 
the presentation of the situation as a crisis (bolstering; differentiation; attacking 
the accuser).   
These professional routines factors also interacted with factors at the 
organisational level, as discussed below.  
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4. ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL: REDEFINING THE SITUATION, PUBLIC 
RELATIONS COMPANIES, VISITS TO FOREIGN MEDIA, AND 
UNPREPAREDNESS   
The organisational level of influence looks at organisational structures, 
policies, and processes that lead to variation in content between media 
organisations, and “seeks to explain variations in content that cannot be 
attributed to differences in routines and individuals” (Shoemaker & Reese, 
1996, p. 139). In this study, it looks at processes and structures of the 
organisation practicing public diplomacy (IAA/BNA), showing some of the 
background contexts at the time of the government’s communication of frames 
that limit the presentation of the situation as a crisis, or externalise the causes 
of the crisis.   
Two of the frame-building factors that emerged from the data at the 
organisational level are: redefining the crisis by government representatives 
through excluding negative aspects about the crisis from government 
narratives; and the IAA/BNA unpreparedness for crisis situations. The analysis 
also revealed organisational processes that may not have direct connection 
with the articulation of frames in BNA’s content, but highlight organisational 
efforts to promote specific versions of reality about the crisis to foreign media 
and publics. These processes are employing foreign public relations’ agencies 
and visiting certain foreign media outlets. The analysis argues these 
organisational level factors, in combination with factors from other levels of 
influence, were at the background context of communicating frames that limit 
the crisis or externalise its causes. I discuss this in the following subsections.   
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 4.1.  Redefining the situation in government narratives  
This factor focuses on the process of excluding references to internal 
negative aspects of the crisis from IAA/BNA’s content aimed at foreign media 
and publics. The interview analysis suggests connections between this factor 
and the analysed frames tendency to externalise the causes of the crisis and 
represent a discourse strategy of ‘shifting the blame’ (Benoit, 1997), especially 
in the second examined moment. For instance, two interviewees 
problematized IAA’s approaches of responding to foreign media’s coverage 
which emphasised the internal political tensions in Bahrain during the crisis 
(Al-Rawi, 2015; Tawfeeq, 2011; Yateem, 2014). Instead, the next excerpt 
highlights that the government approach was to redefine the situation in their 
communication with foreign media, without addressing the internal aspects 
causing the crisis:    
9. We used to see the deficiency in some of the government 
side people. They insisted on presenting a counter narrative, 
another reality from the existing reality being covered in the 
[foreign] media… my approach: … let us address the current 
narrative, and counter argue, and tackle this issue… so we 
stayed away from conspiracy stuff. We stayed away from 
foreign interference stuff [after November 2011]. These are 
domestic political issues. We will address them as domestic 
political issues within terms and resolutions in Bahrain. (I5)  
The quote highlights how some government representatives redefined 
the situation by providing “another reality from the existing reality being 
covered in the media”. Sectarian tensions escalated rapidly during the Bahraini 
crisis, especially in the second examined moment (BICI, 2011, p. 167). Instead 
of addressing this, some government representatives tended to present the 
crisis as a result of “foreign interference” and “conspiracy” and not “domestic 
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political issues”. These “counter argue[ments]” bare similarities with the frames 
observed in BNA’s analysed content particularly in the second examined 
moment (‘existential threat’; ‘sovereignty’), suggesting connections between 
frame-building at this stage of the crisis and the approach of redefining the 
crisis as a result of foreign conspiracy.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the frame analysis revealed that in 
the second examined moment the ‘existential threat’ frame prevailed in BNA’s 
content, and it worked with the ‘sovereignty’ frame to present the unrest in 
Bahrain as a result of ‘foreign conspiracy’ triggered by ‘Iran’. The frame 
analysis also argued that these frames represent ‘shifting the blame’ and 
‘attacking the accuser’ discourse strategies respectively (Benoit, 1997). Note 
that ‘shifting the blame’ is a variation of the ‘denial’ strategy (Benoit, 1997). 
This suggests that denying an internal crisis in BNA’s analysed content is not 
always connected to lack of crisis experience, the unprecedented crisis, or 
absence of decision making as in the earliest responses to the crisis discussed 
previously.   
Conversely, the interview analysis suggests that at later stages of the 
crisis the denial of the internal causes of the crisis was a choice by government 
representatives who shifted the blame to “conspiracy” and “foreign 
interference”. ‘Shifting the blame’ and ‘attacking the other’ are image repair 
strategies used to limit the perceived responsibility for the offensive act 
(Benoit, 1997, pp. 178-179).  Social rewards and punishments are a function 
of how responsibility is attributed for the positive or negative consequences of 
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actions, and this applies to the practice of public diplomacy in a crisis context 
(Mor, 2009, p. 226). “Given that actors seek to avoid punishment and obtain 
rewards, they have an incentive to manipulate the attribution of responsibility 
and the perception of consequences of significant others. Thus, a 
‘predicament of image protection’ occurs when the public image of the actor is 
under threat of being held responsible for negative consequences (and thus 
blamed).” (ibid, pp. 226-227) With the attempt to avoid punishment, “a key 
function of political discourse is to attempt to hide negatives” (Maguire & 
Vickers, 2013, p. 20), and the negative here is the internal sectarian conflict in 
Bahrain, which could present the Bahraini protests as another Arab Spring 
caused by internal issues, and thus legitimise the protests as upheavals 
against oppressive regimes. Therefore, the Bahraini government’s approach 
of redefining the situation by shifting the blame to “foreign interference” 
corresponds to common public diplomacy practices of reallocating 
responsibility for an offensive act to avoid negative consequences. 
Furthermore, and as indicated in the previous chapter, the combination of the 
strategies of ‘attacking the accuser’ and ‘shifting the blame’ in BNA’s analysed 
content represents a strategy of “attacking the other”, which is a common 
public diplomacy response to defend a nation’s image in a crisis, especially in 
an effort to reduce its responsibility for an offensive act among foreign publics 
(Mor, 2009, p. 228).  Redefining the situation by “building/creating” a new issue 
is a strategy to “switch or distract the media focus or public attention by 
creating a different issue” (Haung et al., 2005, p. 230). This approach of 
creating a different issue is different from “reframing the facets within the same 
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issue but in a larger or favourable context” (ibid). For instance, I discussed in 
the Professional Routines section (3) that the routine of “putting out the 
positive news” contributed to the articulation of frames that limit the crisis. Note 
that a government can still promote its favoured positive message if it 
addressed unfavourable aspects or messages and put across their 
perspective on them. Nevertheless, the interview analysis suggests that with 
the promotion of “positive news” and "external threat", BNA/IAA frame-building 
not only reframed the facets of issues, but also suggested alternative frames 
(i.e. “another reality from the existing reality being covered in the [foreign] 
media” (I5)). This was specifically evident in the second examined moment by 
‘shifting the blame’ to “foreign interference”. Note that IAA’s exclusion of 
negative messages that appear in foreign media’s content is not due to lack of 
attention to its content. Section 5 discusses how this organisational level factor 
interacted with the external role of foreign media’s coverage, especially where 
the communicators indicate attention to foreign media’s ‘unfavourable’ 
coverage.  
  The following subsection discusses the role of foreign public relations 
companies in promoting the Bahraini government’s favoured messages to 
foreign media and publics.  
4.2. Foreign public relations companies   
The analysis revealed that the IAA/BNA consulted foreign public relations 
agency on crisis communication. Yet, one participant argued that the role of 
the agency was limited to initiating contacts and establishing networks with 
significant foreign media outlets:   
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10. And no matter people say that, you know, yeah PR 
companies [did the work for us] or whatever. Believe me PR 
companies, they are good. They are good in the beginning, 
why? Because, Oh I know this guy in the Times newspaper, 
then you call him to see whether you can see him. They open 
doors for you. But in the end, who needs to go to the Times, 
or who needs to go to the Financial Times? Bahraini has to 
go. So we have to do the work. (I4)    
While the above quote suggests the role of public relations agencies was 
limited to networking and gaining access to the media through their 
established relationships with journalists, previous research indicates that the 
Bahraini authorities employed several Western public relations companies to 
rebuild an image of stability, which has been the core of Bahrain’s public 
diplomacy efforts since the examined crisis unfold (Jones, 2017, p. 326). 
These companies include “Bell Pottinger, Qorvis, and M&C Saatchi”, and they 
focused on promoting more positive image of Bahrain by promoting investment 
in the Kingdom to blur the negative image resulting from accusations of human 
rights abuses (ibid).    
The companies’ emphasis on ‘promoting positive image’ seems to interact 
with IAA/BNA’s routine of “putting out the positive news”. It also suggests 
connections with the analysed frames tendency to limit the presentation of the 
situation as a crisis through focusing on positive messages and excluding 
references to negative aspects of the situation, such as human rights 
breaches, violations against the protestors, and internal sectarian tensions. As 
mentioned earlier, IAA’s use of foreign public relations’ companies during the 
crisis indicates organisational effort to promote a specific version of reality 
about Bahrain to foreign media and publics.   
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Employing such foreign agencies is not new in the GCC region. In Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, American public relations firms, law companies, and 
consultants were employed when the Saudi image in the US was seriously 
damaged by its connections with terrorism after the 9/11 attacks (Zhang & 
Benoit, 2004, p. 162). Some of the crisis response strategies employed by 
these foreign companies succeeded, and a key success factor was the 
consistency between the messages that represent these strategies and the 
actions of the Saudi authorities. For example, revoking bin Laden’s Saudi 
citizenship was consistent with denying the country had any connection with 
terrorism (ibid, p. 166). In the case of Bahrain, one communicator indicated 
that the foreign company’s “insistence on presenting a positive image cost us 
[the government] the confidence of foreign media due to the void between the 
messages and the escalation of events on ground” (I2). Nevertheless, this 
‘mistrust’ cannot be entirely blamed on the approach of foreign public relations’ 
companies in communicating about Bahrain to foreign media and publics. As 
revealed in this analysis, it was also the government’s approach to promote 
positive news, redefine the situation and exclude reference to internal 
problematic issues- approaches which also create void between the 
government’s narrative and the escalations on ground.      
Additional frame-building factor at the organisational level is official visits 
by delegations from the IAA to certain foreign media outlets to promote the 
Bahraini government’s perspective on the crisis. This is discussed directly 
below.    
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4.3. Visits to foreign media organisations  
The interview analysis revealed that the IAA organised official visits to 
foreign media outlets which had significant international recognition and, at the 
same time, was against the Bahraini government in its coverage of the crisis. 
One communicator, for example, mentioned:     
11. With a lot of American stations, we were weak. ABC, NBC. 
Those stations, no one knew them [at the IAA/BNA or 
networked with them before the crisis]. Wall Street Journal, 
New York Times, they had negative position [against the 
Bahraini government]. We visited them several times and 
managed to lessen the damage. I went with young 
representatives from the IAA to put a human face on the 
problem and make our perspective on the issue more 
convincing.  
(I4)   
This factor may not have direct connections with the articulation of frames 
in BNA’s content. Yet, as mentioned earlier, it indicates IAA’s efforts to 
promote specific versions of reality about Bahrain and the crisis to foreign 
media. Sending officials in speaking tours is one of public diplomacy’s image 
repair activities (Zhang & Benoit, 2004, p. 162). This refers to the vital role of 
foreign news media in shaping the public opinion on other countries, especially 
because, unlike domestic issues, foreign news are beyond an individual’s 
direct experience (Lim & Seo, 2009, p. 204).  Personal communication with 
relevant stakeholders, like the media, is also a common practice by European 
professional communicators in the context of organisational crises to repair a 
threatened image (Verhoeven et al, 2014, p. 109).   
As suggested by its label, the factor of visiting foreign media outlets 
interacted with foreign media’s coverage at the external level of influence. For 
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example, the coverage of the Bahraini crisis in the New York Times, one of the 
media organisations visited by representatives from the IAA, was 
overwhelmingly against the Bahraini government (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011). 
Instead, it supported the protestors by primarily using them as news sources, 
and ended the news stories with quotes that trigger readers’ sympathy towards 
the demonstrators (ibid). This could be connected to the political ideology in 
the US, which favours people seeking democracy over authoritarian rule 
(Guzman, 2016).  
I discussed earlier that the Bahraini messages were not convincing to 
foreign media. This was attributed to, for example, the mismatch between the 
messages and the actual events (I2), and the emphasis on democratic values 
by a government that represents a monarchy rather than a democracy (I5). 
The interview analysis suggests that the IAA representatives’ visits to foreign 
media outlets were to deal with the failure to promote its favoured public 
diplomacy messages on the crisis to such significant foreign news 
organisations. According to one interviewee, “it took over a year before we 
were able to gain some kind of respect, credibility and understanding... Getting 
to know the [foreign] media journalists, I think, played also a great role. Once 
they get to know you, and you accept and you take part of the responsibility 
for things that did go wrong, then you will earn their respect” (I4). Thus, this 
indicates that it was not until the government accepted responsibility for some 
of the events and gained trust of the media that it increased the government’s 
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potential to influence media reporting and having their voices and views heard 
in the media.    
4.4. Organisational unpreparedness for crises  
Another factor observed at the organisational level of analysis is the 
IAA/BNA unpreparedness for a crisis. Cloudman and Hallahan (2006, p. 367) 
present organisations’ preparedness for crises as “an important element of 
anticipating a crisis that involves mentally rehearsing scenarios and equipping 
the organisation with systems and procedures so that responses are 
appropriate, sufficient, and timely”. A key indicator of an organisation’s 
preparedness for a crisis is having a written plan which can pre-determine best 
practices, and save precious response time (ibid, p. 368). Another indicator of 
preparedness is when such plans are supported by “tactical preparation”, such 
as the appointment of a crisis team to anticipate contingencies and then take 
charge during a crisis. I discussed in previous sections of this chapter that the 
communicators at the IAA/BNA were “shocked” as the Bahraini crisis unfolded 
despite their ability to anticipate a problematic situation due to the upheavals 
in other Arab countries, and the online announcements of Bahraini protests 
echoing these demonstrations. This suggests that unpreparedness for crisis 
also influenced frame-building at least at a very early stage of the protests. 
Further, excerpt (1) indicated that it was not until 3-4 days of the crisis unfold 
that an emergency team was put together to handle crisis response: “an 
emergency media team was formed [after 3-4 days]… The team’s mission was 
to closely observe the situation: monitor, analyse, and then suggest how to 
deal with the situation” (I1). This was not presented by the interviewees as a 
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decision based on pre-planning for potential crisis situations, suggesting the 
IAA/BNA’s unpreparedness for a crisis situation in this aspect.  
A further indicator of an organisation’s preparedness for a potential 
crisis is preparing communicators for responding through training (Cloudman 
& Hallahan, 2006). Yet, the analysis revealed that this was not done at the 
IAA/BNA, suggesting the organisation’s unpreparedness for potential crises. 
One interviewee, for instance, stated:  
  
12. We learnt a lot from this crisis. As communicators we learnt 
how to respond and interact, how to perceive different 
events, how to use language, tone, and articulate. We 
needed training of course. So we started various training 
programmes to handle media in crises: spokesperson, 
online media, translation, political analysis. All these training 
programmes did not exist before, but due to the crisis we had 
to adapt, and change even our training programmes. (I1)  
  
Another tangible measurement for organisational crisis preparedness 
that was not considered by the IAA/BNA is the appointment, training, and 
empowerment of one or more spokespersons who can speak with authority 
and a single voice (Cloudman & Hallahan, 2006). It is stated:  
  
13. A government spokesperson was nonexistent. Look at the 
events from the early beginning, from February, who spoke? 
... The Crown Prince appeared in February. Yet, it is not his 
role to be a spokesperson. He tried to contain the situation 
and calm it down when he came out and spoke, yet the 
purpose was not even to address the media. We did not 
have spokespersons between February and October. (I5)     
  
Thus, besides the lack of crisis experience at the individual level, the 
IAA/BNA did not prepare its communicators for potential crisis situations 
through training. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals that the IAA/BNA took 
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some measurements after the crisis to address its lack of preparedness in 
handling the examined crisis. One example is the training programmes 
highlighted in excerpt 12.   
Another tactic to deal with the lack of preparedness at the IAA was 
widening the communication networks with foreign media:  
14. After the crisis we initiated work with many media 
organisations we didn’t work with before. We activated 
agreements with the Spanish and Italian [media]. In India, 
we are now working with the biggest news agency, PTI. We 
expanded the agreement with the Russian [agency]. We 
initiated cooperation with China and South Korea. We have 
agreements with the French and now negotiating expansion. 
With the Spanish our goal is to cover Latin America because 
we did not have a voice reached there... in the Arab region 
we increased cooperation with the Egyptian news agency as 
the situation changed there and the image on the Bahraini 
situation did not reach Egyptian people clearly. The Bahraini 
[official] image did not reach many Arab publics. So we had 
to activate agreements with many Arab countries to publish 
news about Bahrain daily, and deliver the true image. (I1)  
  
Changes in the IAA/BNA processes were also observed at a strategic 
level, as two strategies were built to deal with the consequences of the 
examined crisis:  
15. A year after the crisis there were two strategies. One 
developed by Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohammad [CEO of the 
IAA at the time] to improve Bahraini [official] media and deal 
with the challenges arising from the crisis. The other strategy 
was put by Samira Rajab [Minister of State for Information 
Affairs (April 2012-December 2014)]. It was about the 
[official] media and improving it. Both strategies involved the 
communication challenges we faced in 2011 and how to deal 
with it. (I1)    
  
Thus, this subsection highlighted how the articulation of Bahraini public 
diplomacy frames that tend to limit the presentation of the situation as a crisis, 
or externalize its causes took place in a context of unprepared organisation for 
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a potential crisis. However, the analysis suggests that the IAA/BNA learnt 
lessons from the crisis, and took measurements to fix the consequences of the 
2011 crisis through the development of communication strategies, and, for 
example, training the communicators for crisis communication. This indicates 
that the examined crisis is a turning point in the Bahraini government practices 
of public diplomacy in response to crises. For example, to deal with the 
aftermath of the publication of BICI report, the Bahraini government took a 
strategic initiative of inviting celebrities in the capacity of their respective 
professions to Bahrain (e.g. musicians; singers; pop stars). Those praise their 
visits to the Kingdom using rhetoric that mirrors that of the state. This is 
significant as “celebrities can provide a mediating function between foreign 
publics … [that] can serve to introduce ideologically weighted sentiments to 
audiences who would not necessarily describe themselves as political” (Jones, 
2017, p. 326).  
Therefore, this section discussed the contribution of organisational level 
factors to the frame-building at the IAA/BNA. It argued that the process of 
redefining the situation without addressing the internal problematic aspects of 
a crisis contributed to the articulation of frames that tend to ‘shift the blame’ in 
public diplomacy messages instead of addressing an internal crisis. It also 
argued that this factor, in interaction with the employment of foreign public 
relations’ companies, and the ritual of promoting positive news contribute the 
articulation of public diplomacy frames that limit the presentation of the 
situation as a crisis. Moreover, the analysis revealed that the Bahraini 
government’s efforts to promote its favoured messages went beyond 
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publishing them on state-owned online platforms, and involved visiting foreign 
media outlets to promote these messages. It also highlighted that the 
articulation of public diplomacy messages during the 2011 crisis took place in 
an organisation unprepared for a crisis despite its ability to anticipate it.       
As indicated in previous sections of this chapter, foreign media’s coverage 
had close connections with IAA/BNA’s framing of the Bahraini crisis. The next 
section discusses the external frame-building factors, including the role of 
foreign media, social media, and negotiations between the Bahraini authorities 
and political societies.    
  
5. EXTERNAL LEVEL: FOREIGN MEDIA, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND 
NEGOTIATIONS  
In Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model, the external level of influence is 
labelled ‘extra-media’ and covers influences on content from outside the media 
organisation. In this thesis, however, it is labelled ‘external level’ because it 
looks at the factors from outside the organisation practicing public diplomacy 
(IAA/BNA). The interview analysis revealed three frame-building factors at this 
level: 1) foreign media’s coverage, 2) social media, and 3) negotiations 
between the authorities and political societies. The analysis suggests the 
external level factors worked in combination with factors at other levels of the 
hierarchal model, contributing to the articulation of frames that tend to limit the 
presentation of the situation as a crisis. I discuss this directly below.   
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 5.1.  Foreign media’s coverage   
Previous chapters indicated that the Bahraini authorities faced negative 
publicity across foreign media due to accusations of violence and human 
rights’ breaches (Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). Major American 
newspapers (New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post), for 
example, framed the crisis strongly against the Bahraini government by 
presenting it as an authority against democratic change (Bowe & Hoewe, 
2011). Other media (e.g. BBC; CNN; Al-Alam TV) also presented the Bahraini 
authorities as violating human rights, and oppressing Shiite citizens for not 
allowing them to protest and using violent responses against demonstrations 
("Mushaima Talks to Al-Alam TV", 2011; "Bahrain Demands Further Reforms", 
2011; "Thousands Protest to Overthrow Bahraini Government", 2011). 
Nevertheless, the interview analysis revealed that the communicators did not 
only perceive foreign media’s coverage as negative. Rather, all the 
interviewees discussed an issue of “media fallacy”, where the communicators 
perceived that some foreign media outlets intentionally published false 
information about Bahrain and did not give the government the chance to 
deliver their message:  
16. Our problem was with foreign media channels which had 
credibility among foreign publics and published false news 
about Bahrain and the events happening here. This 
phenomenon created pressure on the [official] Bahraini 
media. They did not give Bahrain the chance to defend itself. 
(I3)    
 Examples of the “false news” discussed by the participants revolve around 
spreading “false information on injuries and deaths among protestors”, and 
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“the use of violence against the protestors” like “bombings and air attacks” (I1; 
I2; I5). Noteworthy is the fact that the IAA provided the BICI with a list of factual 
errors in foreign media’s coverage of the crisis between February and March 
2011. The list included transcripts from the coverage of “Reuters news agency, 
Al-Quds Alarabi newspaper, the BBC, Elaph website, the Kuwaiti newspapers 
Al-Jarida, Al-Dar, AlRai, Al-Qabas, the Lebanese Al-Akhbar, the Egyptian Al-
Shorouq, Radio Monte Carlo, CNN, Al-Jazeera.net, Al-Hurra television station 
and Dutch Radio” (BICI, 2011, p. 395). BICI investigations confirmed certain 
foreign news media and even some protestors spread false news about 
Bahrain. For instance, the Commission’s investigations revealed that at 
Salmanya Medical Complex (SMC), the main governmental hospital in Bahrain 
where injured protestors were taken, some medical staff members spread 
false news and rumours to the media about the situation and number of injuries 
(BICI, 2011, p. 213). Further, it confirmed one individual, at least, 
impersonated SMC medical staff and gave false information to unknown news 
agency to spread exaggerated false information on the injuries and deaths 
among protestors (ibid). Moreover, it asserted that Iranian media’s coverage 
of the Bahraini crisis tended to incite sectarian tensions in the Bahraini society 
through its exaggerated coverage (Yateem, 2014, pp. 99-100).     
Within this negative media context presented by the communicators as 
‘false coverage’, IAA’s main goal was to “correct false information published 
across media” (I2). The analysis suggests that these perceptions of false 
coverage started to have connections with the frame-building after 3-4 days of 
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the protests’ commencement. One communicator, for instance, described how 
IAA and BNA started noticing ‘false’ coverage, and how they responded:  
17. We started paying attention to foreign media [after 3-4 
days]… especially as false news started to spread and 
increase at the level of information about the victims, the 
deaths, the detentions, everything, even the vocabulary 
used [like revolution]... As a news agency our role was to 
communicate with all agencies we had agreements with, and 
which operate in different languages: Russian, Chinese, 
Italian, Indian, German, and French. We started to activate 
our work with each agency we had agreement or 
cooperation with by directly communicating with them to 
assure the delivery of Bahrain’s news and the true situation 
… [because] after the fourth or fifth day [of the protests], 
there started to be more focus on Bahrain [in foreign media]. 
There were statements coming from countries, and stances 
from countries that did not know what exactly was happening 
in Bahrain. Therefore, the target was to… present the 
situation to foreign media outlets. (I1)    
This excerpt suggests how, after 4-5 days of the protests’ 
commencement, the communicators started to pay attention to foreign media’s 
content, particularly ‘false’ coverage on Bahrain. Section 4.1 of this chapter 
(Redefining the situation in government narratives) argued that IAA/BNA’s 
responses excluded any negative narrative by foreign media from their 
responses and, instead, presented “another reality from the existing reality 
being covered in the [foreign] media” (I5). Yet, this section argues that despite 
excluding foreign media’s negative narratives, foreign media’s coverage 
contributed to the articulation of frames that contest foreign media’s ‘false’ 
coverage.  
Foreign media’s influence on frame-building in the IAA/BNA did not work 
in isolation. For instance, the above excerpt (17) indicates the interaction with 
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professional routines, where the communicators started “directly 
communicating” with foreign news agencies to assure the delivery of the 
official Bahraini messages and the “true situation”. I also highlighted in section 
3.2 (promoting positive news) that a ‘new’ response routine was introduced to 
IAA/BNA’s daily processes, particularly “putting out the positive news” to 
“correct a lot of the mistakes out there”, “combat any negative coverage” and 
“get our [the government] story out there” (I4). On the organisational level too, 
the IAA organised official visits to significant foreign media outlets to “lessen 
the damage” and “make our [the government] perspective on the issue more 
convincing” to foreign media organisations which had “negative position” (I4) 
against the Bahraini government.   
The interview analysis suggests that the interaction between these 
factors, spearheaded by unfavourable coverage in foreign media contributed 
to the articulation of frames that limit the presentation of the situation as a crisis 
to counter foreign media’s ‘negative’ coverage. Examples of these frames are 
‘events’, ‘supported leadership’ and ‘unprecedented achievement’ which do 
not present the examined context as a crisis, and instead represent crisis 
response  of ‘minimisation’, ‘differentiation’, and ‘bolstering’ respectively. 
Previous sections of this chapter argued that the tendency of these frames and 
crisis responses to limit the presentation of the situation as a crisis is mainly 
connected to routines of promoting positive news, and this section illustrated 
how this routine was put in place to combat unfavourable coverage and what 
the communicators perceived as “false news”. The articulation of public 
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diplomacy frames that do not present the situation as a crisis thus seems to 
be connected to activities of contesting unfavourable coverage in foreign 
media.   
Note that external contexts, like media, work as powerful influences on 
government decision making during crises (Lee, 2009, p. 75). In crises, 
relevant actors enter framing contests to win media attention and favourable 
coverage (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 449). Media coverage is considered 
successful when the event, topic, or political actor is framed in a way that 
supports the positions and commentary of one side in the conflict or that is 
detrimental to the other (Entman, 2003, p. 417; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 270). 
The analysis in this study suggests that foreign media’s coverage was not 
‘successful’ from the perspective of the interviewed communicators, and 
therefore, IAA/BNA’s crisis responses targeted at foreign media and publics 
needed to contest this unfavourable coverage.   
Note too that “limiting” or “ignoring” a crisis is observed in Arab and 
Middle-Eastern countries’ communication with or through the media even 
before the Arab Spring (Avraham, 2015). This is observed in communications 
by Egypt and Turkey to promote their countries as tourist destinations post 
crises (ibid). In the case of Bahrain, ‘limiting’ the presentation of the situation 
as a crisis in BNA’s analysed content seems connected to unfavourable 
coverage in foreign media to combat “false news”. Nevertheless, and as stated 
earlier in different positions of this thesis, the Bahraini government (IAA/BNA) 
did not win the framing contest with foreign media, especially as the coverage, 
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particularly in Western news media was against the Bahraini government (i.e. 
Bowe & Hoewe, 2011).   
The interview analysis also revealed that frame-building at the IAA/BNA 
was not only connected to unfavourable content in mainstream media. The 
following section discusses connections with social media too.    
 5.2.  Social media  
The interview analysis revealed that public diplomacy frame-building at the 
IAA/BNA during the Bahraini crisis was also connected to what was at the time 
unprecedented role of social media. The following interview fragment, for 
instance, highlights how the influence of social media on public opinion was 
an element of surprise to government communicators during the examined 
crisis, how it interacted with the unprecedented nature of the crisis to Bahrain, 
and coverage in foreign media. The excerpt also highlights connections 
between these factors and not addressing the crisis in the government’s 
messages when the crisis unfolded:   
18. The first thing that everyone has to be aware of is that this 
was a very new phenomenon and crisis that Bahrain was 
never exposed to before in front of the world with so much 
media technology. And even though there were 
announcements of the events [the protests] that were going 
to happen on 14 February, I think as events deteriorated the 
government and the country was put in a situation never 
faced before. We saw what happened in Egypt only few 
weeks earlier, and we saw social media in Egypt playing a 
huge role in the change of the regime. But we never thought 
that not only social media but the normal mainstream media 
would affect how opinions would be formed on Bahrain. So 
basically, immediately I think the first mistake that the 
Bahraini government did that they didn’t respond, they did 
nothing [about addressing a crisis]. That was a mistake. 
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They did nothing; they were like a dear caught in the 
headlights. Just froze in the middle of the road. (I4)  
The role of social media is one of the most studied topics in relation to 
the Arab Spring phenomenon, for its vital role in the unfold and development 
of the events in several Arab countries at the time (Howard et al., 2011). The 
core influence of social media during the Arab Spring is enabling mass publics 
to circulate their messages timely, nationally and internationally, to elites and 
to publics alike, exposing oppressions by Arab regimes and triggering 
sympathy toward publics rallying for political and economic rights (Wolfsfeld et 
al., 2013). According to the quote above, the IAA/BNA undermined the 
potential influence of social media on the situation in Bahrain despite noticing 
its critical role in overthrowing the regime in Egypt, and arranging for mass 
public protests in Bahrain to echo the demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia (Al-
Hasan, 2015; Weatherby & Longworth, 2011, p. 92; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3). 
Social media was also used by Bahraini publics during the Bahraini crisis to 
present their own perspective on the situation and reflect on how it relates to 
their own lives (Howard et al., 2011). This unprecedented role of social media 
in communicating public’s experience and views with a potential to influence 
opinions about the situation in Bahrain seems to leave the government in 
“shock” (I1) as they “just froze in the middle of the road” (I4).   
The interview analysis suggests this ‘surprising’ role of social media is 
another factor connected to frame-building at the beginning of the examined 
crisis, where the dominant frame in BNA’s content was ‘reform’, and the 
response strategy was ‘denial’. Other factors that contributed to the ‘denial’ 
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response strategy are the lack of crisis experience at the individual level, the 
unprecedented nature of the crisis at the external level, and the absence of 
decision making at the professional level. I discussed these factors in previous 
sections of this chapter.    
The role of social media in the framing of the Bahraini crisis was not 
limited to the early stages. For instance, one communicator indicated that the 
government had to strengthen its presence on social media platforms to 
assure the delivery of their messages:   
19. The social media revolution surfaced during the events in Arab 
countries [Arab Spring]. It was the fastest platform to deliver 
information and to build an image. [In Bahrain] the attacks 
[against the government and its policies] started from social 
media. The false news [against the government] started from 
social media. The threats [against Bahrain] started from social 
media. Harassing publics [by other publics with different views 
on the protests] started from social media. So we [IAA/BNA] 
had to be present [on social media] as an official and media 
organisation and perform as the only official source of 
government messages. (I1)    
The interviews did not show how social media influenced the articulation of 
BNA’s online content. Nevertheless, the excerpt highlights an interaction with 
the organisational level, where IAA/BNA started using social media platforms 
to promote the government’s favoured messages. Note that the IAA/BNA did 
not use such platforms as a main source of government messages before the 
crisis, which is another indicator that the crisis represented a turning point, not 
just for Bahraini public diplomacy, but government communication in general. 
One communicator, for instance, mentioned that when the crisis unfolded:  
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20. We used our personal accounts on Facebook and Twitter to 
correct false news published by the protestors… at a later 
stage we had official accounts for the IAA/BNA on Twitter and 
Facebook to publish official messages and correct false news 
such as the number of deaths, locations of events, and using 
bombs against the demonstrators. (I2)   
Therefore, the interview analysis suggests that at the early stage of the 
crisis, social media, in combination with factors from other levels of influence 
was at the background of communicating a frame that tended to ‘deny’ a crisis 
in Bahrain. The analysis also argues that at later stages of the crisis it 
contributed to the Bahraini government’s efforts to promote its favoured 
messages by pushing the IAA/BNA to use social media platforms to promote 
its favoured versions of reality on the crisis.   
Note that even before the proliferation in the use of social media, real-
time media in a globalised world enabled corporations, countries, and 
individuals reach into the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever 
before (Vujnovic & Kruckeberg, 2005, p. 340). This increased the challenge 
raised by the emergence of non-state actors in the international relations’ 
environment, which suggests public diplomacy is no longer mere government 
practice. Rather, the involvement of private individuals and groups in public 
diplomacy challenges governments’ public diplomacy efforts because these 
actors’ agenda may differ from the governments’ (Dolea, 2015, p. 278; Van 
Dyke & Vercic, 2009, p. 916; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 264; Zaharna & Uysal, 
2016, p. 110). In the examined case, the protestors’ ability to use social media 
to contest, contradict and challenge the government’s framing of the situation 
contributed to the Bahraini government’s public diplomacy efforts by 
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specifically starting to use such platforms as an official source of its messages.  
Using such platform by the government is not exceptional, as a number of 
studies highlight the use of social media as a public diplomacy tool in countries 
like the US (Zhang, 2013; Zhong & Lu, 2013), South Korea and Japan (Park 
& Lim, 2014).    
Another external level factor is the negotiations between the Bahraini 
authorities and political societies. I discuss this below.   
 5.3.  Negotiations between the government and political societies   
Previous chapters indicated that due to the escalation of the situation in 
Bahrain, King Hamad delegated the Crown Prince to call for a comprehensive 
dialogue among all components of the Bahraini society to listen to their 
demands and solve any issues (BICI, 2011, p. 131; bna.bh, 2011; Ulrichsen, 
2013, p. 3). The interview analysis revealed connections between these 
negotiations and frame-building in the first key moment. It also suggests that 
the failure of these negotiations has relations with the shift in the most 
prominent frames between the first and second examined moments.  
This is exemplified in the following quote:   
21. For the first 3-4 weeks there was a complete lid on any 
media [by the Bahraini government in terms of addressing a 
crisis]. And I think now I understand maybe because there 
were a lot of negotiations taking place… between the 
political societies involved in the protests in the roundabout, 
and the decision makers and authorities here in Bahrain. 
And they were trying to make a deal to find a solution and a 
way out. What we all know is: the political societies involved 
did not accept any kind of compromise and therefore the 
deal fell through. Then they [the government] realized they 
have a bigger problem now in their hand… and that is not 
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only they did not engage with the media from day one, but 
they were hoping that that would lead to a solution. The 
negotiations did not happen so now they have a bigger 
problem that they didn’t engage from day one [in a crisis 
narrative], they engaged 4 weeks later. (I4)  
The previous chapter suggested that frames communicated in the first 
key moment (‘reforms’; ‘events’; ‘supported leadership’) do not problematize 
the situation in Bahrain. Even when the ‘events’ frame acknowledged the 
protests, it represented a ‘minimisation’ response strategy (Benoit, 1997) when 
it reduced the protests to tolerated expression of opinions and excluded the 
escalations resulting from the death of two protestors after clashes with 
security forces. The above quote suggests that using a ‘minimisation’ (Benoit, 
1997) discourse strategy in the second half of the first examined moment is 
connected to government aspirations to solve the situation through 
negotiations without having to address a problem. Minimising a crisis in such 
case is common as crisis communicators will tend to symbolically solve the 
crisis by argumentatively altering perceptions in a manner favourable to their 
interests (Hearit & Courtright, 2003, p. 83).  
However, the negotiations failed around 13 March 2011 (BICI, 2011, p. 
131; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 3), and the above excerpt suggests it was only then 
when the Bahraini government engaged in a narrative that problematizes the 
situation. Hence, it changed its crisis response. The frame analysis revealed 
a change in BNA’s most prominent frames between the first and second key 
moments. In the second examined moment, the ‘existential threat’ frame 
portrayed the protests as a suspicious movement triggered by a foreign 
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conspiracy to infiltrate into the Gulf region. The frame analysis also suggested 
this was a shift from a “minimisation” to “shifting the blame” response strategy 
(Benoit, 1997). This suggests that external factors, like failure of political 
solutions, can push a government to redefine the situation, including a radical 
shift from portraying normality through a ‘minimisation’ strategy to highly 
threating crisis. Note though, as I discussed in section 4.1 when the Bahraini 
government addressed the crisis in the second examined moment it tended to 
portray the situation as a foreign conspiracy without reference to the internal 
problematic aspect of the crisis. This highlights the interaction between the 
external and the organisational levels in the framing of the crisis during the 
second examined moment, where the frame analysis suggested BNA’s 
dominant frame was ‘existential threat’ and the discourse strategy was ‘shifting 
the blame’. This is also connected to the ideological level of influence which is 
discussed in the next section.   
Therefore, this section discussed connections between the external level 
of the hierarchal model and frame-building. It highlighted that external factors 
like unfavourable coverage in foreign and social media can contribute to the 
articulation of public diplomacy frames that limit the crisis and construct more 
positive image of the situation to counter negative and/or inaccurate coverage. 
It also highlighted interactions between such external factors and the 
professional and organisational levels, where a government initiates or 
changes its communication routines or organisational processes to assure the 
delivery of its favoured messages to foreign media and publics. This section 
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also argued that aspired solutions like dialogue, negotiations and their 
breakdown contributed to the articulation of frames that limit the crisis without 
giving salience to all the problematic aspects of the crisis. Additionally, it is 
argued that the failure of such aspired solutions triggers a government to shift 
its response strategy from one that limits the crisis to a highly problematic 
situation such as foreign threat.   
The next section discusses how the ideological level worked closely with 
other levels of influence on frame-building processes.  
  
6.  IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL: SECTARIAN CONFLICTS  
 The ideological level of analysis examines factors that contribute to the 
articulation of frames that support the interpretation of a certain issue from the 
perspective of power centres in a society (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, pp. 223-
224). The analysis at this level also highlights how lower levels of influence 
work in favour of powerful actors not as individuals, but as a class transcending 
any one organisation, industry, or a place (ibid, p. 224). I indicated earlier that 
the goal of public diplomacy practitioners is to promote government messages 
and causes to foreign publics to change or maintain foreign public opinion for 
the benefit of a sponsoring government (L’Etang, 1996, p. 16; L’Etang, 2006, 
p. 378; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 139). This goal is the core of public 
diplomacy. However, the interview analysis revealed that promoting 
government frames did not only work at the professional level during the 
Bahraini crisis, especially as the understanding of public diplomacy in this 
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research draws attention to examine how various actors, through their 
practice, try to impose their own definitions and interpretations of specific 
issues, or even manipulate meaning in order to impose specific versions of 
reality in the competitive environment of international relations (Dolea, 2015, 
p. 275; L’Etang, 2006, p. 379). Here, the goal of public diplomats is not only 
prompting governments’ messages, but boosting the power of their sponsoring 
government by promoting its values while rhetorically defining its interests 
(Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 383).   
The interview analysis revealed that ideological sectarian tensions 
between the Bahraini and Iranian authorities were another background context 
of frame-building during the examined crisis. I discuss this directly below, 
illustrating how ideology interacted with factors at other levels of influence.  
The analysis suggests that long-standing ideological conflicts between 
Bahrain and Iran triggered the Bahraini government to engage in framing 
contests with Iranian and Shiite media to assure the way the crisis is framed 
does not affect its power status as a legitimate authority. The communicators’ 
attention to this ideological conflict in the process of handling the crisis through 
the media is indicated by references to “vicious media attack” (I3) with “political 
dimension” (I1) that aimed to misrepresent Bahrain to the world, and a political 
“agenda” against Bahrain which, according to one interviewee, hampered the 
government’s efforts to deliver its message:  
22. [Bahraini official] media was always criticized for not 
keeping up with the challenges facing the country [during the 
crisis]. I agree to some extent, and don’t agree at the same time. 
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To what extent we [government communication] managed to 
deliver our message. Well, there were a lot of efforts, but we also 
need to know there was agenda against Bahrain. If they wanted 
the Bahraini [government’s] voice to be heard, they would have 
allowed it. But, the goal was to mute the Bahraini [government] 
voice [in foreign media]. The political dimension was way more 
dominant than media issues. (I1) The participant pointed at 
“agenda” against Bahrain with “political dimension”. In a follow-
up discussion with the communicator to understand what they 
meant by this, they indicated “Iranian attempts to present the 
situation in Bahrain to foreign publics as a revolution to justify the 
protests and a change of the political system” (I1). This suggests 
that at the background processes of responding to the examined 
crisis, communicators at the IAA/BNA were aware of framing 
contests with Iranian and Shiite media.  
As indicated in earlier chapters, the ideological tension between Bahrain 
and Iran can be traced to the times of Shah Pahlavi’s rule in Iran, when he 
argued Bahrain must be under Iranian sovereignty after its independence from 
Britain in 1971 (Pinto, 2014, p. 169). Even after the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
the relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iran deteriorated significantly 
due to the strong anti-monarchy ethos of the revolution (ibid). In more recent 
years, Bahrain is one among other Arab Sunni GCC monarchs (especially 
Saudi) that aim to maintain strategic power in the region and resist the Iranian 
Republic’s, with its Shiite ideology, attempts to play more strategic role in the 
region (Belfer, 2014, p. 33; Mabon, 2012). “The split between Sunnis and 
Shi’as is directly linked to a power struggle over rightful leadership of umma, 
the Muslim community of believers” (Karolak, 2013, p. 3). This history of 
ideological conflict encouraged the understanding of the crisis by the Bahraini 
and other GCC authorities as Iranian incited riots to trigger a wave of unrest in 
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the region and topple Arab Sunni monarchies in the Gulf (Pinto, 2014, p. 172). 
This perception was reinforced among GCC authorities by the fact that in 
countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq demonstrations were held in 
support of the Shiites protesting in Bahrain (ibid). Moreover, one cannot ignore 
the fact that Iran and the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon used information 
platforms in their political and ideological warfare against Bahrain since the 
1990s (Yateem, 2014, pp. 98-99). Even during the examined crisis Al-Alam 
TV, a channel run by the Iranian government, devoted a special section to 
thoroughly cover the events in Bahrain (Al-Rawi, 2017). It tended to “fabricate” 
an image of struggling Shi’a majority ruled by a Sunni ‘dictatorship’ (Yateem, 
2014, pp. 99-100; see also Karolak, 2017, p. 83).  
The analysis suggests that this ideological tension is connected to the 
articulation of frames that counter the ‘revolution’ frame, especially as Iranian 
media platforms presented the crisis as a “revolution” by oppressed Shi’a 
majority against a Sunni dictatorship (Karolak, 2017). The success of such 
Iranian framing of the Bahraini crisis could jeopardise the authorities’ position 
as a legitimate regime, especially because the ‘revolution’ portrayal increases 
associations between Bahrain and the ‘Arab Spring’. As mentioned earlier, the 
‘Arab Spring’ frame legitimises the protests, and presents regime overthrows 
as valid solution to help oppressed citizens peruse democratic change 
(Cofelice, 2016; Harlow & Johnson, 2011; Joffe, 2011; Yli-Kaitala, 2014). 
Thus, it is important for the Bahraini authorities to resist Iranian framing of the 
protests as a ‘revolution’. This is reinforced by one of the communicators who 
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explicitly stated that their general communication goal was resisting the 
‘revolution’ framing:  
23. The general message was: it is not a revolution… this was 
the Bahraini position, our reality. This was good for [foreign] 
media channels [which want to understand what is 
happening in Bahrain]. If any politician, social or sports figure 
calls, this will help them know what the position in Bahrain 
is, what is happening in Bahrain. (I1)   
Note that the excerpt highlights the rejection of a “revolution” frame. This 
is important because the situation escalated in Bahrain during the second 
examined moment, and the PSF was deployed in the country to protect it in 
case of potential foreign military interference (BICI, 2011, p.139). Iranian 
media and officials presented the deployment of the PSF as a “massacre” 
against Shiite Bahrainis (Belfer, 2014), a “Saudi invasion” (BICI, 2011), and 
“foreign interference” (reuters.com, 2011), claiming that PSF units participated 
in clearing demonstrations at the GCC roundabout on 16 March 2011 in a 
severe breach of human rights. BICI investigations, however, confirmed the 
PSF did not engage with civilians in any form and did not commit any violations 
of human rights (BICI, 2011, p. 387). The PSF role was limited to securing 
strategic locations and being prepared to assist in the defence of Bahrain 
against any potential foreign armed intervention (ibid, p. 257). Therefore, it is 
suggested that Iranian attempts to define the unrest as a ‘revolution’ was taken 
into account in the process of articulating IAA/BNA public diplomacy messages 
during the crisis.  
Note that the frame analysis revealed that none of the analysed frames 
portrays the demonstrations as a revolution. Conversely, the analysed issue-
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specific frames which address the demonstrations (‘events’; ‘existential threat’) 
represent either a ‘protest’ or ‘riot’ master frames. The first contests a 
revolution frame by presenting the demonstrations as a legitimate practice of 
political rights (Hertog & McLeod, 2001), while the second delegitimises the 
demonstrators’ acts and emphasises the role of security forces in preserving 
order and protecting bystanders (ibid).  Even in terms of the image repair 
strategies represented by the analysed frames, the previous chapter indicated 
that the discourse strategies represented in BNA’s content were ‘minimisation’ 
and ‘shifting the blame’. The frame analysis also argued that despite 
addressing a crisis through the ‘existential threat’ frame, the frame tends to 
‘shift the blame’ of the crisis to Iran by externalising the cause of the crisis and 
excluding any reference to internal tensions that could present the situation as 
a conflict between the authorities and citizens. The interview analysis suggests 
that this tendency to contest a revolution framing is related to ideological 
tensions between Bahraini and Iranian authorities, especially with the latter’s 
attempts to portray the Bahraini unrest as a ‘revolution’.   
Another indication of ideological contributions to the frame-building was 
observed in discussions on IAA/BNA’s actions taken to reduce what they 
perceived as unfavourable coverage in foreign media. One communicator 
highlighted contacting foreign news agencies to stop referring to Bahrain in 
terms of its sectarian demographics. Stressing on majorly Shi’a population in 
foreign media’ content could trigger sympathy toward the majorly Shi’a 
protestors and reinforce Iranian media presentation of the crisis as a 
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‘revolution’ by oppressed Shiite citizens against a minority Sunni ‘dictatorship’. 
The participant stated:   
24. We usually struggled with Reuters, and the French and 
German news agencies. They always used a fixed 
background in their news about Bahrain. They kept saying it 
was ruled by Sunni family, or Sunni minority and Shi’a 
majority. This language is not used in the country’s system, 
neither in its law. So, they are triggering sectarian fallacy and 
sectarian tensions. They are telling the Sunnis they are the 
majority, or telling the Shiite they are the majority. They must 
not write in this way. I don’t see them saying in their news 
about Britain that Protestants are more than Catholics, or 
Catholics are more than Protestants as a fixed background. 
It was obvious that they intended to put this [sectarian 
message] as a fixed message [about Bahrain].  
(I1)  
This quote suggests how the Bahraini government rejected sectarian 
references to the country in foreign media’s coverage. This is significant because 
the Bahraini protests did have a sectarian character, and they tend to be 
discussed in terms of sectarian divide (Stoller, 2014, p. 116; Yateem, 2014, p. 
98). However, the analysis suggests that the Bahraini government resistance to 
sectarian references is connected to the fact they were emphasised in Iranian 
and some Western media narratives. This is important because such references 
tend to present the Shi’a as a majority revolting against a Sunni minority, and 
this could legitimise a regime change. Al-Rawi (2015) suggests that the 
‘existential threat’ frame, which was present in BNA’s analysed content, is 
articulated through references to sectarian conflicts. Nevertheless, the frame 
analysis in this research revealed that BNA’s texts carrying this frame do not 
explicitly refer to sectarianism, sects, Sunnis, or Shiite. Rather, the sectarian 
aspect is only implicitly implied by reference to Iran as a threat, suggesting that 
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if the crisis has any sectarian dimensions, it is external and not an internal 
problem.   
Note that there are no recent publicly available figures on the exact size 
of the Sunni and Shi’a communities of Bahrain. A census undertaken in 1941 
prior to Bahrain’s independence from Britain placed the percentage of Sunnis 
at 48% and Shi’a at 52% of the Muslim population (70%). Current unofficial 
estimates vary between 60-70% Shi’a and 30-40% Sunni, although these 
figures and demographic data in Bahrain generally, are a contentious issue 
(BICI, 2011, p. 13). The exclusion of the sectarian aspect from BNA’s analysed 
news seems related to the Bahraini government frame contest with Iran and 
other Western media, which tend to give salience to this aspect in a manner 
that implies the legitimacy of a majorly Shi’a ‘revolution’ against a Sunni ruling 
minority.   
Externalising the cause of the Bahraini crisis is not merely related to the 
ideological conflict. As indicated earlier, it is connected to the organisational 
level factor of redefining the situation and excluding the reference to any 
internal problematic aspects of the crisis, and the external factor of 
unfavourable coverage in foreign media.   
Therefore, this section discussed how ideological conflicts contributed to 
the construction of public diplomacy frames during the crisis by triggering the 
government to engage in framing contests to protect its power position. 
Engaging in such framing contests is common in the practice of public 
diplomacy during crises, especially as failure or success in crisis 
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communication is often a matter of whose crisis frame dominates the situation 
(Coombs, 2011, p. 223). In the examined case, the Bahraini government 
contested Iranian and Shiite media framing of the crisis as a ‘revolution’ by 
‘shifting the blame’ of the crisis to Iranian interference. Not resisting Iran’s 
‘revolution’ frame and emphasis on internal sectarian issues increases 
connections between Bahrain and the ‘Arab Spring’. Avoiding the ‘Arab Spring’ 
frame was important for the Bahraini authorities as it legitimises public protests 
in Arab countries and overthrowing their regimes.  
However, as discussed earlier, such framing by the Bahraini government 
was challenged when the BICI could not confirm Iranian role in the Bahraini 
unrest. Opponents of the ‘Iranian interference’ argument suggest the Bahraini 
government intentionally constructed the protests as an Iranian plot to 
demonise the protestors and be able to implement strict measures to contain 
the situation (Carlstorm, 2012). While it is beyond the focus of this research to 
determine whether ‘foreign interference’ had a role in the Bahraini crisis or not, 
using such argument in the Bahraini authorities’ framing of the crisis offers an 
example of public diplomacy framing contests during crises, which work with 
the purpose of maintaining power positions of the sponsoring government. In 
such cases, public diplomacy practitioners not only try to impose their own 
definitions and interpretations of specific issues, but even manipulate meaning 
in order to impose specific versions of reality in the competitive environment 
of international relations (Dolea, 2015, p. 275; L’Etang, 2006, p. 379). 
Generally, the practice of persuasive communication (e.g. public diplomacy) 
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in Arab governmental institutions is looked at as a “tool of … manipulation” 
(Kirat, 2005, p. 325).    
The next section presents the concluding remarks of the interview analysis.     
  
7.  CONCLUSIONS   
This chapter presented the analysis of interviews with five communicators 
working within the IAA/BNA during the examined crisis to deliver insights on 
the background processes and factors connected to frame-building in Bahraini 
public diplomacy. The interview analysis revealed how frame-building started 
in a context of confusion, absence of decision making, and lack of crisis 
experience and preparedness. Yet, in a matter of days, strategic choices of 
promoting positive news to counter foreign media’s coverage were also at the 
background of frame-building at the IAA/BNA.   
The analysis used Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model of 
influences on media content to organise frame-building factors in public 
diplomacy. The analysis suggested 11 factors at different levels of the 
hierarchal model are connected to frame-building: 1) limited crisis 
communication experience (individual level); 2) absence of senior decision 
making (professional level), 3) promoting positive news (professional level); 4) 
redefining the situation by government representatives without addressing 
internal problematic issues in Bahrain (organisational level); 5) employing 
foreign public relations’ companies (organisational level); 6) visiting foreign 
media organisations (organisational level); 7) IAA/BNA’s unpreparedness for 
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a crisis (organisational level); 8) foreign media’s negative coverage (external 
level); 9) social media (external level); 10) negotiations between the authorities 
and political societies (external level); and 11) the sectarian conflicts 
(ideological level).   
The analysis revealed that in the first couple of days of the crisis, frame-
building was connected to lack of crisis experience and preparedness at the 
individual and organisational levels, shock resulting from the unprecedented 
nature of the crisis to Bahrain, and absence of senior decision making at the 
professional level. The combination of these factors in the very early days of 
the crisis suggests that framing choices were mostly unintentional, but 
occurred as a result of other actions. This confusion by the IAA/BNA at the 
beginning of the crisis is not uncommon to crisis situations, as it is generally 
difficult to frame crises that unfold quickly (Coombs, 2011, p. 220). The 
analysis revealed these factors contributed to IAA/BNA’s frame-building at a 
time when the ‘reform’ frame was dominant in BNA’s analysed content. This 
suggests that the ‘denial’ strategy (Benoit, 1997) represented by the reform 
frame can be connected to such confusion and not to a strategic and planned 
effort to promote positive framing of the Bahraini government while hardly 
mentioning and downplaying the crisis.  
The analysis also revealed that after 3-4 days of the crisis unfold, frame-
building turned to be connected to change of response routines and a choice 
to focus on promoting positive news to contest unfavourable coverage in 
foreign media. It also shows connections with aspirations to contain the crisis 
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through negotiations. These factors contributed to frame-building at a time 
when the ‘events’ frame was dominant in BNA’s analysed content, 
representing a ‘minimisation’ strategy (Benoit, 1997). The tendency to limit a 
crisis is a common practice by professional communicators who may 
strategically remain silent on specific aspects of a crisis not to give the story 
“oxygen” (Dimitrov, 2015, p. 645), and prevent or limit the spread of news that 
may threaten the image or reputation of their sponsor among significant 
publics. However, the Bahraini government could not continue downplaying 
and ignoring the crisis, especially when the negotiations flailed and the unrest 
escalated in the second examined moment.  
The interview analysis shows that during the second examined moment of 
the crisis, frame-building at the IAA/BNA was related to the failure of 
negotiations to start a national dialogue, government’s representatives 
redefining of the situation as Iranian plot without addressing the internal 
causes of the crisis, and ideological tensions between Bahraini and Iranian 
authorities. During this phase of the crisis, the ‘existential threat’ frame 
prevailed in BNA’s analysed content and was reinforced by the ‘sovereignty’ 
frame. The frames represent strategies of ‘shifting the blame’ and ‘attacking 
the accuser’ respectively. The combination of these two strategies represents 
a strategy of “attacking the other”, which is a common public diplomacy 
response to defend a nation’s image in a crisis, especially in terms of reducing 
its responsibility for wrongdoing (Mor, 2009, p. 228).  
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The analysis revealed that also in the third examined moment, frame-
building was connected to the routine of promoting positive news to contest 
unfavourable coverage across foreign media. Note that in the third examined 
moment, the BICI report confirmed that a number of the security forces' 
members committed violations against human rights. Instead of highlighting 
this, the dominant frame in BNA's analysed content was the 'unprecedented 
achievement' frame, which represented a 'bolstering' strategy (Benoit, 1997). 
Generally, nations are less likely to employ crisis response strategies that 
admit guilt (Benoit, 1997; Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 216). Saving a nation’s image 
in this regard is significant for its empowerment and dignity; therefore it is more 
likely to implicitly admit guilt through other strategies to save face (Peijuan et 
al., p. 216).  
Further, the analysis revealed information which does not specifically relate 
to the articulation of messages in BNA’s content, yet it offers insights on the 
Bahraini government’s efforts to promote their preferred messages to foreign 
media and publics. These are: visiting foreign media organisations, employing 
foreign public relations’ companies, and using social media. The analysis also 
suggests Bahraini public diplomacy lacked experience and preparedness to 
handle national crises with such international exposure, and how this crisis 
could be a turning point in the practice of Bahraini public diplomacy especially 
in terms of communicating with foreign media. This analysis aimed to 
contribute to academic debates on public diplomacy frame-building especially 
at a time of crisis and its aftermath. As discussed in the literature review, 
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majority of studies (Entman, 2008; Jungblut, 2017; Melki & Jabado, 2016; 
Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Sheafer et al., 2014; Yarchi et al., 2013; Zhang, 2006) 
looking at public diplomacy framing during crises focus on the content of the 
message and the factors that may help public diplomats successfully promote 
their preferred frames to appear in foreign media’s content. My research shifts 
focus by looking at the background processes and factors connected to the 
articulation of frames in public diplomacy texts (information subsidies) offered 
to the media and public in attempt to promote their preferred messages. Thus, 
instead of looking at whether, how, or why public diplomacy frames appear in 
foreign media content; this research looks at the frames in public diplomacy 
texts and the factors that influenced their construction. This aims to deliver 
insights on how public diplomacy activities in specific cultural contexts 
contribute to the construction of specific versions of reality in their messages 
during crisis.   
The analysis also delivers insights on factors connected to the 
communication of frames that depict specific crisis response strategies offered 
by Benoit’s (1997) image repair theory by looking at different levels of influence 
offered by Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model of influence. The 
frame analysis in the previous chapter argued that the analysed frames and 
the response strategies they represent do not portray the examined protests 
as a crisis, and even when they do they present it as a foreign conspiracy and 
not internal issue as in other ‘Arab Spring countries’. The interview analysis 
argues that this started with confusion and lack of experience and 
preparedness at the IAA/BNA. However, it then became connected to 
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professional routines of promoting positive news to contest unfavourable and 
incorrect coverage across foreign media and maintain the power status of the 
Bahraini authorities in face of ideological tensions with Iran – a practice which 
reinforces realist conceptualisations of public diplomacy as a ‘power tool’ in 
the hands of the sponsoring government to boost its power by promoting its 
values through rhetorically defending its interests (Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 
383).  
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CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSIONS   
  
  
In February 2011, a series of controversial protests started in Bahrain, 
generating negative publicity against the Bahraini authorities across foreign 
media due to accusations of human rights’ breaches and violence against the 
protestors (Bowe & Hoewe, 2011; Brown, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013, p. 82). The 
account of the presentation of this crisis varies widely among different relevant 
actors (Karolak, 2012, p. 186). Previous research on the framing of the 
Bahraini crisis mainly looks at several foreign media outlets’ framing of 
different stages of the crisis (e.g. Abdul-Nabi, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2015; Bowe & 
Hoewe, 2011). Yet, what remained unexplored is the Bahraini government’s 
framing of the protests in its public diplomacy messages to foreign media and 
publics.   
My research addressed this gap by examining public diplomacy frames 
communicated by the Bahraini government during the 2011 crisis in Bahrain, 
and exploring background processes related to the building and construction 
of these frames. This research employed qualitative frame analysis to identify 
and explore the frames present in online content targeted at foreign media and 
published on the English website of Bahrain News Agency (BNA) during three 
key moments of the crisis: the first week of protests (14-19 February 2011), 
the arrival of the PSF to Bahrain (14-16 March 2011), and the publication of 
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BICI report (23-25 November 2011). The research also employed qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with government communicators involved in 
message construction and/or decision making during the crisis to deliver 
insights on the background processes and factors connected to the frame-
building.   
The aim of this research was to deliver insights on how public diplomacy 
activities of responding to crises through media relations contribute to the 
construction of specific versions of reality in messages communicated on 
behalf of the government. It also contributes to research understanding the 
role of public diplomacy in representations of the Bahraini 2011 crisis through 
offering insights on frames communicated by one of the significant actors in 
this crisis: the Bahraini government. These frames are: ‘reform’; ‘events’; 
‘existential threat’; ‘unprecedented achievement’; ‘supported leadership’; and 
‘sovereignty’.     
The analysis in this research revealed that Bahraini public diplomacy 
responses to the crisis, as manifested in the analysed content targeted at 
foreign media, majorly communicated frames that did not address a crisis, and 
when some of the frames did they presented the cause as foreign conspiracy 
and not internal issues as was the case in ‘Arab Spring countries’. The 
interview analysis suggests that this tendency not to address the internal crisis 
started in a context of absent decision making, and lack of crisis experience 
and preparedness. It then became more related to choices of promoting 
positive news to contest unfavourable and incorrect framing across foreign 
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media, and to maintain the power position of the Bahraini authorities in face of 
ideological tensions with Iran.  
These findings also offer an example of government framing in the Arab 
Spring context. This is significant as previous studies on the Arab Spring 
phenomenon focus on the framing of Arab upheavals by different foreign news 
media platforms, with a specific focus on the upheavals in Egypt (e.g. Du, 
2016; Guzman, 2016), keeping a gap in how Arab governments framed the 
crises in their countries. Moreover, the current research offers insights on an 
Arab government practice of public diplomacy in the Arab Spring context.  
Research on public diplomacy during the Arab Spring focuses on how Western 
state and non-state actors engage in public diplomacy activities in relation to 
the Arab Spring (e.g. Cofelice, 2016; Golan, 2013; Yli-Kaitala, 2017).   
This research revealed the frames communicated to foreign media by the 
BNA worked together to represent the situation in Bahrain as different from 
that in other Arab countries where popular protests were taking place around 
the same time. I suggest that despite communicating different frames at 
different stages of the crisis and representing different crisis response 
strategies, they all attempted to contest accusations of human rights’ violations 
to prevent comparisons between the Bahraini events and those in Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia, for example. Instead, it promoted a favourable image of the 
Bahraini government as a reformed, credible, responsible, non-authoritative 
regime, which, according to some of these frames, was the victim of foreign 
conspiracy. Thus, all the frames and the strategies they depict contest the 
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‘Arab Spring’ framing by excluding a crisis portrayal, or blaming the crisis on 
foreign conspiracy. “Limiting”, “minimising”, or “ignoring” a crisis is a popular 
response by professional communicators in Arab and Middle-Eastern 
countries to problematic situations even before the Arab Spring (Avraham, 
2015, p. 228). While this is observed in the context of promoting Middle-
Eastern countries as tourist destinations, the frame analysis in this thesis 
suggests it is an approach used by Bahraini public diplomacy to deal with 
accusations of human rights’ violations which could increase associations 
between the Bahraini protests and the Arab Spring.  
Beyond the frames, the research contributes to public diplomacy research 
by exploring what crisis response strategies as offered by Benoit’s (1995) 
image repair theory (IRT) are represented by the analysed frames, keeping in 
mind that the term ‘strategy’ in this context does not necessarily involve 
strategic intent by the organisation or individuals putting the message together. 
The identified strategies were: denial, minimisation, shifting the blame, 
bolstering, differentiation, and attacking the accuser. The combination of these 
strategies in BNA’s analysed content also suggests that Bahraini public 
diplomacy responses to the examined protests denied a crisis caused by 
internal issues between segments of the Shiite community in Bahrain and the 
Sunni authorities. Employing Benoit’s (1995) theory in the current study 
extends its use beyond Western contexts, where it was developed and widely 
applied (Towner, 2009). Using the IRT here shows how Bahraini public 
diplomacy messages to foreign media and publics during the examined crisis 
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represented some of the most common image repair strategies identified in a 
Western context.   
Other than offering insights on a non-Western context, employing the IRT 
in my study contributes to the limited research using the theory in a public 
diplomacy context, especially as it is widely used to study corporate crises 
(Lyu, 2012, p. 779; Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 214; Schultz & Raupp, 2010, p. 113; 
Siew-Yoong Low et al., 2010, p. 191; Zhang & Benoit, 2004, p. 162). My 
research finds that the image repair strategies represented by the analysed 
frames are similar to what previous studies suggest about nations’ responses 
to crises, particularly employing responses that do not admit responsibility for 
wrongdoing (Benoit, 1997; Peijuan et al., 2009, p. 216). Rather, saving a 
nation’s image in this regard is significant for its empowerment and dignity, 
and therefore, is less likely to admit guilt in its crisis responses even when 
there is evidence (Peijuan et al., 2009). Instead of admitting guilt, a common 
public diplomacy response to crises is ‘blaming the other’ to reduce its 
responsibility for offensive acts (Mor, 2009, 228). This was observed in 
Bahraini public diplomacy responses to the crisis, especially through the 
‘existential threat’ and the ‘sovereignty’ frames which represent image repair 
strategies of ‘shifting the blame’ and ‘attacking the accuser’ respectively. Thus, 
as observed by previous studies on nations’ responses to crises, Bahraini 
public diplomacy messages in response to the examined crisis did not employ 
any discourse strategies that admit guilt.    
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A further contribution of my research’s framework and findings is that 
existing literature on public diplomacy framing focuses on the factors that 
influence the success or failure of public diplomacy frames in appearing in 
media content (Entman, 2008; Jungblut, 2017; Melki & Jabado, 2016; Sheafer 
et al., 2014; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009; Yarchi et al., 2013; Zhang, 2006). The 
current study shifts focus in public diplomacy frame-building research by 
examining the background processes and factors connected to the articulation 
of specific frames in public diplomacy texts written by professional 
communicators and not journalists. This is specifically done here by applying 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchal model of influence, a media 
research model, to organise our understanding of public diplomacy frame-
building factors at five different levels: individual, professional, organisational, 
external, and ideological. Using this media theory to explore a public 
diplomacy context also responds to academic calls to study public diplomacy 
using frameworks from other relevant disciplines to help us understand how 
public diplomacy works (Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 211; Gilboa, 2008, p. 75).  
Employing the model in this thesis delivered insights on factors connected 
to public diplomacy frame-building at different levels, and how these factors 
interact rather than work in isolation. Such insights are not limited to the 
understanding of the articulation of frames, but also the (IRT) discourse 
strategies represented by these frames. The significance of combining 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model with the IRT here is also highlighted by 
delivering insights on the level of strategic intent in the background processes 
of designing public diplomacy frames, which also represent specific crisis 
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response strategies. The interview analysis revealed that the main factors 
connected to frame-building at the IAA/BNA during the examined crisis were: 
limited crisis communication experience (individual level); absence of senior 
decision making (professional level); promoting positive news (professional 
level); redefining the situation by government representatives without 
addressing internal problematic issues in Bahrain (organisational level); 
employing foreign public relations’ companies (organisational level); visiting 
foreign media organisations (organisational level); IAA/BNA’s unpreparedness 
for a crisis (organisational level); foreign media’s negative coverage (external 
level); social media (external level); negotiations between the authorities and 
political societies (external level); and the sectarian conflicts (ideological level).  
The interactions between several factors form different levels of influence 
at different stages of the crisis show similarity with common background 
contexts influencing crisis response. Examples of these are the difficulty of 
framing crises that unfold quickly (Coombs, 2011, p. 220), crises disruption of 
established work routines (Cloudman & Hallahan, 2006, p. 367; Coombs, 
2006, p. 172; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997, p. 280), the strong influence of 
media on government decisions during crises (Lee, 2009, p. 75), and how 
crises create framing contests between relevant actors to win media attention 
and favourable coverage (Entman, 2003, p. 417; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009, p. 
449; Yarchi et al., 2013, p. 270).  
Another finding is the Bahraini government lack of preparedness to handle 
national crises with such international exposure. The significance of this sits in 
the fact that the Bahraini authorities worked on rebranding the country as a 
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reformed nation since 2000 (Govers, 2012, p. 52; Karolak, 2012, p. 4; Karolak, 
2014, p. 97; Ulrichsen, 2013, p. 1; Wright, 2008, p, 12). However, it did not 
seem to prepare for a potential crisis that would threaten its very efforts of 
presenting Bahrain in the international arena as a reformed country.  
Nevertheless, the research revealed how the examined crisis triggered the 
Bahraini government to take some steps to prepare for potential future crises 
and deal with the consequences of this crisis. Examples of these are training 
the BNA communicators, and developing strategies to deal with the challenges 
arising from the 2011 crisis. This suggests that the examined crisis could be a 
turning point in the practice of Bahraini public diplomacy, especially in terms 
of devoting further efforts to assure the promotion of messages that support 
the authorities’ policies, and thus, its power status. Nations’ rising interest in 
public diplomacy was most of the time a direct reaction to a downturn in foreign 
perceptions of their nations and the recognition of the significance of a nation’s 
favourable image abroad to achieve its foreign policy goals (Melissen, 2005a, 
p. 9; Fitzpatrick, 2007, p. 194). This is not to suggest that Bahrain did not 
engage in public diplomacy before the crisis, especially as it worked on 
improving the nation’s image abroad since 2000. Yet, it is suggested that the 
2011 crisis drew the Bahraini government’s attention to the significance of 
devoting further efforts to promote their favoured messages when its image is 
threatened among significant foreign publics. The crisis was a turning point in 
public diplomacy, because the government adopted a lot more strategic 
approach to crisis communication, media relations and communication in 
general, cultivated media relations, started utilizing social media.   
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The findings of this research suggest that the Bahraini public diplomacy 
responses to the 2011 crisis correspond to realist conceptualisations of public 
diplomacy, which are argued to be the most reflective of how public diplomacy 
is practiced in the real world (Fisher, 2010, p. 277; Zhang & Swartz, 2009, p. 
383). Within such conceptualisations, realist public diplomacy is perceived as 
a power tool in the hands of the sponsoring government to support and 
maintain its power position in the international relations environment (Zhang & 
Swartz, 2009, p. 383). The analysis in this thesis revealed how all the 
communicated frames, and the frame-building activities tended to 
communicate the government’s favoured messages, which could 
subsequently maintain the power status of the authorities in face of 
accusations of human rights’ violations. Therefore, based on the findings of 
this research, I suggest that this could be presented as a definition of public 
diplomacy from a critical perspective, especially as it highlights the centrality 
of maintaining power in the practice of public diplomacy. This thesis worked 
through the lens of the social constructivist paradigm, yet, I suggest that future 
research can look into public diplomacy from a critical philosophical stance to 
focus on addressing power issues in the practice of public diplomacy.   
Although this thesis contributes to the limited research on Bahraini public 
diplomacy, especially in a crisis context, it does not capture a comprehensive 
account of the Bahraini government’s framing during the examined crisis. The 
BNA English website is only one communication platform used, and owned, 
by the Bahraini government during the examined crisis. Bahrain Television 
(BTV) – the official television channel in Bahrain, for instance, is another state-
 305  
  
owned communication platform used during the 2011 crisis to deliver the 
Bahraini government’s messages to domestic publics. According to BICI 
findings, BTV was accused of sectarian discrimination and defamation of some 
Bahraini Shi’a during the crisis (BICI, 2011, pp. 421-422). On the other hand, 
the analysis in my research revealed that frames present in BNA’s analysed 
content are not articulated through any references that emphasise the 
sectarian aspect of the situation, or used any references to sects. If any, 
references to the sectarian dimension of the situation were only implicitly 
suggested by references to Iran, which has deep-rooted ideological tensions 
with the monarchs of the GCC countries, especially on sectarian grounds. 
Therefore, future research can look into government messages communicated 
through other platforms to generate more comprehensive understanding of the 
co-construction of specific versions of reality by the Bahraini government 
during the 2011 crisis and its aftermath.   
Moreover, it should be noted that the discussion of the implications of 
the analysed frames and image repair strategies in the current study is not 
built on systematic analysis of the effects of these frames or discourse 
strategies because it is beyond the focus of this thesis. Rather, the discussion 
on implications mainly builds on insights from previous research about events 
and actors relevant to the examined crisis. I suggest that insights on the effects 
and implications of the frames and the response strategies can be developed 
in future research by looking into other phases of Scheufele’s (1999) framing 
model, which offers a framework to do this systematically.   
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Although the frames analysed in this thesis are issue-specific, they can 
be used not only in future research looking at government messages on 
platforms other than the BNA website, but also in comparative studies 
examining public diplomacy framing by other Arab governments in the wider 
context of the Arab Spring. The frames can be also fruitful in future research 
taking a social constructivist approach to examine how the examined crisis is 
co-constructed by other actors relevant to the Bahraini crisis. Other than the 
frames, the crisis response strategies identified in this research can be used 
in future research to examine any patterns in Bahraini public diplomacy 
responses to other crises, and explore the level of strategic intent in employing 
certain ‘strategies’ and frames over others.  
Besides the frames and discourse strategies analysed in this thesis, 
insights on background processes and factors connected to frame-building 
can contribute to future studies on Bahraini public diplomacy handling of other 
crises that unfold after the 2011 crisis, or other consequences of the 2011 
crisis. Such studies can examine any difference or similarity in the Bahraini 
public diplomacy activities of constructing specific versions of reality in its 
messages. This is specifically significant as the current research revealed the 
lack of experience and preparedness to handle national crises under 
international scrutiny, and argued the 2011 crisis is a turning point in the 
practice of Bahraini public diplomacy. A recent study, for example, indicates 
that in the aftermath of revealing the findings of BICI report, the Bahraini 
government invited celebrities in the capacity of their respective professions to 
Bahrain (e.g. musicians; singers; pop stars), and those praise their visits to the 
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Kingdom using rhetoric that mirrors that of the state (Jones, 2017, p. 326). 
Moreover, in late 2011, the CEO of the IAA announced that Bahrain was 
launching a new satellite channel and posting media counsels overseas “to 
project the truth abroad and debunk fallacies and lies” (Brown, 2011). In 
December 2016, also, the National Communication Center was established, 
and one of its responsibilities is to handle government communications in 
crises (alwatannews, 2017; alwasatnews, 2016). Thus, future research on 
Bahraini public diplomacy can examine whether and how the Bahraini 
government employment of such initiatives, or any other image repair 
endeavours is connected to any learnt lessons or experience from the 
examined crisis.  
Beyond the case of Bahrain, I suggest future research can employ 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model in public diplomacy studies, and extend 
it to explore public diplomacy in other cultural contexts. I also suggest 
combining this with the other frameworks employed in this thesis: frame 
analysis and the IRT to help generate more comprehensive understanding of 
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APPENDIX 3: SAMPLE OF ONE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT   
 
 
- In my research, I’m working on the concept of public diplomacy. We don’t use 
this label in Bahrain, but the practice of government communication targeted at 
publics of other nations is still observed in Bahrain. I’m specifically focusing on 
the aspect of media relations within public diplomacy.   
- Okay. 
- So, what I want to know is how BNA or IAA as the main governmental 
communication platform during the examined crisis communicated its 
messages about Bahrain during the timeframes of focus? How it framed 
Bahrain? This is one thing I’m looking at, and I intend to explore it through 
interviews with people who were involved in message writing and decision 
making during the crisis. The other thing is the news articles published by BNA 
during the crisis. I’m not focusing on confidential texts communicated at the 
time. I’m interested in what was actually published.   
- Are you interested in certain timeframes within the crisis? 
- Yes, the peak moments within the 2011 crisis: the beginning of the crisis, the 
events of February and March 2011, and the publication of BICI report. 
- Okay. In terms of the published news, I’ll arrange for you to meet someone to 
show you how to access the data you need. If you want they can provide you 
with a soft copy of everything. It may take them a day or two, maximum, if you 
want them to prepare soft copies. 
- Excellent. 
- So how did we deal with the events from a media perspective. At the beginning 
of the 2011 crisis, we didn’t know how to deal with media regarding the events 
in Bahrain. Definitely, the situation was strange to us; no one expected it. We 
don’t have any previous experience in handling it. There were troubles in more 
than one country and we were watching. We were shocked. So the shock 
resulted, in the first 3-4 days, in unclear media vision. What is our direction, 
where are we going with this, how to use language, what approaches should 
we use? We didn’t know. So, an emergency media team was formed. It 
contained senior people from IAA and communicators from other government 
entities. The team’s mission was to closely observe the situation: monitor, 
analyse, and then suggest how to deal with the situation... We started 
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preparing news drafts ahead based on expectations and scenarios in the 
region. Then we tried to get approval on our messages and be ready. 
- Okay. 
- After the fourth or fifth day, there started to be more focus on Bahrain. There 
were statements coming from countries, and stances from countries that didn’t 
know what exactly was happening in Bahrain. Therefore, the target was to 
present the situation to foreign media outlets. 
- Can you remember when exactly? 
- I can’t remember it was chaotic. We were late in many things in terms of the 
steps taken to respond to foreign media. But it was also never too late. We 
started to focus on foreign media… an emergency media team was formed to 
work within IAA. The team was considered an emergency media team to 
handle the communications during that time. The team was important 
especially as false news started to spread and increase at the level of 
information about the victims, the deaths, the detentions, everything, even the 
vocabulary used…  As a news agency our role was to communicate with all 
agencies we had agreements with, and which operate in different languages: 
Russian, Chinese, Italian, Indian, German, and French. We started to activate 
our work with each agency we had agreement or cooperation with by directly 
communicating with them to assure the delivery of Bahrain’s news and the true 
situation. After the crisis, we expanded the activation of these agreements. We 
increased our co-operation with these agencies to continue our media battle of 
correcting the false image about Bahrain and defend Bahrain in foreign media. 
BNA’s role was to communicate daily with these agencies and send our news 
to them through the Wires system. We also used emails. We established a 
database for the most popular journalists and writers interested in the events in 
Arab countries and Bahraini affairs. So, we sent them a daily package 
containing news, images, and videos to show them the image on daily bases 
and to communicate the official stance. the videos were used to assure they 
get the true image on what is happening. 
On a later stage, we also used journalists’ visits. We invite journalists. When they 
come and see the situation with their naked eyes, they tend to believe more. When an 
image or a video is sent, they might think it is fabricated. Or they think we are trying to 
glorify the image of the government. So decision makers decided to invite journalists 
to Bahrain. And the visits actually started. I won’t say that they changed their 
perspective 100%, but they started to be convinced on what it is really happening in 
Bahrain.    
- So all these procedures were initiated as a result of the crisis? 
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- Yes, a result. On the communicative level, no one was ready to handle a crisis 
like this. But we started to learn, every day we go through an experience and 
we learn from it. We also started to learn from others’ experiences. We started 
observing how other countries dealt with problematic events, and we started to 
correct our previous approaches. We did well in certain places, but we also 
failed in others due to the lack of information. 
The visits by foreign journalists had more positive than negative effect. It was not our 
goal to change their perceptions. Our goal was to let them see with their own eyes. 
So we started to observe that some of them finally started to write objectively. We 
also found, through the journalists who used to visit Bahrain, that some of them used 
to enter the country as tourists but pursue their journalistic work as soon as they 
arrive. Some of them used to come with a prepared agenda to meet a certain person 
and leave. So we tried to make sure, we don’t want to change their opinion, but at 
least we want our voice to be heard too. We want our statements to be also included 
in their coverage. Honestly, some journalists were professional as they responded 
well to this, either Arab or foreign journalists. Some journalists, no, they have a 
specific agenda- they leave the airport to meet a certain person, and they say they 
don’t want our opinion. 
- Were those the same journalists who entered Bahrain as tourists? 
-  Many of them entered as tourists, although Bahrain doesn’t prevent the entry 
of journalists. The IAA was ready to welcome any journalist. Our only condition 
was, if you are covering a story in Bahrain take both opinions. This was the 
only condition. We will not interfere in your journalistic work, or what to write, 
but include different perspectives. 
- Did you start working with any foreign media platforms, news agencies, media 
organisation which you never dealt with before as a result of the crisis? 
- Many. After the crisis we initiated work with many media organisations we 
didn’t work with before. We activated agreements with the Spanish and Italian. 
In India, we are now working with the biggest news agency, PTI. We expanded 
the agreement with the Russian. We initiated cooperation with China and 
South Korea. We have agreements with the French and now negotiating 
expansion. With the Spanish our goal is to cover Latin America because we 
did not have a voice reached there... in the Arab region we increased 
cooperation with the Egyptian news agency as the situation changed there and 
the image on the Bahraini situation did not reach Egyptian people clearly. The 
Bahraini image did not reach many Arab publics. So we had to activate 
agreements with many Arab countries to publish news about Bahrain daily, 
and deliver the true image. 
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- As we are still discussing the beginning of the crisis, you told me that there 
were many things you learnt after the crisis. Didn’t you have a clear strategy 
before the crisis? At the BNA? At the IAA? Did you apply the concept of 
strategic planning? 
- There were only general plans. But the events that occurred imposed many 
things that we did not consider earlier. 
- Do you believe strategic planning was implemented at any stage? 
- Maybe in certain sectors to handle some crisis experiences on organisational 
level in ministries. But unprecedented comprehensive crisis on military, 
security, economic, and political levels was a new experience. 
- Okay. Would you like to continue the discussion on the strategy at other stages 
of the crisis or do you want to talk about messages now? 
- No, strategies. After a year from the events, or immediately after the events, 
there were work plans. But as strategies, a year after the crisis there were two 
strategies. One developed by Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohammad to improve 
Bahraini media and deal with the challenges arising from the crisis. The other 
strategy was put by Samira Rajab. It was about the media and improving it. 
Both strategies involved the communication challenges we faced in 2011 and 
how to deal with it. 
- How were these post-crisis strategies developed? Research? External 
agencies? Or by seniors at IAA? 
- The first one was put with the help of a company, but the consultants were 
from all the media sectors inside and out the IAA. The second was through 
internal consultants besides the executive faculty at the IAA… 
- Would you like to discuss anything on the motives of employing external 
agencies and not IAA staff to develop strategies? 
- It was the vision of the minister. The leadership of the ministry. 
- So all this happened after 2011? 
- Yes. 
- Was this in general, or there was something specifically done at the time of 
publishing BICI report? 
- As I told you, the strategy was to meet the challenges that they both met, each 
one at a time different from the other. But there wasn’t a plan in action. Our 
media was always criticized for not keeping up with the challenges facing the 
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country. I agree to some extent, and don’t agree at the same time. To what 
extent we managed to deliver our message. Well, there were a lot of efforts, 
but we also need to know there was agenda against Bahrain. If they wanted 
the Bahraini voice to be heard, they would have allowed it. But, the goal was to 
mute the Bahraini voice. The political dimension was way more dominant than 
media issues.   
- Was there any documentation of this strategy? Even for purposes of internal 
communication? 
-  Yes, it was. 
- Can I take a look at the document? 
- I may find you a copy. 
- Is it a confidential document? 
- No, it was published online. I’ll try to find you a copy if it is still available. I think 
it is too old now to be found online. 
- Was there something specifically developed for the publication of BICI report? 
A special strategy? We are now discussing the third timeframe, unless you 
want to discuss something about the first two. 
- Not really. 
It was a historical event for Bahrain. The report. We didn’t know the details that will be 
in the report. But we were prepared to communicate the truth as soon as possible. 
Everybody was waiting for BICI report. The whole world is watching, media channels; 
citizens; everyone. So, as a news agency, we made sure to be the first voice to 
transmit the results as soon as possible. So we were there. Of course, we prepared 
reports about the significance of this topic. We didn’t know the content, so we didn’t 
even have any analysis of the findings, or expectations on what will happen. But, we 
knew there will be a speech by Bassioni, and a speech by his majesty the king. This 
is the scenario we had. And there is a report that will be approved. So we were there 
at the ceremony. We were broadcasting live for those who couldn’t watch TV, so they 
can watch through the internet. After that, since the king and Bassioni’s speeches 
started, we started broadcasting as soon as possible through social media or Twitter. 
We wanted to assure that the published news is correct. It is true that there was more 
than one media platform covering the event, but we gave the best credibility 
especially as people were waiting for the truth and they wanted to hear it from the 
news agency. 
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After this, we started the analysis phase. Publishing the report on BNA’s website for 
two years. The original report was available for two years; we then replaced it with the 
report of the follow-up committee.  
- Did you prepare any messages on the publication of the report before it was 
actually published? About this project in particular? 
- Sure, we prepared a media plan. After a while there was a comprehensive 
media plan on what to talk, this event, this project, this step taken by Bahrain. 
A step no one dared to take before- to invite a foreign committee to investigate 
the events in your country. The main goal was to focus on this effort. The other 
thing is, we did not expect the existing scenario as we did not know the content 
of the report. It could be something positive or negative in the report. We were 
ready to share everything, really. The King’s order was to publish the full report 
as it is. So the full detailed report was published on BNA’s website to work as a 
scientific resource for anyone interested in the case of Bahrain. 
- We know when the report was published it created further challenges for 
Bahrain. What was next? Did you change anything about your 
communications? Was something new established? 
- The goal of media communications was as the plan. On the level of news 
agencies, we share news with them as soon as possible. For social media 
specifically, we started to use it more. After accepting the report’s findings, we 
entered the phase of implementing the recommendations of the report. So the 
challenge of the media plan was always emphasising the implementation of 
the recommendations. Emphasise the government’s seriousness about the 
recommendations. This was the main message- Bahrain is serious about 
implementing the recommendations of BICI. We established special sections 
on the website, and we published news there, and updated it with images to 
show the government’s seriousness about the implementation of the 
recommendations. 
- Didn’t this lead, as at the beginning of the crisis, to establishing new 
communication activities or news networks? I understood form what you said 
that social media was one thing.   
- In the first year we established a main database. After this, any VIP, guest, or 
figure interested in Bahrain’s affairs was added to this list. So the database 
grew like a snowball. At least our goal was to do something correctly- we 
established a database for contacts and we communicated with them on daily 
bases. This database is still growing today.  
-  Is it correct what I understood about focusing on social media after publishing 
the report? 
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- The social media revolution surfaced during the events in Arab countries. It 
was the fastest platform to deliver information and to build an image. The 
attacks started from social media. The false news started from social media. 
The threats started from social media. Harassing publics started from social 
media. So we had to be present as an official and media organisation and 
perform as the only official source of government messages. 
- Were all these plans put at the IAA or BNA, or were there external 
contributors? 
- We continuously, almost daily, work on reports about the country’s 
accomplishments under the umbrella of BICI’s findings. We also utilise info-
graphics- we use it on social media. We also use PDF images. We try to keep 
up with what is published on BNA’s website by publishing it on social media 
too. 
- Did anything change after this phase? After publishing the report? 
- In my personal opinion, the report experience was shocking to many countries. 
No one expected Bahrain to be this brave. To open doors and implement the 
project, no one expected it. The other surprise was Bahrain’s, under the 
leadership of his majesty the king, acceptance of the entire recommendations. 
It was expected that, like any country Bahrain would reject the 
recommendations, or accuse the committee to distance the truth. Bahrain’s 
goal was to know the truth about the vents. It believed in the committee and 
gave it all authority. The biggest challenge was to accept all recommendations 
without exceptions. And the last thing is the implementation of the 
recommendations.  
- I want to go back to media messages at the beginning of the crisis. Were you 
focused on specific messages before 2011 and then changed it? Did you 
change your media tone? 
- … 
- Okay.  
- We only started to have messages after 3-4 days about what to say and what 
we need to do. As I told you, we did not have information; there was an 
absence of decision making during a specific time. What is happening, what to 
say, we did not know. Journalists and media people would call and we did not 
know what to tell them. The situation was not clear, the information was not 
clear. 
- Do you remember these messages? Are there any documents? 
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- … 
- Okay, I understand. 
Can I have a moment to revise my questions and make sure if I missed something? 
- Okay and I will try to find if there is any document on the messages. 
- So, was there any other department at the IAA responsible for communicating 
the messages with foreign media? 
- Just the agency. 
- Was the cooperation with foreign media platforms successful with all of them, 
or do you feel there are some that didn’t respond and continued as it was? 
- We did not aim to pressure foreign media as much as we aimed to deliver our 
voice. To be honest, there were countries which supported us, knew the 
situation, and published everything we wanted. In other countries we only 
hoped to get our voice to them without pressuring them. We believed that as 
long as they started to publish news about Bahrain then we must get our voice 
heard in their own language. Not as a response, but included in the story.  
… 
- I want to ask about the daily processes, how did the BNA work on producing 
materials targeting foreign media? 
- There is a point I want to mention, which establishing a unit at the IAA for news 
exchange. Previously we only published through Wires- we broadcast, finish, 
and goodbye. Now no. we have a follow-up unit introduced to the 
organisational chart. It is not just a name, but a unit in the organisational chart. 
The mission of the news exchange unit is to follow-up with the news agencies 
to assure the activation of our agreements with them, not just signing an 
agreement and that’s it. This assures follow-up for both sides- they publish, 
and we publish.  
Okay, so you asked me about the daily processes at the BNA. 
- Sorry, can you just tell me when was this unit introduced? 
- 2013. As an idea of a project it started in 2013. But it only started to function 
lately. 
- Okay, you can continue now where I interrupted you. 
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- Okay, so how the BNA works and the daily process. As news agency, we have 
more than one news source. We either have ready press releases received 
from ministries, or an event covered by the agency’s media team. We also 
have news published through Arab, Gulf, or foreign news agencies... We have 
agreements with some agencies so we publish their news, and they publish 
ours… After receiving news from different sources, we have a team comprised 
of editors and a chief editor. Tasks are allocated by the chief editor: you cover 
this story, you cover that. After this, the news returns to the chief editor and 
he/she publishes it on the wires service for international reach. Then we have 
the Internet team who takes the news from the wires system and publishes it 
on our website. Now we also use social media with all its tools. We now also 
have people to follow-up when we have important news story that must be 
delivered in hand or phone. We now have a unit for networking with other news 
agencies, or through emails, SMS, or WhatsApp groups to send them the 
news, and kindly ask them to take care of this story. 
- Is this the unit introduced in 2013, or was it there before? 
- Yes. Before it used to happen spontaneously. But to organise our work better 
we introduced this unit to handle follow-up. All news agencies receive our 
news. Yet, if we a have a news story which we want to emphasise, we need to 
communicate on a personal or administrative level: please can you take care 
of this story by emphasising or publishing it? You know, every agency receives 
hundreds of news every day, and therefore is not obliged to publish your news. 
But with good relationships and by highlighting their news and vice versa you 
create a good relationship, and build mutual respect to be able to publish any 
news you want in the future. 
- Did you need to train any of the people who handled the writing of the 
messages during the different stages of the crisis? Did you need to bring new 
people? 
- We needed to bring more people to help with the English language. We 
needed support with translating from Arabic to English and vice versa. We 
needed support in writing and revising our statements to make sure it is 
accurate. We needed support in translation and articulation of messages. We 
needed to make sure the messages are clear and accurate. 
... 
- I remember you telling me that at the beginning of the crisis your work was 
hampered by the need for approvals on the messages. 
- Yes, no one knew what is happening, what is the situation, what is the crisis, 
what will happen, what is the scenario. Until 3-4 days, things became a bit 
clearer, and we all became on the same track… 
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- I want to make sure I got this correctly. Were the written materials only 
targeted at foreign media, or was it used for other purposes too? 
- We mainly publish our news items on the website. This is the first step so 
foreign media can see it. We also send these items to the local press, and 
email the same material to foreign media.  
- So was this the main process? 
- Yes. Sometimes we also need to wait on certain messages to get approval and 
assure the accuracy of the information. Sometimes there is a press 
conference, and we need to contact the person in charge to make sure this is 
what they mean.  
- You mention that you monitor the news published across foreign media 
platforms, agencies, or other sources. Did the materials published foreign 
platforms have any connections with how you write your messages? 
- Can you explain? 
- Do you monitor foreign media and adjust your own messages accordingly? 
- … 
- So does the material you observe influence your own messages? 
- Normally. … 
- So, did you need to change anything?  
- If we find that the image is still not clear in certain areas, we increase the news 
published in that sector. If there is an agency that always uses a wrong 
background, we try to deliver the correct image, and that this background you 
are using is false information. Repeatedly publishing false information, so we 
have to intervene. Our role of intervening is to draw their attention to the false 
information. 
- Were there any major incidents you can tell me about? 
- We usually struggled with Reuters, and the French and German news 
agencies. They always used a fixed background in their news about Bahrain. 
They kept saying it was ruled by Sunni family, or Sunni minority and Shi’a 
majority. This language is not used in the country’s system, neither in its law. 
So, they are triggering sectarian fallacy and sectarian tensions. They are telling 
the Sunnis they are the majority, or telling the Shiite they are the majority. They 
must not write in this way. I don’t see them saying in their news about Britain 
that Protestants are more than Catholics, or Catholics are more than 
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Protestants as a fixed background. It was obvious that they intended to put this 
[sectarian message] as a fixed message. 
- Was there anything that could have been done differently at the time? 
- With the first shock we were not ready. Then we tried to prepare ourselves 
within the resources we have. There were improvising. In certain places we did 
well, and in others we didn’t. So after this we had to stop or correct where to 
point our compass.  
- What are the lessons the IAA and BNA learned from this experience? 
- In general, we need to have a well-studied plan, and to have well-prepared 
communicators to implement this plan. We have challenges now in terms of 
employment. In any government organisation in any country, you can find a 
problem in this area. We learnt a lot from this crisis. As communicators we 
learnt how to respond and interact, how to perceive different events, how to 
use language, tone, and articulate. We needed training of course. So we 
started various training programmes to handle media in crises: spokesperson, 
online media, translation, political analysis. All these training programmes did 
not exist before, but due to the crisis we had to adapt, and change even our 
training programmes.  
- In terms of communicating with foreign media in specific, was there something 
where you said this we must change? 
- It is easier now, when a level of trust is built. When there’s any foreign media 
representative that wants to visit Bahrain, the procedure is easier. The follow-
up is easier. There is more trust now in the official Bahraini media or in the 
BNA. Our news is always present. At the same time, we don’t prevent them 
from using our news and adding opinions and comments. The most important 
thing is that the BNA message or the official message is present in their news.  
- Is there anything you’d like to add on any of the topics we discussed today? 
- No, I believe this is all I have. Can I contact you if  I remember anything? 
- Of course, please do. You have my phone number and email. 
- You can get in touch too if you need to ask more questions. 
- Thank you…
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